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HOW LAW MATTERED TO THE MONO LAKE
ECOSYSTEM1
SHERRY A. ENZLER, J.D.*
M[ono] L[ake] lies in a lifeless, treeless, hideous
desert, eight thousand feet above the level of the sea . . . . This
solemn, silent, sailless sea—this lonely tenant of the loneliest
spot on earth—is little graced with the picturesque. . . .
The lake is two hundred feet deep, and its sluggish
waters are so strong with alkali that if you only dip the most
hopelessly soiled garment into them once or twice, and wring
it out, it will be found as clean as if it had been through the
ablest of washerwomen’s hands. . . .
. . . .
Half a dozen little mountain brooks flow into Mono
Lake, but not a stream of any kind flows out of it. It neither
rises nor falls, apparently, and what it does with its surplus
water is a dark and bloody mystery.2
–Mark Twain
In the West, it is said, water flows uphill toward
money. And it literally does, as it leaps three thousand feet
1 Michael McCann argues that the key empirical question about the relationship between
law and social change is “[h]ow law does and does not matter” to social change. Michael
McCann, Law and Social Movements: Contemporary Perspectives, 2 ANN. REV. L. SOC.
SCI. 17, 19 (2006) [hereinafter McCann (2006)].
* Resident Research Fellow, Institute on the Environment, Department of Forest Resources,
University of Minnesota, senzler@umn.edu; Adjunct Professor, William Mitchell College
of Law. In preparing this article I am indebted to both Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold and
John Hart for their detailed case studies of the events surrounding the restoration of the
Mono Lake Ecosystem. I would also like to thank Prof. Dorothy Anderson, North Carolina
State University; Prof. Brad Karkkainen, Mondale School of Law, University of Minnesota
and Prof. Kristen Nelson, Department of Forest Resources, University of Minnesota, for
taking the time to explore the mesh of social science and legal concepts analyzed in this
article and for reviewing multiple drafts of this article. Their guidance and support with
this project has been immeasurable. I must also thank Prof. J. David Prince and Prof.
Marcia Gelpe, William Mitchell College of Law, for their thoughtful review and comments
on earlier drafts of this article and the Consortium on Law and Values in Health,
Environment and the Life Sciences at the University of Minnesota for providing financial
support for this project.
2 1 MARK TWAIN, ROUGHING IT 259, 262 (Harper & Bros. ed., P.F. Colier & Son Co. 1913)
(1871) (emphasis omitted).
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across the Tehachapi Mountains in gigantic siphons to slake
the thirst of Los Angeles . . . .
It still isn’t enough.3
–Marc Reisner
ABSTRACT
The 2005 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Board reported
unprecedented degradation of ecosystems and the services they provide
to human well-being which, if allowed to continue, would adversely affect
human health, security, and welfare. Our environmental legal authori-
ties, however, are not designed to protect the health of our nation’s eco-
systems, focusing instead on clean air, clean land, and clean water as a
single medium, often referred to as the silo approach to environmental
protection. Protecting ecosystems requires a systemic approach to the
environment in both policy and law; this in turn requires a change in our
approach to environmental protection. How do we motivate such a change
in our legal constructs and political systems? This is a question posed by
a number of communities and states struggling with the concept of eco-
system protection. This article postulates that the strategic use of litiga-
tion by environmental social movements can destabilize established legal
constructs to protect ecosystems. Using the case study of Mono Lake, I
examine the role law played in the struggle to change the political and
social systems necessary to protect the Mono Lake Ecosystem—that is,
how and if law mattered to the protection of the Mono Lake Ecosystem.
I further hypothesize how other social movements might use law to
protect ecosystems.
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INTRODUCTION—WHY ECOSYSTEMS MATTER4
In 2005, the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Board reported
that “[h]uman activity is putting such strain on the natural functions of
Earth that the ability of the planet’s ecosystem[5] to sustain future gen-
erations can no longer be taken for granted.”6
4 See generally Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold & Leigh A. Jewell, Litigation’s Bounded
Effectiveness and the Real Public Trust Doctrine: The Aftermath of the Mono Lake Case,
8 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1 (2001); JOHN HART, STORM OVER MONO: THE
MONO LAKE BATTLE AND THE CALIFORNIA WATER FUTURE (1996).
5 What constitutes an ecosystem is much debated among ecologists, but for purposes of
this article the definition provided by A.G. Tansley will suffice. Tansley defines an eco-
system as the ecological system or biological community that occurs in a given locale and
the physical and chemical factors that make up the system’s non-living or abiotic environ-
ment. A.G. Tansley, The Use and Abuse of Vegetational Concepts and Terms, 16 ECOLOGY
284, 299 (1935).
6 MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT BD., LIVING BEYOND OUR MEANS: NATURAL ASSETS
AND HUMAN WELL-BEING 5 (2005) [hereinafter MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT BD.,
LIVING BEYOND OUR MEANS].
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Ecosystems provide extensive services to human well-being.7 These
services can be divided into four categories:
1. Provisioning Services: products or commodities ob-
tained from ecosystems and used for consumptive
purposes including food, fiber, fuel, genetic medici-
nal, fresh water, energy, and ornamental;8
2. Regulating Services: including air quality, climate
regulation, water regulation (i.e. timing of runoff,
groundwater recharge, flooding), water purification
and waste treatment, disease and pest regulation,
pollination, and natural hazard regulation;9
3. Cultural Services: including contributions to spir-
itual and religious values; knowledge of systems;
educational, inspirational and cultural heritage;
our sense of place, and aesthetic and recreational
values;10 and
4. Supporting Services: including soil formation, photo-
synthesis, nutrient cycling, water cycling and pri-
mary production.11
The destruction of watershed-based ecosystems12 and their services can
adversely affect human health, security, and general human welfare.13
7 Ecosystem services are “the benefits people obtain from ecosystems.” MILLENNIUM ECO-
SYSTEM ASSESSMENT BD., ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: WETLANDS AND WATER:
SYNTHESIS, at v (2005) [hereinafter MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT BD., SYNTHESIS].




12 Ecosystems exist in hierarchies, thus a pond may support a localized ecosystem that
exists within the context of a larger ecosystem situated within a watershed system that
supports numerous interacting ecosystems. KENNETH N. BROOKS ET AL., HYDROLOGY AND
THE MANAGEMENT OF WATERSHEDS3–4 (3d ed. 2003). A watershed is defined by Brooks
et al. as a
topographically delineated area drained by a stream system; that is,
the total land area above some point on a stream or river that drains
past that point. The watershed is a hydrologic unit often used as a
physical-biological unit and a socioeconomic-political unit for the plan-
ning and management of natural resources.
Id. at xiii.
13 See MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT BD., LIVING BEYOND OUR MEANS, supra note
6, at 5.
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For example, destruction of ecosystems within watersheds may affect the
ability of an ecosystem to purify water (a regulating function), which in
turn may increase disease and decrease the amount of water available for
human consumption (a provisioning service), which in turn may decrease
personal security and social cohesion (a cultural service).14
To preserve ecosystems, the scientific community has moved to a
systems approach to environmental management.15 This approach focuses
on natural systems within geographic parameters such as watersheds,
wildlife habitat, or airshed and on “maintain[ing] the integrity of . . .
interdependent natural systems” within those parameters to “insure [sic]
sustainable resource development opportunities” and to “preserve . . .
valuable resources.”16 “[E]ffective ecosystem management requires that
land managers identify and analyze the full impact, both cumulatively and
geographically, of management proposals on existing resource systems to
minimize the disruption or fragmentation of ecosystem processes.”17
This systems approach to environmental management is not re-
flected in our traditional approach to environmental policy that developed
in the early 1970s.18 Environmental policy and law historically sought to
minimize human impacts on the environment.19 These historic constructs
addressed human-environment interactions from the perspective of in-
dividual environmental media (e.g., air, land, and water) resulting in in-
dividual statutory schemes to eradicate air, land, and water pollution.20
14 See BROOKS ET AL., supra note 12 at 3–4; Lynton K. Caldwell, The Ecosystem as a
Criterion for Public Land Policy, 10 NAT. RESOURCES J. 203, 207 (1970).
15 Ecosystem management is a “regional” or “resource system” approach to environmental
management. Robert B. Keiter, NEPA and the Emerging Concept of Ecosystem Management
on the Public Lands, 25 LAND & WATER L. REV. 43, 45 (1990).
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 See Fred P. Bosselman & A. Dan Tarlock, The Influence of Ecological Science on
American Law: An Introduction, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 847, 866–69 (1994) (giving a
detailed account of the evolution of ecosystem theory and regulation).
19 Modern environmental law and policy was premised on the theory that there was a
natural “equilibrium between organisms and [the] environment” that could sustain itself
absent human interference. Id. at 866–67.
20 Joseph H. Guth, Cumulative Impacts: Death-Knell for Cost-Benefit Analysis in Environ-
mental Decisions, 11 BARRY L. REV. 23, 30 (2008). For example, the Clean Air Act was
enacted to “protect and enhance the quality of the Nation’s air resources so as to promote
the public health and welfare and the productive capacity of its population,” while the
Clean Water Act was enacted to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (2006); 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2006).
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These statutes were designed to limit environmental degradation through
complex permitting and/or regulation schemes managed by divisions
within federal agencies such as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(“EPA”).21 These agencies resisted a cross-functional or systems approach
to the environment; instead, these divisions focused on single issues or
functions such as air pollution, water pollution, and the management of
solid or hazardous wastes.22 The result was a silo approach to environ-
mental protection, which fails to assess the overall health of ecosys-
tems.23 The Clinton Administration highlighted the shortcoming of this
system when it concluded that
[b]ecause EPA has concentrated on issuing permits, estab-
lishing pollutant limits, and setting national standards, the
Agency has not paid enough attention to the overall envi-
ronmental health of specific ecosystems. In short, EPA has
been “program driven” rather than “place-driven.”
Recently we have realized that, even if we had per-
fect compliance with all our authorities, we could not assure
the reversal of disturbing environmental trends.24
Protecting the nation’s ecosystems and the services they provide requires
a shift from a fragmented approach to environmental management to an
approach that focuses on the “ultimate goal of healthy, sustainable eco-
systems that provide us with food, shelter, clean air, clean water and a
multitude of other goods and services. We [must] . . . move toward a goal
of ecosystem protection.”25
21 John P. Dwyer, The Role of State Law in an Era of Federal Preemption: Lessons from
Environmental Regulation, 60 L. & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 203, 205 (1997).
22 Guth, supra note 20, at 30. For an excellent discussion of the creation of the EPA and
the development of a silo approach to environmental management, see Alfred A. Marcus,
EPA’s Organizational Structure, 54 L. & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 5 (1991).
23 See Guth, supra note 20, at 30. See generally Marcus, supra note 22.
24 ECOSYSTEM PROTECTION WORKGROUP, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, DRAFT, TOWARD A
PLACE-DRIVEN APPROACH: THE EDGEWATER CONSENSUS ON AN EPA STRATEGY FOR
ECOSYSTEM PROTECTION, at 1 (1994).
25 Id.; see also MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT BD., LIVING BEYOND OUR MEANS,
supra note 6, at 21; James Salzman et al., Protecting Ecosystem Services: Science,
Economics, & Law, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 309, 309–10 (2001).
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R. Edward Grumbine, in his review of ecosystem management
literature, suggests that this shift requires political and legal constructs
that work across political and administrative boundaries and that are
reflexive, adaptive, and capable of modification as new data are developed.26
Grumbine further suggests that the shift requires political and legal con-
structs that involve multiple levels of government and stakeholders, that
encompass organizational change, and that infuse ecosystem values into
human systems.27 How might this change occur? The case history of the
citizens of California’s struggle to protect and restore the Mono Lake
ecosystem offers an opportunity to explore how social movements have
used the law and litigation to protect ecosystems and the resulting change
in the governance structures charged with the allocation of California’s
water resources.28
I. THE DEMISE OF THE MONO LAKE ECOSYSTEM
A. The Mono Lake Ecosystem
Mono Lake is situated “at the base of the Sierra Nevada [Moun-
tains] near the eastern entrance of Yosemite National Park.”29 The lake
is 190 miles east of San Francisco and 300 miles north of Los Angeles.30
Once part of the Great Basin stretching from the Great Salt Lake south-
west to the Owens Valley and north to Klamath Lake, the Mono Lake
watershed is a confined system.31
26 See R. Edward Grumbine, What Is Ecosystem Management?, 8 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY
27, 31 (1994).
27 See id.
28 See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Getting to “Lets’s Talk”: Legal and Natural Destabilizations
and the Future of Regional Collaboration, 8 NEV. L.J. 811, 814–17 (2007) (arguing that
the Mono Lake and Everglades ecosystem restorations are prime examples of the use of
destabilizing litigation to foster both environmental and institutional change to protect
ecosystems).
29 Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine Cnty. (Nat'l Audubon), 658 P.2d 709, 711
(Cal. 1983); see also infra Figure 1.
30 Michael C. Blumm & Thea Schwartz, Mono Lake and the Evolving Public Trust in
Western Water, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 701, 704 (1995).
31 HART, supra note 4, at 8–9. Approximately three million years ago the Mono Lake
watershed became isolated from the remainder of the Great Basin. Mono Lake reached
its present size approximately 9,000 years ago. Id. at 9–13.
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Figure 1: Map of the Los Angeles Aqueduct System32
When Mark Twain visited Mono Lake in 1870, the watershed was
approximately 695 square miles and the lake itself was over seventy
square miles.33 The historic elevation of Mono Lake prior to diversion
ranged from 6404 to 6428 feet above sea level.34 Mono Lake is fed by four
tributaries that carry snowmelt from the Sierra Mountains.35 Because
 
32 Mono Lake and Los Angeles Aqueduct, HYDROLOGY FUTURES, http://www.hydrology
futures.com/LAA_Map_1.gif (last visited Jan. 22, 2011).
33 CAL. DEP’T OF WATER RES., MONO LAKE BACKGROUND (2004), http://www.water.ca.gov/
saltonsea/historicalcalendar/ac/03.23.2004/MonoLakeValues.pdf; see also infra Figure 2.
34 JONES & STOKE ASSOCS., MONO BASIN ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REPORT, CHAPTER 3E:
ENVIRONMENTAL SETTING, IMPACTS, AND MITIGATION MEASURES-AQUATIC PRODUCTIVITY
OF MONO LAKE 3E–3 (1993), http://www.monobasinresearch.org/images/mbeir/dchapter3/
3e.pdf; see also infra Figure 3.
35 See HART, supra note 4, at 7. The primary tributaries of Mono Lake are Lee Vining Creek
and Rush Creek, which is augmented by Parker and Walker Creeks, and Mill Creek. Id.;
see also infra Figure 2.
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Mono Lake is a terminal lake with no natural outlet, water leaves the
system solely through evaporation, resulting in a high mineral concen-
tration—currently two and a half times saltier than the ocean.36
Figure 2: Mono Lake Basin37
Historically, the Mono Lake watershed supported a unique and
vibrant ecosystem.38 Although Mono Lake was too alkaline to support
 
36 Gordon Young, The Troubled Waters of Mono Lake, 160 NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC 504, 504
(1981). Mono Lake is a “triple-water lake: it is saline; it is alkaline; and, due to its volcanic
surroundings, it is sulfurous.” HART, supra note 4, at 14.
37 Mono Lake Watershed, MONO LAKE COMM., http://www.monolake.org/newsletter/images/
99spmap.gif (last visited Jan. 22, 2011).
38 See HART, supra note 4, at 15.
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most fish species, it produced both “algae and other microscopic plants by
the millions of tons.”39 These minuscule organisms fed the brine shrimp
and the alkali flies in numbers that astounded Twain, who reported:
There are no fish in Mono Lake . . . . [N]o living thing exists
under the surface, except a white feathery sort of worm,
one-half an inch long, which looks like a bit of white thread
frayed out at the sides. If you dip up a gallon of water, you
will get about fifteen thousand of these. . . . Then there is a
fly, which looks something like our house-fly. These settle
on the beach to eat the worms that wash ashore—and any
time, you can see there a belt of flies an inch deep and six
feet wide, and this belt extends clear around the lake—a
belt of flies one hundred miles long. . . . You can hold them
under water as long as you please—they do not mind it—
they are only proud of it. When you let them go, they pop up
to the surface as dry as a patent-office report.40











































































40 TWAIN, supra note 2, at 261 (emphasis in original).
41 Mono Lake Elevation Level, MONO LAKE COMM. (on file with author).
*Water Board issues Los Angeles Department of Water and Power Water Permit.
**1942 Grant Lake Dam Completed.
***Second Barrel LA Aqueduct Completed.
****National Audubon Decision issued by Court and temporary injunction setting tem-
porary lake level.
# Agreed upon low level base line for the lake.
***** Settlement and California State Water Resource Control Board decision issued.
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The Mono Lake alkali fly (Ephydra hians) and brine shrimp
(Artemia monica) are the primary food source of the more than 100 bird
species that historically frequented Mono Lake; as many as 800,000 birds
have been counted on Mono Lake in a single day.42 Mono Lake is the pri-
mary nesting area for the California gull.43 Other migratory birds use
Mono Lake as a stop between their breeding grounds in North America
and their wintering grounds in Central and South America.44 The Lake
also serves as a stopover in the migratory flight path of numerous duck
species in such quantities that, in the 1940s, hunters and birders reported
millions of waterfowl fed at Mono Lake.45 Prior to diversion, the Mono
Lake tributaries also supported a vibrant fish population.46 At the 1993–94
California State Water Resources Control Board (“SWRCB”) hearing to
amend Los Angeles’s water diversion permit, local residents and experts
testified that the Mono Lake tributaries supported catchable brown trout
and occasional eastern brook trout.47 Mono Lake was also recognized for
its scenic attributes.48 John Muir described the area as “[a] country of won-
derful contrasts, hot deserts bordered by snow-laden mountains, cinders
42 Mono Lake Basin, Decision 1631, Cal. State Water Resources Control Board, Sept. 28,
1994, at 180, available at http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/publications_forms/publications/general/
docs/monolake_wr_dec1631_a.pdf [hereinafter Decision 1631]; Young, supra note 36, at 509.
43 Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine Cnty. (Nat'l Audubon), 658 P.2d 709, 716
(Cal. 1983) (citing a 1969 Task Force Report jointly prepared by the U.S. Department of
Interior and the California Department of Water Resources). “Ninety-five percent of
[California’s] gull population and 25 percent of the total species population nests at
[Mono] Lake.” Id.
44 HART, supra note 4, at 16–20. The Wilson’s Phalarope is an example of the many species
dependent upon Mono Lake. See id. at 18. The Wilson’s Phalarope (phalaropus tricolor)
breeds in May in the northern Great Plains. Id. In late June, the phalarope begins migra-
tion to its wintering grounds in the Central Andes. Id. The first leg of this journey is the
flight from the Great Plains to Mono Lake where phalaropes feast on brine shrimp prepar-
ing to journey south. Id. at 19. In 1981, ornithologist Joseph Jehl reported
[b]y the end of July, when migration began [from Mono Lake], the skies
were thick with birds . . . . The first females departed, to be followed by
the fattened-up males by mid-August. Before leaving Mono Lake, the
adults may double their weight, storing enough fat to power their non-
stop flight to the northern coastline of South America.
Joseph R. Jehl, Jr., Mono Lake: A Vital Way Station for the Wilson’s Phalarope, 160 NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC 520, 524 (1981).
45 HART, supra note 4, at 20.
46 Decision 1631, supra note 42, at 22, 38–39, 53–54.
47 Id. at 21, 53–54.
48 See id. at 133.
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and ashes scattered on glacier-polished pavement, frost and fire working
together in the making of beauty.”49
This is not to say that the Mono Lake ecosystem was unimpaired
prior to Los Angeles’s water diversion from the Mono Lake tributaries.50
Mono Lake tributaries flowed year round, often overtopping their banks
during the spring and depositing soils and “rich sediment on the flood-
plain[s].”51 Both Hart and the SWRCB report that the floodplains of the
Mono Lake tributaries supported local grazing and irrigation for decades
prior to the Los Angeles diversion.52 However, during this period local
water extractions had a negligible impact on Mono Lake’s pre-diversion
water levels.53
As evidenced by this overview, the Mono Lake ecosystem provided
a number of ecosystem services over time.54 It served as a major rookery
and migration stop for a vast array of bird species including waterfowl.55
This provisioning service contributed to extensive biological diversity not
only in northern California, but also within North America.56 Annual
flooding of the tributaries provided supporting services such as a nutrient
cycling system.57 Cultural services provided a unique sense of place rec-
ognized by luminaries such as Twain, Muir, and Adams.58 And then,
there were regulating services, services that only became apparent as
Mono Lake levels began to plummet and air quality deteriorated after
the Los Angeles diversion.59
49 Id. (citation omitted).
50 See id. at 83-85 (discussing pre-1941 hydrologic conditions of the Mono Basin).
51 Id. at 23.
52 See HART, supra note 4, at 22–30, 39–42; see also Decision 1631, supra note 42, at 83–85.
53 See Decision 1631, supra note 42, at 84; see also supra Figure 3.
54 See, e.g., Decision 1631, supra note 42, at 86.
55 Id. at 93–96.
56 See id. at 94.
57 Cf. MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT BD., LIVING BEYOND OUR MEANS, supra note
6, at 2 tbl.1 (explaining the important role water sources have in causing nutrient cycling);
Richard Kattelman, Sierra Nev. Aquatic Research Lab., Historic Floods in the Eastern
Sierra Nevada, in HISTORY OF WATER: EASTERN SIERRA NEVADA, OWENS VALLEY, WHITE-
INYO MOUNTAINS 74 (1992).
58 Nora Matell, The Student Revolution that Saved Mono Lake: Los Angeles’ Diversion of
Mono Basin Water in 1941 Threatened This 700,000-Year-Old Lake, CAL. HISTORIAN,
http://www.californiahistorian.com/articles/mono-lake.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2011).
59 Decision 1631, supra note 42, at 120–24. As lake levels declined, larger swaths of Mono
Lake’s bed were exposed, and a white ring of playa began to form around the lake. Id. at
122. Wind erosion of the playa caused suspended particulate matter in quantities not seen
at pre-diversion levels. Id. These suspended particulates were smaller than PM-10 (an
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B. The Los Angeles Diversion and Demise of the Mono Lake
Ecosystem
Three hundred miles southwest of Mono Lake is the City of Los
Angeles whose growth has long exceeded the available supply of local
water.60 As early as 1904, the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power
(“LADWP”) cast its eyes eastward for water, to the Owens River Valley.61
By 1913, the LADWP had completed construction of an aqueduct to trans-
port water from the Owens River Valley to Los Angeles.62 Massive for its
day, the aqueduct extended 223 miles and climbed 4000 feet uphill from
the Owens River Valley to Los Angeles.63 By 1925, the Owens River was
virtually dry, and the Los Angeles population had exploded beyond ex-
pectations.64 The City of Los Angeles began casting around for another
water source, which became Mono Lake and its tributaries.65
Between 1912 and 1913, the LADWP began purchasing land and
water rights in the Mono Lake watershed.66 These acquisitions included
land for a reservoir in which to store water from the Mono Lake tribu-
taries.67 Water could then be transported from the Mono Lake tributaries
inhalable aerodynamic diameter of fewer than ten microns) and exceeded national ambient
air quality standards. Id. at 123–24.
60 See ABRAHAM HOFFMAN, VISION OR VILLAINY: ORIGINS OF THE OWENS VALLEY—LOS
ANGELES WATER CONTROVERSY 45 (1981); WILLIAM L. KAHRL, WATER AND POWER: THE
CONFLICT OVER LOS ANGELES’ WATER SUPPLY IN THE OWENS VALLEY 270 (1982); REISNER,
supra note 3, at 60–61; see supra Figure 1.
61 REISNER, supra note 3, at 62.
62 See generally HOFFMAN, supra note 60, at 3–173; KAHRL, supra note 60; REISNER, supra
note 3, at 52–103 (containing a general history of the LADWP’s acquisition of water in
the Owens Valley and construction of the Los Angeles Aqueduct).
63 REISNER, supra note 3, at 61, 84–85. Hoffman reports that when the Los Angeles
Aqueduct was dedicated on November 5, 1913, and the first waters from Owens Valley
spilled out, LADWP Chief Engineer, William Mulholland was reported to have uttered
only five words: “There it is. Take it.” HOFFMAN, supra note 60, at 172; see also HART, supra
note 4, at 32.
64 By 1900 the population of Los Angeles was 100,000. REISNER, supra note 3, at 62. By
1913, when the Los Angeles Aqueduct opened, the population of Los Angeles had risen
to 500,000. Id. at 73. And by the early 1920s, Los Angeles’s population had increased to
such a degree that Mulholland decided that the only option was to dry up the Owens Valley
and search for alternate water sources. Id. at 89. Reisner reports that in 1925, “Mulholland
had expected 350,000 people . . . but had 1.2 million on his hands instead.” Id. at 87. And
Kahrl notes that by 1920, growth in Los Angeles had upset all the calculations on which
Mulholland had predicated the Los Angeles Aqueduct. KAHRL, supra note 60, at 260.
65 KAHRL, supra note 60, at 269.
66 HART, supra note 4, at 37.
67 See id.
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to the reservoir for storage and then to the Owens River and the Los
Angeles aqueduct.68 In 1919, William Mulholland, Chief Engineer of the
LADWP, entered into a contract with the United States Reclamation
Service (Bureau of Reclamation), an agency of the Interior Department, to
“prepare plans, surveys, and cost estimates” for an expansion of the aque-
duct from Owens Valley north into the Mono Lake Watershed.69 Mulholland
and Bureau of Reclamation Chief Arthur Powell Davis also entered into a
secret agreement to withdraw extensive public lands70 in the Mono Basin
from private settlement or claims, in effect reserving these lands for acqui-
sition by the LADWP and facilitating the Mono Lake diversion.71 This
agreement would eventually backfire on Bureau of Reclamation Chief
Davis, leading to his resignation.72 His successor, Elwood Mead, refused to
overturn Davis’s decision, noting “[t]here seems no question that the water
of this region will soon be needed for domestic and industrial purposes
in the City of Los Angeles, and its value for these purposes is far greater
than for agriculture”73 or, for that matter, the Mono Lake ecosystem.74 In
1923, the LADWP applied for a permit to “appropriate the entire flow of
the Mono [Lake tributaries] for domestic use and power generation.”75
68 See id.
69 Id.
70 The majority of land in the Mono Basin was federally owned. Id. at 38. Through the
19th century, the primary public land policy of the U.S. Government was one of “disposal”
of public lands into private ownership to “encourage settlement and development.” PUB.
LAND LAW REVIEW COMM’N, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION’S LAND: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
AND CONGRESS 28 (1970). Beginning in 1900 public lands began to be withdrawn from
disposal. Id. Public land is considered withdrawn if a statute, executive order, or admin-
istrative order designates a parcel as unavailable for disposal or resource exploitation.
JAN G. LAITOS, NATURAL RESOURCE LAW § 5.01(d)(3), at 161 (2002). Kahrl observes that
the Bureau of Reclamation had a history of setting aside land for future reclamation proj-
ects to prohibit private parties from acquiring land that might be needed or used for water
projects. KAHRL, supra note 60, at 40–41. A more detailed discussion of the withdrawal of
federal lands for future construction of the Mono Lake project is outlined in Kahrl’s book
on the construction of the Los Angeles Aqueduct. Id. at 330–338. Kahrl also notes that the
Bureau of Reclamation made the withdrawal despite the fact that Los Angeles “had no
definite plans for [the Mono Lake] project” at the time of the withdrawals. Id. at 337.
71 See HART, supra note 4, at 37.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 38 (quoting the statement of Dr. Elwood Mead). Dr. Mead served as the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation from 1924 to 1936. Dr. Elwood Mead,
SUNSETCITIES, http://www.sunsetcities.com/lake-mead/dr%20elwood%20mead.html (last
visited Jan. 22, 2011).
74 See HART, supra note 4, at 38.
75 Id. (emphasis in original).
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During this same time period California water law was in flux.76
Historically, California operated a dual water rights system recognizing
both riparian and appropriative water rights,77 but, in 1913, it passed the
Water Commission Act making all water in the state that was not being
applied to a “useful and beneficial purpose[ ]” eligible for appropriation.78
And in 1921, the Water Commission Act was amended allowing the
SWRCB to reject an appropriation permit application when it determined
the purpose of the appropriation was not in the public interest.79 The 1921
amendment also admonished the SWRCB that “[i]n acting upon applica-
tions to appropriate water the board shall be guided by the policy that
domestic use is the highest use . . . of water.”80 And in 1928, the California
Constitution was amended to provide:
[T]he general welfare requires that the water resources of
the State be put to beneficial use to the fullest extent of
which they are capable, and that the waste or unreasonable
use or unreasonable method of use of water be prevented,
and that the conservation of such waters is to be exercised
with a view to the reasonable and beneficial use thereof in
the interest of the people and for the public welfare.81
Not only did the amendment abolish certain rights of riparian owners
to use water,82 it required that “[a]ll uses of water [in California], includ-
ing public trust [water] uses . . . conform to the standard of reasonable
76 See Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine Cnty. (Nat'l Audubon), 658 P.2d 709,
724 (Cal. 1983).
77 Id. Under California’s riparian doctrine the owner of land abutting a watercourse had
the right to “reasonable and beneficial use of water on his [or her] land.” Id. In contrast, the
appropriation doctrine required the taking or diversion of water from the water body for
“useful and beneficial purposes.” Id. An appropriative rights system is grounded in the
belief that the greatest public good arises out of placing water rights in private hands.
Cynthia L. Koehler, Water Rights and the Public Trust Doctrine: Resolution of the Mono
Lake Controversy, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 541, 552 (1995).
78 Nat’l Audubon, 658 P.2d at 724. The Water Commission Act formalized the procedure by
which a party could acquire appropriative water rights. Id. Only water that was not being
applied to “useful and beneficial purposes” was eligible for appropriation. Id. “[A]ppropria-
tive rights acquired under the [Water Commission A]ct were inferior to pre-existing rights”
including “riparian rights.” Id. at 725. See also CAL. WATER CODE § 1201 (West 2010).
79 CAL. WATER CODE § 1255 (West 2010). See also Nat’l Audubon, 658 P.2d at 713.
80 CAL. WATER CODE § 1254 (West 2010). See also Nat’l Audubon, 658 P.2d at 713.
81 Nat’l Audubon, 658 P.2d at 725 (quoting CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2).
82 Id.
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use.”83 While under this amendment in-stream uses, such as recreation,
were considered beneficial uses,84 in-stream uses were not the highest
use of the water.85 The highest beneficial uses were extractive uses.86 The
door was open for the LADWP’s appropriation of water from the Mono
Lake Watershed.87
To appropriate water from the Mono Lake tributaries, the LADWP
had to meet three requirements. It had to obtain project financing, acquire
riparian lands with pre-existing water rights, and obtain a permit from the
SWRCB.88 In 1930, after an extensive public campaign initiated by the
LADWP proclaiming a forthcoming “water famine” the citizens of Los
Angeles passed a $38.8 million bond to finance the Mono Lake water
83 Id.
84 See City of Los Angeles v. Aitken (Aitken), 52 P.2d 585, 592 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1935);
Nat’l Audubon, 658 P.2d at 725–26 (citing Aitken for the principle that in-stream uses are
reasonable and beneficial uses of water).
85 See Aitken, 52 P.2d at 592.
86 See Nat’l Audubon, 658 P.2d at 713–14.
87 See id.
88 The process for acquiring water rights through appropriation is set out in California’s
Water Code. See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 102, 1252 (West 2010). “The process is initiated by
application to the [SWRCB] for a permit to put unappropriated water to beneficial use.”
Cal. Trout, Inc. v. State Water Res. Control Bd. (Cal. Trout I), 255 Cal. Rptr. 184, 198 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1989) (citing CAL. WATER CODE § 1252 (West 2009)). The application must in-
clude the “nature and amount” of the water request, the “location and a description” of the
physical infrastructure needed for the diversion, the anticipated infrastructure completion
date, and must affirmatively state when all of the requested water will be put to its bene-
ficial use. CAL. WATER CODE § 1260 (West 2010). If the application is approved by the
SWRCB, a permit is issued giving the permittee “the right to take and use water [but]
only to the extent and for the purpose granted.” Id. at §§ 1380–81. The right to appropri-
ate water under the permit is a conditional right and must be perfected by the permittee.
Cal. Trout I, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 198–99. Perfecting the right requires the permittee to
“diligently commence and complete [infrastructure] construction . . . and apply the water
to beneficial use in accordance with the . . . terms of the permit.” Id. at 198–99 (citing CAL.
WATER CODE §§ 1395–97 (West 2009)). The California Water Code provides that “[a]
permit shall be effective for such time as the water actually appropriated under it is used
for a useful and beneficial purpose . . . but no longer.” Id. at 611 (quoting CAL. WATER CODE
§ 1390 (West 2009)). If a permittee “fails to beneficially use all or any part of the water
claimed by him, for which a right of use has vested . . . for a period of three years, such
unused water reverts to the public and shall be regarded as unappropriated public water.”
Id. (quoting 1943 Cal. Stat. ch. 368 section 1241, 1615–16) (Section 1241 of the California
Water Code has since been amended to permit a five year time frame to use appropriated
water). Additionally, the California Water Code requires a permit to be revoked if the infra-
structure necessary for diversion is not undertaken and completed with due diligence. CAL.
WATER CODE § 1410 (West 2010). If, however, the infrastructure is diligently completed
and the water is diverted and put to beneficial use, then the SWRCB will issue a license
confirming the permittee’s rights to appropriate the water. Id. at § 1610.
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project.89 The LADWP then condemned the private property necessary
for the project, a process that in 1935 culminated in a condemnation action
in Tuolumne County Superior Court.90 Experts in the condemnation action
testified that the diversions from the Mono Lake tributaries would reduce
the lake
to one-tenth of its present volume of water within five to
ten years leaving the bed of the lake and the exposed mud
flats covered with a thick crust of mineral salt . . . which
will pulverize and fly with every breeze that blows over the
surrounding land, ruining all vegetation and destroying
the fertility of the soil[,]91
thereby draining Mono Lake and creating a desert.92 Although the court
required the City of Los Angeles to pay riparian owners for desertification
and the taking of riparian water rights, the court found that the diversion
itself met the public necessity requirement.93 The LADWP immediately
began infrastructure construction for the diversion.94
89 HART, supra note 4, at 38.
90 Aitken, 52 P.2d at 586. In Aitken, the City of Los Angeles and the LADWP brought suit
to condemn riparian water rights and divert all of the water of Rush and Lee Vining
Creeks for use by the City of Los Angeles. Id. at 585–86. The court determined the taking
of water for domestic use in Los Angeles was a public necessity. Id. at 586, 591. At trial,
the LADWP argued that the finding of necessity and California’s constitutional re-
quirement of beneficial use precluded payment of riparian owners for the taking of their
littoral property rights or considering those rights in property valuation. Id. at 587.
LADWP argued that valuation should be premised on the assumption that Mono Lake
did not add value to the adjacent properties. Cf. id. The court disagreed, holding that
although California’s Constitution favored the beneficial use of water it did not obviate
an adjacent owner’s riparian rights. Id. at 588. Thus the LADWP was required to pay the
landowners property damage assuming the benefits to property value provided by Mono
Lake. Id. at 588, 592.
91 Id. at 587.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 586.
94 HART, supra note 4, at 42. The infrastructure necessary to transfer water from the Mono
Lake tributaries to the Owens Valley included construction of a “diversion dam on Lee
Vining Creek;” construction of a buried pipeline from Lee Vining designed to divert water
from Rush Creek, Parker Creek, and Walker Creek to the Grant Lake reservoir; construc-
tion of Grant Lake reservoir for storage of the water from the Mono Lake tributaries;
construction of “a buried pipeline running from Grant Lake to the . . . Mono Craters;” and
construction of the Mono Craters Tunnel, an 11.5 mile tunnel carrying the water from
Grant Lake to a “discharge point on the upper Owens River.” Id. Once in the Owens
River, the water would flow into the Long Valley reservoir. Id. The water would then be
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In 1938, the SWRCB commenced hearings on the LADWP’s appro-
priation request.95 Locals opposed the appropriation alleging the diver-
sion would reduce property values, destroy tourism, and “lay waste and
desert” to large areas of the Mono Lake Basin.96 Despite opposition, the
SWRCB, on June 1, 1940, granted the LADWP a permit to appropriate
the entire flow of water from the Mono Lake tributaries.97 In granting the
permit the SWRCB stated:
It is indeed unfortunate that the City’s proposed develop-
ment will result in decreasing the aesthetic advantages of
Mono Basin but there is apparently nothing that this office
can do to prevent it. The use to which the City proposes to
put the water under its Applications . . . is defined by the
Water Commission Act as the highest to which water may
be applied . . . . This office therefore has no alternative but
to dismiss all protests based upon the possible lowering of
the water level in Mono Lake and the effect that the diver-
sion of water from these streams may have upon the aes-
thetic and recreational value of the Basin.98
The permit allowed the LADWP to divert the full flow of the Mono Lake
tributaries despite the fact that the LADWP did not have the capacity to
use all of the appropriated water.99 In 1940, the Los Angeles aqueduct could
only carry one half of the flow of the Mono Lake tributaries.100 The Los
Angeles aqueduct would not have capacity to carry the full flow until 1970
when a second barrel of the Los Angeles aqueduct was constructed.101 The
1940 permit was, on its face, inconsistent with California’s appropriation
funneled through a series of power plants prior to “[r]ejoining the Owens [river]bed.” Id.
Finally, the water would be funneled into the Los Angeles aqueduct. Id. at 42–43. See also
supra Figure 1.
95 Id. at 45.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine Cnty. (Nat’l Audubon), 658 P.2d 709, 714
(Cal. 1983) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Div. of Water Res. Dec. 7053, 7055, 8042 & 8043
at 26 (Apr. 11, 1940)).
99 HART, supra note 4, at 56.
100 Id. The infrastructure necessary to extract the total volume of water from the Mono Lake
tributaries and store it in Grant Lake Reservoir was completed in 1940. Id.
101 Id.
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system, which required that appropriated water be put to beneficial use
as a condition of the permit.102
The 1940 Mono Lake Permit decision was also inconsistent with
the 1940 Rock Creek ruling in which the SWRCB ruled that the California
Water Commission Act required the State to “protect streams in recre-
ational areas by guarding against depletion below some minimum amount
consonant with the general recreational conditions and the character of
the stream.”103 That the Rock Creek ruling reasoning was not applied to
the Mono Lake appropriation is yet another illustration of the special re-
lationship between the SWRCB and the LADWP. When it came to water
appropriations, what the LADWP wanted, it got, regardless of the appli-
cable law.104 This point is further illustrated by the state’s treatment of
the “fishway rules” in the case of the Mono Lake project.105
Prior to the LADWP’s Mono Lake project, the Mono Lake tributaries
supported “good trout populations.”106 Beginning in 1953, California law
required new dam constructions to include fish passages or “fishways.”107
In lieu of a fishway, the project proponent could substitute a hatchery.108
In 1935, the Fish and Game Commission conducted a hearing on the
LADWP’s proposed Grant Lake dam, part of the infrastructure needed
to transport water from the Mono Lake tributaries south to the Owens
Valley, and found that “a fishway was not practicable and would not be
required.”109 A second hearing reconsidering the issue was held in 1936.110
The Fish & Game Commission’s tentative resolution was for the LADWP
and the Fish and Game Commission to “work out the possibilities” of a
fish hatchery at Hot Creek.111 Then, in 1937, the California Legislature
102 See supra note 88 (discussing the requirements of California’s water appropriation
scheme).
103 Nat’l Audubon, 658 P.2d at 714 n.6 (quoting Div. of Water Res. Dec. 3850 at 24
(Apr. 11, 1940)).
104 See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Aitken (Aitken), 52 P.2d 585, 591 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1935).
105 See, e.g., Cal. Trout, Inc. v. State Water Res. Control Bd. (Cal. Trout I) , 255 Cal. Rptr. 184
(Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (discussing the LADWP’s and SWRCB’s arguments about why the
State was excepted, in the Mono Lake case, from complying with a California law requiring
that dam owners keep the dam in a condition such that fish may live below the dam).
106 Id. at 189.
107 See id. at 186–88 (citing CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 5937 and noting that the predecessor
to section 5937 was first enacted in 1933).
108 Id. at 188.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Cal. Trout I, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
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imposed a requirement that “all dams, old or new . . . must let enough
water pass to maintain ‘in good condition’ the fish in the streams below”
the dam.112 There appeared to be no way the LADWP could bypass this
minimum flow requirement.113 By 1937, the LADWP had yet to complete
construction of Grant Lake dam.114 To comply with the fishway require-
ments, the LADWP agreed to construct a hatchery on Hot Creek but made
no provision to meet the minimum flow requirements below Grant Lake
dam as required by law.115 Then, on November 25, 1940, the Chairman of
the California Game and Fish Commission entered into an agreement with
the LADWP exempting the Grant Lake dam from the 1937 statutory mini-
mum flow requirements.116 This meant that the LADWP could run the
creeks dry below the Grant Lake dam,117 meaning certain death for the
trout in the Mono Lake tributaries.
Impoundment of waters from the Mono Lake tributaries began
shortly after the LADWP received its appropriation permit, and, in April
1941, the LADWP began shipping water south to the Owens River.118
Because the LADWP was only able to send half of the water appropriated
from the Mono Basin tributaries through the aqueduct to Los Angeles, the
remaining portion of the Mono Lake diversion sat in Grant Lake.119 The
effect of the project on the Mono Basin tributaries was almost immediate.120
On March 10, 1941, a California Game and Fish fisheries biologist, Elden
Vestal, wrote to the LADWP reporting that Rush Creek had been dry since
October 1940 and requesting that the LADWP maintain a minimum flow
in Rush Creek to maintain fish hatcheries as required by statute.121 Vestal
received a letter from the LADWP advising him to consult with the terms
112 HART, supra note 4, at 45; see also CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 5937 (West 2010); Cal.
Trout I, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 191–92 (discussing the 1937 amendment to CAL FISH & GAME
CODE § 5937).
113 See HART, supra note 44, at 45.
114 See id.
115 See id.
116 Id. at 45–46.
117 Id. at 47.
118 See id. at 46.
119 Cf. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine Cnty. (Nat’l Audubon), 658 P.2d 709,
714 (Cal. 1983) (noting that Grant Lake was one of the reservoirs in use before the second
aqueduct was completed).
120 Id.; see also HART, supra note 4, at 47.
121 See HART, supra note 4, at 47 (quoting a letter to the LADWP from Elden Vestal,
fisheries biologist for the California Board of Game and Fish, dated March 10, 1940).
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of the Hot Creek Agreement.122 Upon further inquiry with the chief of
the Bureau of Fish Conservation, Vestal received a “thinly veiled warn-
ing to stop [his] investigations into what was apparently a very sensitive
political question.”123
The impact of the diversion on Mono Lake itself was also devas-
tating.124 “Between 1940 and 1970, the [LADWP] diverted an average of
57,067 acre-feet of water per year” from the Mono Lake Watershed.125
“[T]he lake’s surface level receded at an average of 1.1 feet per year.”126 Los
Angeles’s demand for water from the Mono Lake tributaries intensified in
1964 when the U.S. Supreme Court issued a decree limiting California’s
water allocation under the Colorado River Compact.127 The amount of
water the LADWP was able to transport to Los Angeles escalated in 1970
when it completed the second barrel of the Los Angeles aqueduct.128 Com-
pletion of the aqueduct meant the LADWP could perfect its permit.129 In
1974, thirty-four years after granting the original permit to appropriate
the full flow of water from the four Mono Lake tributaries, the SWRCB
found that the LADWP “had perfected its appropriative right by the actual
taking and beneficial use of water” and issued the LADWP two permanent
licenses authorizing the LADWP to “divert up to 167,000 acre-feet annually
122 Id.
123 Id. (quoting Elden Vestal).
124 See, e.g., Nat’l Audubon, 658 P.2d at 714.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 714; see supra Figure 3.
127 Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340 (1964), amended by 383 U.S. 268 (1966), overruled
in part by 438 U.S. 645 (1978), per curiam supplemental decree at 439 U.S. 419 (1979),
supplemental opinion at 460 U.S. 605 (1983), supplemental opinion at 464 U.S. 144 (1984),
supplemental opinion at 531 U.S. 1 (2000), amended by 547 U.S. 150 (2006). In 1952, the
State of Arizona filed suit against the State of California regarding the volume of
California’s water appropriations from the Colorado River system. Arizona v. California,
373 U.S. 546, 550-51 (1963), supplemental opinion at 376 U.S. 340 (1964), amended by
383 U.S. 268 (1966), overruled in part by 438 U.S. 645 (1978), per curiam supplemental
decree at 439 U.S. 419 (1979), supplemental opinion at 460 U.S. 605 (1983), supplemental
opinion at 464 U.S. 144 (1984), supplemental opinion at 531 U.S. 1 (2000), amended by
547 U.S. 150 (2006). Eventually the states of Nevada, New Mexico, and Utah and the
United States were added as parties in a case that ultimately was intended to apportion
the waters of the Colorado River system. See generally 373 U.S. at 564-90 (discussing the
allocation and apportionment of water of the Colorado River system among the states and
other users).
128 Decision 1631, supra note 42, at 5–6.
129 See supra note 88 (explaining the requirement that a water permit be perfected); HART,
supra note 4, at 43-44, 56 (detailing that LADWP’s permit allowed appropriation of the
entire flow from the tributaries).
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(far more than the average annual flow)” of the Mono Lake tributaries.130
The SWRCB “viewed this action as a ministerial action, based on the
1940 decision, and held no hearings on the matter.”131 “By 1979, the
Mono Lake feeder streams supplied almost twenty percent of Los Angeles’
water” supply.132
Between 1970 and 1980, LADWP was diverting “an average of
99,580 acre-feet per year” from the Mono Lake watershed.133 By 1979,
Mono Lake’s surface level dropped from 6435 feet above sea level to 6373
feet above sea level.134 The impacts of the LADWP diversion on the Mono
Lake watershed ecosystems have been extensively documented in both the
scientific and popular literature.135 The four major Mono Lake tributaries
were dry most—if not all—year, and fish populations disappeared.136 With-
out fresh water input, Mono Lake receded forty-three feet below prediver-
sion level,137 exposing a mile-wide ring of powdery alkali flats around the
lake that, as early as 1965, gave rise to a new phenomena in the Mono
Basin: alkali dust storms.138 These dust storms violated the ambient air
standards of the federal Clean Air Act.139
The lack of fresh water input also caused an increase in Mono
Lake’s salinity levels,140 which in turn adversely affected the symbiotic
populations of alkali flies and brine shrimp.141 The closest alternative food
source for migratory birds was the Salton Sea, 350 miles south of Mono
Lake.142 Bird populations began to plummet.143 And, the receding waters
130 Nat’l Audubon, 658 P.2d at 714 n.8.
131 Id.
132 Arnold & Jewell, supra note 4, at 7.
133 Nat’l Audubon, 658 P.2d at 714.
134 Id.; see supra Figure 3.
135 A comprehensive discussion of the environmental impacts of the LADWP diversion
from the Mono Lake Basin is contained in the Final Environmental Impact Report for the
Review of Mono Basin Water Rights of the City of Los Angeles, prepared between 1989
and 1993 at the request of the SWRCP. CAL. STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., FINAL
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REPORT FOR THE REVIEW OF MONO BASIN WATER RIGHTS OF THE
CITY OF LOS ANGELES (1994), available at http://www.monobasinresearch.org/online
reports/mbeir.htm.
136 Decision 1631, supra note 42, at 21–76.
137 Nat’l Audubon, 658 P.2d at 714; see supra Figure 3.
138 HART, supra note 4, at 52; Young, supra note 36, at 504, 506.
139 Decision 1631, supra note 42, at 120.
140 Id. at 77.
141 See id. at 77–82.
142 Young, supra note 36, at 510.
143 Id.
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exposed land bridges to Negit and Paoha Islands, primary nesting sites
for California gulls.144 Between 1979 and 1994, coyotes crossed these land
bridges and fed on nesting gulls; in 1979 coyote intrusions on Negit Island
caused the California Gull to experience “total reproductive failure.”145
Additionally, prior to the diversions, Mono Lake was surrounded by exten-
sive wetland and delta lagoon systems.146 As the tributaries of Mono Lake
dried up and lake levels dropped, these systems were drained.147 The loss
of this habitat particularly affected waterfowl,148 whose populations began
to dwindle.149
In short, the Mono Lake ecosystem was dying—a death made pos-
sible by the political power of the LADWP facilitated by its established
relationships with the State of California, the SWRCB, and its publically
stated position that the taking of water from Mono Lake was necessary for
the continued health and well-being of the citizens of Los Angeles.150 The
issue was framed as an either-or scenario: either water is provided for
human survival and economic growth, or the water is used to protect the
ecosystem.151 It was presumed that the citizens of California could not have
it both ways.152 Saving the Mono Lake ecosystem would require a different
approach to water allocation—a structural change in the water allocation
144 Id. at 509. Ninety-five percent of the California gull population, including one in five of
all California gulls in the world, nest at Mono Lake. Id.
145 Decision 1631, supra note 42, at 103.
146 Id. at 94. Of the 617 acres of wetlands fringing Mono Lake, there were “260 acres of
brackish lagoons, 175 acres of dune lagoons,” over 60 acres of delta lagoons, and “356
acres of marsh, wet meadow, and wetland willow scrub.” Id.
147 See id. at 97–98.
148 Id. at 100.
149 Local residents reported that prediversion, the sky was “thick with ducks and geese;”
since diversion “[i]t’s hard to find even one out there.” Young, supra note 36, at 510.
Current data indicate that duck populations at Mono Lake dropped from a prediversion
level of 175,000-400,000 ducks per day to 11,000-15,000 ducks per year. Decision 1631,
supra note 42, at 113-15.
150 See Young, supra note 36, at 512-14; Editorial, Water and Power in Our Future, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 11, 1980, at D6. See generally Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine Cnty.
(Nat’l Audubon), 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983) (discussing LADWP’s argument that taking
water from Mono Lake was a necessity).
151 Editorial, supra note 150, at D6 (arguing that continued extractions from Mono Lake
were needed for the city’s future). Los Angeles has a long history of framing the water issue
as one of economic viability. REISNER, supra note 3, at 55, 60–62, 70–72. Reisner reports
that as early as 1905, LADWP officials were crafting a message of water scarcity and the
need for water if Los Angeles were to thrive. Id.
152 See Editorial, supra note 150, at D6.
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decision-making process.153 Ultimately, the task of changing this structure
would fall upon the shoulders of graduate students-turned-activists who
would use both social movements and litigation to facilitate change.154
II. LITIGATION AND SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CHANGE—A THEORY
Lawyers and social scientists have long argued about the role of
law and litigation in generating social and political change.155 As early as
the mid-seventies, legal scholars including Abram Chayes156 and Joseph
Sax157 argued that “public law litigation” could facilitate social and political
change, and social science scholars led by Stuart Scheingold argued that
litigation could alter public policy if players were willing to take a political
approach to law and social change.158 However, legal and social science
theorists approach the role of litigation in promoting social and political
change from different vantage points.159
A. Public Law Litigation and Legal Theorists
It is often argued that environmental law is an example of how
litigation can cause social and political change.160 Environmental law was
born in the 1960s out of the common law as a means to “discipline public
agencies, through . . . ‘public interest’ litigation.”161 This evolution was
153 See infra Part II (discussing a shift in the approach to water allocation and public
environmental litigation).
154 See infra Part II. See generally HART, supra note 4, at 62-84 (describing the origins of
new challenges to the LADWP).
155 See infra Part II.A.
156 See generally Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 1281 (1976).
157 See generally JOSEPH SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN
ACTION (1970) [hereinafter SAX (1970)].
158 See generally STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC
POLICY, AND POLITICAL CHANGE (1974).
159 See discussion infra Part II.A. Compare SAX (1970), supra note 157, at xviii (viewing
the courtroom and citizen-led public litigation as essential tools for effective participation
in the governmental process), with SCHEINGOLD, supra note 158, at 4-9 (arguing that a legal
frame of reference leads to an oversimplified approach to social and political change, and
that a political approach that views courts as just one of a number of political resources
for change is needed).
160 See, e.g., SAX (1970), supra note 157.
161 A. Dan Tarlock, The Future of Environmental “Rule of Law” Litigation, 17 PACE ENVTL.
L. REV. 237, 241 (2000) [hereinafter Tarlock (2000)]. See generally J. B. Ruhl, Toward a
Common Law of Ecosystem Services, 18 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 1 (2005–2006).
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made possible by the rise of “public law litigation” in the latter part of
the nineteenth century162 and the relaxation of constraints on equitable
remedies that permitted courts to examine controversies about future
probabilities, such as the impact of government agency policies.163
Unlike traditional common law litigation, which has at its heart the
resolution of disputes between private individuals,164 public law litigation
focuses on “whether or how a government policy or program should be car-
ried out.”165 As more political and policy decisions were made by bureau-
cratic agencies, there was a recognition that agencies were locked in a
symbiotic relationship with the very interests they sought to regulate—
they were “captured.”166
On the environmental front, Sax argued that the administrative
agency
has supplanted the citizen as a participant [in the decision-
making process] to such an extent that its panoply of legal
strictures actually forbid members of the public from par-
ticipating even in the complacent process whereby the regu-
lators and the regulated work out the destiny of our air,
water, and land resources. . . . The implementation of the
public interest, he [the citizen] is told, must be left ‘to those
who know best.’167
And “those who [knew] best” were the agency experts and those they
regulated.168 Citizens with an interest in resource preservation lacked
the political power to be meaningful players in the agency-developer
162 Chayes, supra note 156, at 1288–89. The rise of public law litigation coincided with the
increase of reform legislation at the close of the nineteenth century; the relaxation of rules
governing pleadings, standing, and class action litigation; and the relaxation of constraints
on equitable remedies. Id. at 1283–89, 1292.
163 Id. at 1292–93.
164 Id. at 1282–88. Traditionally, the lawsuit was viewed as a mechanism for settling private
disputes between individuals about private rights. Id. Legal liability was apportioned
among litigants based on concepts of “intention” and “fault.” Id. at 1285. Through the
litigation process, the parties received monetary relief (damages) for legal wrongs. Id. at
1282–83.
165 Id. at 1295.
166 See Robert Glicksman & Christopher H. Schroeder, EPA and the Court: Twenty Years
of Law and Politics, 54 L. & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 249, 264–68 (1991) (discussing the theory
of agency capture prevalent in the early to late 1970s); see also SAX (1970), supra note
157, at 55–64.
167 SAX (1970), supra note 157, at xvii.
168 See id. at xvii–xix.
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decision-making process and were relegated to the position of outsider.169
Citizens, Sax argued, should have the right to use litigation to access the
policy decision-making process.
The availability of a judicial forum means that access to gov-
ernment is a reality for the ordinary citizen—that he can
be heard and that, in a setting of equality, he can require
bureaucrats and even the biggest industries to respond to
his questions and to justify themselves before a disinter-
ested auditor . . . . The citizen asserts rights which are en-
titled to enforcement; he is not a mere supplicant.170
More recently Professors Sabel and Simon, drawing on the work of
Chayes and Roberto Unger’s destabilization theory, argue that public law
litigation can not only affect the outcome of bureaucratic policy decision-
making but can also affect the manner in which public institutions make
policy decisions.171 Unger, in his examination of democratic societies, ob-
served that privileged members of societies or elites172 exercised control
over political resources, including law,173 that permit them to control
169 See id. at 82–88.
170 Id. at 112.
171 See generally Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public
Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1016 (2004).
172 For purposes of this paper, the concept of elite is as defined by C. Wright Mills in his
classic text, The Power Elite. Mills argues that the
power elite is composed of men whose positions enable them to tran-
scend the ordinary environments of ordinary men and women; they are
in positions to make decisions having major consequences. . . . [T]hey
are in command of the major hierarchies and organizations of modern
society. They rule the big corporations. They run the machinery of the
state and claim its prerogatives. . . . They occupy the strategic command
posts of the social structure, in which are now centered the effective
means of the power and the wealth and the celebrity which they enjoy.
C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE POWER ELITE 3–4 (1956).
173 McCann notes that law is a resource that is used by citizens to “structure relations with
others, to advance goals in social life, to formulate rightful claims, and to negotiate dis-
putes where interests, wants, or principle collide.” McCann (2006), supra note 1, at 21–22;
see also Austin T. Turk, Law as a Weapon in Social Conflict, 23 SOC. PROBLEMS 276, 280
(1976). Turk argues that there are five types of political resources embodied in law. Id.
These resources are: an enforcement power, or the implied threat of legal physical coercion
to enforce a legal decision to your benefit; economic/resource power, which is the use of law
to allocate or reallocate economic wealth or natural resources; political power, which is
access to the public decision-making process in a manner that permits you to control how
the decisions are made and the criteria applied to the decisions; ideological power which
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public policy decisions to their benefit,174 creating the phenomenon of polit-
ical blockage.175 Political blockage occurs when the public policy decision-
making infrastructure “is substantially immune from conventional political
mechanisms of correction” and therefore becomes “steeled to [non-elite]
political pressures.”176 There are three types of political blockage:
1. Majoritarian political control—which occurs when
the political system is “unresponsive to the interests
of a vulnerable, stigmatized minority.”177
2. The “ ‘logic of collective action’—in which a concen-
trated group with large stakes exploits or disregards
a more numerous but more diffuse group with col-
lectively larger but individually smaller stakes.”178
3. A hybrid of the two.179
Sabel and Simon suggest that the logic of collective action may be the
primary form of political blockage that affects environmental decision-
making.180
The exertion of political power by the LADWP181 in the acquisition
of water from both the Owens Valley and the Mono Lake tributaries is a
is the use of law to help frame how the public gives meaning to a situation and how they
define what is real and true; and diversionary power, which is the use of the law by the
media to shape the manner in which the issue is relayed to the public. Id. at 280–81.
174 ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY: ANTI-NECESSITARIAN SOCIAL THEORY
IN THE SERVICE OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY FROM POLITICS: A WORK IN CONSTRUCTIVE SOCIAL
THEORY 530–35 (Verso 2001) (1987).
175 See Sabel & Simon, supra note 171, at 1062.
176 Id. at 1062, 1064.
177 Id. at 1064.
178 Sabel & Simon, supra note 171, at 1064. This second type of political blockage encom-
passes the concept of traditional “agency capture.” Chayes and Sax both identify agency
capture as a concentrated minority (elites) with large stakes in the agency decision, cap-
turing the agency decision-making process to the detriment of a larger public concern.
See SAX (1970), supra note 157, at 189; Chayes, supra note 156, at 1313.
179 Id. at 1065.
180 See Sabel & Simon, supra note 171, at 1064–65.
181 See id. at 1064 (explaining the role of political power used by agencies). Although some
might argue that a public agency, such as the LADWP, is not in and of itself an elite,
those within the LADWP in decision-making positions “occup[ied] . . . strategic command
posts.” MILLS, supra note 172, at 4. They effectively commanded power through their
position within the agency, and their celebrity, wealth, and relationships with powerful
elites within the City of Los Angeles; as such they fall within the classic definition of an
elite. Id. at 3–4. Even if they are not defined as elites, those managing the LADWP had
historically exercised significant political power. The LADWP dating back to 1899, and 
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classic example of collective action “political blockage.”182 The LADWP had
a long history of using its political resources to manipulate water allocation
decisions to its benefit—when it came to water, the LADWP got what it
wanted.183 When the LADWP appropriated the water of the Owens Valley
at the turn of the twentieth century, it relied on its political relations with
the Bureau of Reclamation and state agencies; as Kahrl observed: “[t]he
fate of the Owens Valley was sealed the moment President Roosevelt de-
termined that the greater public interest would be served by a greater Los
Angeles. [Opponents] lost without even having had the opportunity to have
their representative present.”184
The LADWP then proceeded to exercise its political muscle and spe-
cial relationships with both federal and state governments to appropriate
for at least three generations thereafter, was run by a group of wealthy business leaders
and other professionals operating in their own self interest. See MIKE DAVIS, CITY OF
QUARTZ: EXCAVATING THE FUTURE IN LOS ANGELES 110–115 (1992); see also KEVIN STARR,
MATERIAL DREAMS: SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA THROUGH THE 1920S, at 120 (1990) (arguing
that Los Angeles, at the turn of the century, had a discernible class of elites: the Oligarchy);
KAHRL, supra note 60, at 13–15. Mulholland, through his celebrity and in his position as
Chief Engineer of the LADWP, was closely linked to, and some would argue was part of,
the Los Angeles Oligarchy. See generally KAHRL, supra note 60, at ch. 1; CATHERINE
MULHOLLAND, WILLIAM MULHOLLAND AND THE RISE OF LOS ANGELES 59–60, 80–92 (2000)
(discussing Mulholland’s rise to power and his relationships with Los Angeles’s business
leaders). The Oligarchy played a pivotal role in exerting its money, influence, and political
power to develop water resources in Los Angeles to promote business and urban develop-
ment. See generally Fionn MacKillop, The Influence of the Los Angeles “Oligarchy” on the
Governance of the Municipal Water Department, 1902–1930: A Business Like Any Other or
a Public Service? 2 BUS. & ECON. HIST. ON-LINE 1 (2004), http://www.h-net.org/~business/
bhcweb/publications/BEHonline/2004/MacKillop.pdf (discussing the role of the Los Angeles
Oligarchy and Mulholland in the development of the Los Angeles water system).
182 See Sabel & Simon, supra note 171, at 1064.
183 See supra Part I.B.
184 KAHRL, supra note 60, at 142. The history of Owens Valley and the construction of the
Los Angeles aqueduct is illustrative of the political power of the City of Los Angeles and
the LADWP. Even Hoffman, who gives the LADWP a more favorable treatment than most
in the Owens Valley history, observed that
[a]lthough the city needed water, it by no means needed the amount that
would be coming down the aqueduct [from Owens Valley] once it was
finished. Mulholland argued that the city’s water rights were at stake
in the matter; to obtain less than what was allowed might set undesir-
able precedents. At the same time, not needing a storage reservoir at
Long Valley in the immediate future, Mulholland ignored Owens Valley
needs . . . .
HOFFMAN, supra note 60, at 275; see also, KAHRL, supra note 60 (containing an excellent
discussion of the LADWP’s leveraging of political power in the construction of the Los
Angeles aqueduct).
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water from the Mono Lake tributaries.185 It convinced the Bureau of
Reclamation to secretly withdraw public lands from public sale and to
convey them to the City of Los Angeles for future construction of the res-
ervoir for the Mono Lake Project.186 It convinced the SWRCB to issue a
temporary permit for the full flow of the Mono Lake tributaries despite the
fact that it did not have the capacity to use the entire flow and would not
have the capacity to use the flow for thirty years.187 When the LADWP com-
pleted the second phase of the Los Angeles aqueduct in 1970, the Water
Resource Board issued the LADWP a final license without so much as a
public hearing.188 Finally, the California Game and Fish Commissioner
ignored the requirements of California’s Fish and Game Code permitting
the LADWP to run the Mono Lake tributaries dry devastating fish popu-
lations.189 In the words of Elden Vestal “the City of Los Angeles was God
Almighty.”190 Restoring the Mono Lake ecosystem would require a re-
crafting of the LADWP’s water permit, a feat that required meaningful
access to the SWRCB’s decision-making process—access that was blocked
by the LADWP.191
Political blockage is counter to democratic accountability.192 Desta-
bilization theory is premised on the argument that citizens in democratic
societies not only have the right to correct bureaucratic policy decisions
made for the benefit of the politically powerful or elite, but they also have
the right to create structural changes in the social and political institu-
tions necessary to reduce the elites’ political power.193 In destabilization
theory, a “destabilization right[ ]” is the right of citizens to make “claims
to unsettle and open up public institutions that have chronically failed
to meet their obligations and that are substantially insulated from the
normal process of political accountability.”194 Public law litigation is a
venue and means by which destabilization rights may legitimately be ex-
ercised; litigation provides citizens access to decision-making processes
closed by political blockage.195 And as Sax and Chayes note, such a venue
185 See supra Part I.B.
186 See supra Part I.B.
187 See supra Part I.B.
188 See supra Part I.B.
189 See supra Part I.B.
190 HART, supra note 4, at 47 (quoting statement of Elden Vestal).
191 See supra Part I.B.
192 See UNGER, supra note 174, at 530.
193 See id. at 532; Sabel & Simon, supra note 171, at 1020.
194 Sabel & Simon, supra note 171, at 1020.
195 See id. at 1055-56.
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is paramount where bureaucratic agencies play a major role in setting
public policy.196
In the case of most modern social legislation, Congress sets
“general policy objective[s] or orientation[s]” but leaves a fair degree of
discretion to the bureaucratic agency to accomplish the statute’s social
objectives.197 The agency is charged with administration of these social
programs.198 This sometimes requires filling policy gaps left by Congress.199
These same gaps also provided an opening for the court to act if the agency
is not accountable to the statute’s objective or, more importantly, if the
agency has closed the decision-making process to the public or has acted
without deference to “the levers of power in the system.”200 The court’s
attention does not focus on policy making per se; it assures democratic
accountability in a decision-making process which is easily captured by
the politically powerful or elite.201 The court’s role in public law litigation is
thus twofold: to assure that the agency action comports with congressional
intent and to assure some modicum of democratic accountability.202
The courts “pry open the democratic process and provoke conse-
quences that are responsive to the merits of the controversy and [that
are] more reflective of the variety of public constituencies which have an
interest in the dispute.”203 The lawsuit is used to force the administrative
agency to reconsider its decision under the hard questioning eye of the
court, putting the agency’s discretion to the test.204 Additionally, the liti-
gation alerts the legislature to differences of public opinion about the use
and allocation of common pool natural resources.205 It becomes a cue to
196 SAX (1970), supra note 157, at 189 (discussing the right of citizens to use the court
system to gain access to bureaucratic agency decision making forums); Chayes, supra note
156, at 1313; accord UNGER, supra note 174, at 532-33; Sabel & Simon, supra note 171,
at 1020.
197 Chayes, supra note 156, at 1314.
198 Cf. id. (explaining that judges may be called upon to examine the authority that legis-
latures pass on to other bodies).
199 See id. at 1300, 1314.
200 Id. at 1315.
201 See id.; cf. Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 558–60 (1970) [hereinafter Sax, Public Trust
Doctrine] (discussing the role of the court using the public trust doctrine to “promote
equality of political power for a disorganized and diffuse majority”).
202 See SAX, Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 201, at 558–60.
203 SAX (1970), supra note 157, at 180.
204 Id. at 181.
205 Id. at 182.
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the legislature that wider debate and policy discussions are needed about
the allocation of common resources.206
Beyond issue resolution, destabilization theorists argue that liti-
gation can break open large-scale organizations that remain closed to
ordinary citizens and operate in insulated hierarchies of power and ad-
vantage.207 To fully understand this perspective it is useful to examine the
nature of private common law litigation. At common law “the lawsuit is a
[mechanism] for settling disputes between private [individuals] about pri-
vate rights” by apportioning legal liability based on concepts of “intention”
and “fault.”208 Private litigation also performs an important social function
through the doctrine of precedence—it clarifies “the law to guide future
private actions.”209 The precedential function of law is inherently regula-
tory, reaching beyond the litigants;210 it is both linear and web-like. It is
linear to the extent that the legal decision guides the outcome of future
cases;211 it is web-like to the extent that it influences markets, industry
standards, or the allocation of public and private resources,212 as illus-
trated by the influence of product liability litigation on industry manu-
facturing standards.213
The imposition of liability on product manufacturers has caused
modification of industry norms, such as the requirement that industry
should not sacrifice public safety for private gain, as illustrated by the
case of the Ford Pinto, Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Company.214 The court
concluded that Ford Motor Company could not avoid correcting a life-
threatening product defect in order to increase profits.215 The outcome of
206 See id. at 182–83.
207 Sabel & Simon, supra note 171, at 1020.
208 See, Chayes, supra note 156, at 1282–83, 1285 (discussing the characteristics of private
litigation and comparing private litigation to public law litigation). Chayes argues that
public law litigation substantially differs from private law litigation in its focus on the
balance of competing interests in the implementation of broad public policy. Id. at 1302; see
also JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY UNITED STATES 89 (1956).
209 Chayes, supra note 156, at 1285.
210 See Sabel & Simon, supra note 171, at 1057.
211 See id.
212 See id. at 1058–59.
213 See, e.g., Michael J. Rustad, How the Common Good is Served by the Remedy of Punitive
Damages, 64 TENN. L. REV. 793, 801–02 (1997) (outlining the beneficial societal impacts
of punitive damage awards in private litigation on industry norms and product safety).
214 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
215 Id. at 388. Grimshaw involved the design of the Ford Pinto’s fuel system, which exploded
in impacts in excess of 20–30 mph. Id. at 360. Fixing the design defect was a relatively
simple and inexpensive process, however, and after conducting a cost benefit analysis,
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the Grimshaw case was twofold. It provided a monetary remedy settling
the legal dispute, and it indirectly changed the duty of care owed by the
industry to the public.216 The rationale of the Grimshaw court was applied
by courts across the nation in cases ranging from the safety of tires to
breast implants and resulted in a new industry norm.217
The Grimshaw case illustrates the process of “creative destruction”
in which new common law norms can reform institutions.218 In effect, the
rule of the case and the damage award—including in the Grimshaw case
punitive damages—was a shot-across-the-bow warning manufacturers to
modify their behavior.219 By holding the manufacturer liable for the
consequences of socially unreasonable practices. . . . [The
court] puts pressure on weaker, less adept firms. Some
will improve their practices; some will go out of business.
When a court raises standards for the industry, it puts pres-
sure on all firms. The reasonableness norm is continuously
revisable; it is elaborated in the context of current social
circumstances.220
In public law litigation, this creative destructive221 process takes
on an added dimension in the embodiment of destabilization rights.222
Public law litigation can be used in democratic societies to “disentrench
or unsettle a public institution when . . . it is failing to satisfy minimum
Ford opted to forgo the correction reasoning that the compensation it would pay in damages
was less than the cost of a product recall. Id. at 361–62. The Grimshaw family sued Ford
after a stalled Pinto was rear-ended and exploded killing Mrs. Gray and disfiguring a
thirteen-year-old passenger (Grimshaw youth). Id. at 359. The jury awarded actual dam-
ages and punitive damages in excess of $3.5 million. Id. at 388. The appellate court upheld
the trial courts award and reasoning that Ford could not trade public safety for profit. Id.
216 See id. at 388.
217 See Rustad, supra note 213, at 825–28.
218 See Sabel & Simon, supra note 171, at 1059–60.
219 See Rustad, supra note 213, at 845.
220 Sabel & Simon, supra note 171, at 1060.
221 The concept of “creative destruction” was developed by Joseph Schumpeter and refers
to the process by which “abrupt institutional subversion and redeployment” disrupt market
process and “generate [new] economic development.” Sabel & Simon, supra note 171, at
1059–60 (quoting JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 81–86
(3d ed. 1950)). Sabel and Simon argue that common law norms, such as those developed in
the Grimshaw case, can “play an important role in this [disruption] process” creating room
for new opportunities and new performance paradigms. Id. at 1060.
222 See id. at 1062.
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standards of adequate performance and . . . it is substantially immune
from conventional political mechanisms of correction.”223 It can alter the
manner in which bureaucratic agencies make decisions.224 Thus, the ques-
tion presented at Mono Lake is whether public law litigation could be used
to: (1) alter the LADWP’s license to protect the ecosystem and (2) change
the decision-making structure of the SWRCB, compelling it to recognize
ecosystem concerns in future water allocations.
1. Essential Elements and Outcomes of Destabilizing Litigation
Sabel and Simon identify two elements essential to successful
destabilization litigation: the failure to satisfy some minimum legal stan-
dard225 and the experimentalist remedy.226
At the outset, effective destabilizing public law litigation requires
the failure of the administrative agency to satisfy some minimum perfor-
mance standard.227 Generally, these legal standards are uncontroversial
or based on “industry standards” developed through custom and practice.228
“[T]he court looks to [these] standards to define minimum performance”
standards for the public agency.229
A second essential element of destabilization is the experimentalist
remedy.230 Because the remedy in public law litigation addresses policy
decisions made by the public agency, the legal issue is not easily resolved
by the award of damages; rather, the remedy looks to modify the agency
decision.231 In the traditional command-and-control decree, the court de-
signs a remedy, generally with some assistance from the parties, to correct
the agency action and commands the agency to implement the remedy.232
223 Id.
224 See, e.g., id. at 1063.
225 Id. at 1062.
226 Sabel & Simon, supra note 171, at 1067.
227 See id. at 1062–63.
228 Sabel and Simon cite, as an example of minimum performance standards, prison
standards adopted by the Federal Bureau of Prisons such as when “Arkansas’s prison
administrator encouraged” public law litigation to promote prison reform in the institutions
he managed. Id. at 1063.
229 Id.
230 See id. at 1067.
231 See SAX (1970), supra note 157, at 113-14.
232 See Chayes, supra note 156, at 1298–1300 (discussing the nature of the judicial decree).
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The experimentalist remedy differs from the command-and-control decree
in that it is negotiated by stakeholders, “takes the form of a rolling-rule
regime,” and is transparent.233
When the court uses the experimentalist remedy, it creates a space
for the litigants and other stakeholders to “negotiate a remedial plan.”234
The negotiation process requires the stakeholders, often under the over-
sight of a special master, to gather and share information, set agendas and
rules for deliberation and decision-making, set goals, and reach a consensus
about a remedial regime that implements the remedial goals.235 Through
the negotiation process, the stakeholders build relationships that facilitate
the creation of trust.236
Often, negotiations between stakeholders are provisional and de-
pendent upon unknown future contingencies; thus, stakeholders continu-
ally reassess and reposition themselves as their knowledge becomes deeper
and time reveals more information.237 Because the complexities and futur-
istic nature of the issue requires stakeholders to make decisions based on
incomplete information, the stakeholder negotiations focus on: performance
outcome norms and goals, monitoring and assessment of norms and goals,
and reassessment of norms and goals—knowledge is increased as a result
of the success or failure of the negotiated remedy to meet performance
measures.238 This rolling-rule regime requires the parties to interact and
renegotiate over time239 and assumes the court will maintain ongoing over-
sight over the litigation until the goals and implementation can be assessed
over time.240
A final essential element of the experimentalist remedy is trans-
parency in the negotiation and remedy-assessment process.241 The court,
through the negotiated process, forces decisions that were once made in
semi-public or non-public forums to be made publicly and subjects them to
ongoing public scrutiny.242
233 Sabel & Simon, supra note 171, at 1067–72 (emphasis omitted).
234 Id. at 1067.
235 Negotiation among stakeholders is deliberative in nature, requiring face-to-face
interaction and good faith negotiation to build consensus. Id. at 1068.
236 See id. at 1068.
237 See id. at 1069–70.
238 See id.
239 See Sabel & Simon, supra note 171, at 1069–70.
240 See id. at 1070.
241 Id. at 1071.
242 See id. at 1071–72.
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Sabel and Simon identify six destabilizing effects of public law liti-
gation: the veil effect,243 the status quo effect,244 the deliberative effect,245
the publicity effect,246 the stakeholder effect,247 and the web effect.248
Together, these effects alter the relationship between the public agency
and its traditional constituency, the relationship between the blocked
citizen and the agency, and may alter the manner in which the agency
implements public programs.249
B. Public Law Litigation, Social Movements, and Social Science
Scholarship
Social scientists, too, have explored the extent to which litigation
can cause social and political change with a substantial amount of dis-
agreement.250 Stuart Scheingold, in his groundbreaking work The Politics
243 Id. at 1074. The negotiation of the remedy places the agency in an uncertain position
in which the agency can no longer rely on past patterns. Id. This requires the agency to
reorient its goals, its partners, and its understanding of how to solve problems. See id.
at 1074–75.
244 Id. at 1075. Although the form of the negotiated remedy is unknown, the parties realize
that that the outcome will, by necessity, be different than the status quo. Id. at 1075–76.
The negotiation stigmatizes the status quo, reducing the risk of change. Change becomes
a forgone conclusion. Id.
245 Sabel & Simon, supra note 171, at 1076. Because the status quo is no longer an option,
the parties are forced to more fully explore alternatives developed by all of the stake-
holders. Id. at 1076.
246 Id. at 1077. “[V]indication of the plaintiff’s claim” increases public scrutiny of the
problem. Id.
247 Id. “[T]he liability determination empowers the plaintiff[]” and legitimizes the claim,
giving the plaintiff a viable position at the negotiation table. Id. The liability determination
and remedy negotiation also cause an internal power shift, increasing the influence of the
plaintiff and decreasing the influence of the traditional agency stakeholders or power
elites. Id. at 1077–78.
248 Id. at 1080. The negotiated remedy may impact actors beyond the litigation and “spill
back and forth between public and private realms” in a “process of iterative disequilibria-
tion and readjustment.” Id. at 1080–81. Thus, for example, a concern about discrimination
may lead to a concern about the quality of services to the disadvantaged. Id. at 1081.
249 See id. at 1073–74.
250 Gerald Rosenberg has characterized the two schools of thought about the ability of courts
to instigate social change as the dynamic court view and the constrained court view.
GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE?
9–10 (1991). The constrained court view argues that courts are not effective tools of social
reform because of “the limited nature of constitutional rights, the lack of judicial inde-
pendence, and the judiciary’s inability to develop [and implement] appropriate policies.”
Id. at 10. Proponents of the dynamic court view argue that courts can produce significant
social change. See id. at 22; McCann (2006), supra note 1, at 19.
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of Rights, posited that law and litigation could alter public policy but only
if players were willing to “abandon . . . conventional legal perspective[s]”
in favor of “a political approach” to law.251
Scheingold argues that there are two prevailing views of law in
American society: the “myth of rights” and the “politics of rights.”252 The
“myth of rights”253 has at its core a “legal paradigm—a social perspective
which perceives and explains human interactions largely in terms of rules
and of the rights and obligations inherent in rules.”254 Americans tend to
believe that public policy development “is and should be conducted in accor-
dance with the patterns of rights and obligations established under law.”255
Reform lawyers, who are students of this view, tend to distrust political
processes in favor of exclusively “legal” approaches to policy change such
as litigation and, in so doing, “grossly overestimat[e] the political impact
of court rulings.”256 This legal frame “tunnel[s] the vision of . . . activ-
ists . . . leading to an oversimplified approach . . . that grossly exagger-
ates the role that lawyers and litigation can play in a strategy for change.
The assumption is that litigation can evoke a declaration of rights from
courts.”257 This declaration can be used to realize rights, which causes
social and political change,258 thus leading to the belief that litigation alone
can cause social reform.259
In truth, using litigation to promote social change is much more
complex.260 Litigation can be successful in promoting social change only
251 SCHEINGOLD, supra note 158, at 4. Scheingold was the “first to develop a systematic
argument for the proposition that litigation and court decisions could be used as part of
a broader strategy to organize and mobilize political action.” Michael Paris, The Politics
of Rights: Then and Now, 31 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 999, 1006 (2006).
252 SCHEINGOLD, supra note 158, at 7.
253 The “myth of rights” has been the dominant view of law in America. Grounded in the
Constitution, it provides American democracy and politics with symbolic legitimacy. Id.
at 13. Symbolic rights, such as the right to own property and the right to contract freely,
“reflect [the] values which are the building blocks of [American] political ideology.” Id.
254 Id.
255 Id. (emphasis omitted).
256 Robin Stryker, Half Empty, Half Full, or Neither: Law, Inequality, and Social Change in
Capitalist Democracies, 3 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 69, 77 (2007) [hereinafter Stryker (2007)].
257 SCHEINGOLD, supra note 158, at 5.
258 Id.
259 See id. at 4–5.
260 See, e.g., Benedict Kingsbury, Representation in Human Rights Litigation, CARNEGIE
COUNCIL (Apr. 6, 2000), http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/resources/publications/dialogue/
2_02/articles/611.html (“In practice, however, the pursuit of human rights through liti-
gation is vastly more complex.”)
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if it is directed “to the redistribution of power,” if used politically.261
Scheingold characterizes this use of law as the “politics of rights” in
which litigation becomes a “political resource[ ] of unknown value in the
hands of those who want to alter the course of public policy,”262 no different
from any other political resource.263 The value of the resource is dependent
upon the manner in which the resource is used.264 For law and litigation
to be used successfully to promote change, two essential elements come
into play: (1) a preexisting group of political activists promoting social
change and (2) legal mobilization or the use of law, or in Scheingold’s
words “rights,” to develop political resources that can be used by activists
in a larger context to promote social change.265
Social science scholars since Scheingold have argued that if law
and litigation are to result in reform change, they must be mobilized by an
organized social movement.266 The term “social movement” has been given
a variety of definitions by social science scholars, a discussion of which is
beyond the scope of this paper.267 It is, however, useful to employ the defi-
nitions of Tilly and Tarrow. Tilly defines a social movement as “a sustained
series of interactions between power holders and persons successfully
claiming to speak on behalf of a constituency lacking formal representa-
tion,”268 in which these activists make public demands for changes in the
distribution and exercise of political power and “back those demands with
public demonstrations of support.”269 Tarrow expands this definition by
further characterizing a social movement as
261 SCHEINGOLD, supra note 158, at 6.
262 Id. at 6–7 (emphasis added).
263 See id. at 7.
264 Id.
265 See McCann (2006), supra note 1, at 21–22.
266 See CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND SUPREME
COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 20–22 (1998); MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT
WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION 279–80 (1994)
[hereinafter MCCANN (1994)]. Even Scheingold, in the preface of the second edition of The
Politics of Rights notes that McCann clearly articulates an important element of public
law litigation that Scheingold assumes, that is, the existence of a social movement orga-
nization. STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND
POLITICAL CHANGE, xxix–xxx (2d ed. 2004).
267 See, e.g., David A. Snow et al., Mapping the Terrain, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 3, 6-11 (David A. Snow et al. eds., 2004) (discussing various definitions
of social movement and proposing a definition).
268 Charles Tilly, Social Movements and National Politics, in STATEMAKING AND SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS: ESSAYS IN HISTORY AND THEORY 297, 305–06 (Charles Bright & Susan
Harding eds., 1984).
269 Id.
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sequences of contentious politics that are based on un-
derlying social networks and resonant collective action
frames, . . . which . . . maintain sustained challenges
against powerful opponents.
. . . .
. . . Collective action . . . is used by people who lack regular
access to institutions, who act in the name of new or unac-
cepted claims, and who behave in ways that fundamentally
challenge others or authorities.270
In the context of political blockage, a social movement is a group of citizens
blocked from the political decision-making process by concentrated elites
and administrative agencies, who are engaged in attempts to destabilize
or challenge established political blockage in order to gain meaningful
access to public decision-making forums, and who have mobilized to make
demands for access to political decision-making forums.271
McCann, in his overview on the use of litigation by social movement
organizations (“SMOs”) to facilitate social and political change, observes
that SMOs seek both an immediate political decision to redress past wrongs
and structural change that eliminates political blockage, opening policy
and decision-making structures for the benefit of the politically disenfran-
chised.272 Additionally, SMOs seek to build the movement itself, to increase
its power and thereby the likelihood of change.273 Thus, the desired out-
come of an SMO is threefold: (1) short term political gains (policy outcome),
(2) meaningful structural change that provides access to policy-making
forums (policy structural outcome), and (3) movement building.274 In the
context of social movement theory, law and litigation is a political resource
that can be mobilized to accomplish some or all of these outcomes.275
270 SIDNEY TARROW, POWER IN MOVEMENT: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND CONTENTIOUS POLITICS
2–3 (2d ed. 1998).
271 See id. at 3 (explaining that “[c]ontentious collective action is the basis of social
movements”).
272 See McCann (2006), supra note 1, at 23–24. McCann argues that social movements “aim
for a broader scope of social and political transformation” than do conventional activists.
Id. While SMOs may press for short-term gains, their true aim is a better society. Id. These
SMOs employ a wide range of tactics but tend to rely on media campaigns and destructive
symbolic tactics that halt or upset ongoing social practices. Id.
273 See, e.g., MCCANN (1994), supra note 266, at 281–82.
274 See McCann (2006), supra note 1, at 23–24; MCCANN (1994), supra note 266, at 281–82.
275 See generally Bob Edwards & John D. McCarthy, Resources and Social Movement
Mobilization, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 116–152 (David A.
Snow et al. eds., 2004) (discussing resources and their use in social movement mobilization).
2011] HOW LAW MATTERED TO THE MONO LAKE ECOSYSTEM 451
Law is a political resource,276 which can be used by elites or SMOs
to control or promote their own interests or ideas over those of another.277
It is generally conceded among SMO scholars that law as a political re-
source generally supports prevailing social relationships of the politically
powerful or elites.278 Political power is the control of political resources,
including law,279 and the exercise of political power is the mobilization of
these resources to control the outcome of political conflicts or conflicts over
public policy outcomes.280
In the context of Mono Lake, California’s legislative water appro-
priation scheme became a political resource used by the LADWP to access
the Mono Lake tributaries.281 The California constitutional provision “that
the water resources of the State be put to beneficial use to the fullest ex-
tent of which they are capable”282 was intended to stretch scarce water
resources to ensure settlement.283 Thus, California’s prior appropriation
water system incorporated a beneficial use doctrine that equated to the
“duty of water.”284 This historic definition of beneficial use weighed heavily
in favor of an extractive and economic use of water.285 In this context, the
276 What constitutes a resource in the context of a social movement is to some degree
dependent upon the social movement theory used by the scholar. For example, scholars
of the rational choice or resource mobilization theory of social movements focus on the
means available to collective actors to facilitate mobilization of social movements. TARROW,
supra note 270, at 15–16. Resources include money, time, and human capital. See Edwards
& McCarthy, supra note 195, at 118. These resources are internal to the SMO. See id.
Tarrow, in his synthesis of social movement theory, argues that people engage in con-
tentious politics when political opportunities are presented to them and that, in this
context, a resource may be either internal to the SMO, in the case of money or power
leveraged to create change, or may be external to the SMO in the form of an external
opportunity—an opening or access point such as the Three Mile Island nuclear accident’s
impact on the anti-nuclear power movement in the United States. See TARROW, supra
note 270, at 19–20.
277 See Turk, supra note 173, at 280–81; McCann (2006), supra note 1, at 21–22.
278 See, e.g., McCann (2006), supra note 1, at 22–23.
279 See, e.g., Turk, supra note 173, at 280 (analyzing the five types of political resources
represented by law).
280 See id.
281 See, e.g., Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine Cnty. (Nat’l Audubon), 658 P.2d
709, 713–14, 727–29 (Cal. 1983) (finding that the LADWP used California’s water appro-
priation scheme to access Mono Lake’s tributaries).
282 Id. at 725 (quoting CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2 enacted in 1928 as art. XIV, § 3).
283 See Janet C. Neuman, Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search for
Efficiency in Western Water Use, 28 ENVTL. L. 919, 965–66 (1998) (providing a brief state-
ment of the history and purpose of the beneficial use doctrine in western water law).
284 See Samuel C. Wiel, What is Beneficial Use of Water, 3 CAL. L. REV. 460, 462 (1915).
285 See Neuman, supra note 283, at 968-69, 975.
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LADWP could use California water law as a political resource to justify
the extraction of water from the Mono Lake tributaries to support eco-
nomic and urban development in Los Angeles.286
The LADWP could also, and did, use law as a resource to help
frame287 the water issue for the citizens of California.288 The framing power
of law can impose limitations, perceived or real, on alternative approaches
to policy determinations.289 In the case of Mono Lake, the beneficial use
doctrine linked the need for water with the human and financial well-
being of the citizens of Los Angeles.290 As early as 1905, the LADWP and
Mulholland used an economic frame to paint “bleak visions of water fam-
ines, drought, and economic collapse” to support Los Angeles’s quest for
water and to gain support for the bonds necessary to fund the Los Angeles
aqueduct.291 The Mono Lake project was presented to the citizens of Los
Angeles “as a vitally important interim device to save Los Angeles from a
water famine until the aqueduct to the Colorado could be completed.”292
Even the court in City of Los Angeles v. Aitken adopted this frame, acknowl-
edging that while the diversion would have a devastating impact on Mono
Lake and the surrounding communities, it was uncontroverted that the
“condemnation of the waters of Rush and Leevining (sic) creeks by the
city of Los Angeles [for municipal purposes] was a necessity.”293
286 See Wiel, supra note 284, at 472 n.53.
287 A “frame” is a “ ‘schemata of interpretation’ that [permits] individuals ‘to locate, perceive,
identify, and label’ ” events and occurrences in their lives and in the larger world. Robert D.
Benford & David A. Snow, Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and
Assessment, 26 ANN. REV. SOC. 611, 614 (2000). Framing permits individuals to organize
their experiences and information and serves to guide actions. Id. Frames permit the indi-
vidual to simplify and condense information. Id. And Nisbet, in his discussion of framing
and climate change, notes that a frame is an “interpretive storyline” that communicates
“why an issue might be a problem, who or what might be responsible for it, and what
should be done about it.” Matthew Nisbet, Communicating Climate Change: Why Frames
Matter for Public Engagement, ENV’T MAG., Mar.-Apr. 2009, at 12, 15 (discussing the
analysis of framing in social science disciplines). Frames convey why an issue matters.
Matthew C. Nisbet & Dietram A. Scheufele, What’s Next for Science Communication?
Promising Directions and Lingering Distractions, 96 AM. J. OF BOTANY 1767, 1770 (2009).
They lend “weight to certain considerations and arguments over others.” Id.
288 See Andrew H. Sawyer, Changing Landscapes and Evolving Law: Lessons from Mono
Lake on Takings and the Public Trust, 50 OKLA. L. REV. 311, 317–18, 324 (1997).
289 See Turk, supra note 173, at 281. Law plays a significant role in shaping the frames
people use to give meaning to situations. Id. The fact that law supports one view can
diminish the legitimacy of other views. Id.
290 See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
291 KAHRL, supra note 60, at 84–85.
292 Id. at 342.
293 City of Los Angeles v. Aitken (Aitken), 52 P.2d 585, 586 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1935).
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If, however, law is to matter in the struggle for political and social
change, then the power of law—the political resources it affords—must
be made available to the SMO as a resource in the struggle for change.294
Through legal mobilization, the SMO translates its desire into an asser-
tion of a lawful claim of right to transform or reconstitute the terms of
the social and power relationships within polities.295 But, legal mobiliza-
tion and court orders alone are insufficient to motivate political change.296
Social movement scholars argue that litigation matters only if it is part
of a broader strategy to organize and mobilize political action, resulting
in the redistribution of political power.297 It is the redistribution of political
power and not litigation that brings about meaningful change. As Stryker
explains in her overview of studies examining the relationship between
social movements and litigation: “maximizing real world inequality re-
duction through law requires combining a number of factors or conditions.
Law interpretation and enforcement must be subject to sustained social
movement pressure from below through a combination of litigation and
mass political mobilization.”298
What role then can litigation play in the process to change political
structures? Both legal theorists and social scientists identify a number of
elements that appear to be necessary for successful destabilizing litiga-
tion that sustains political and social change. These elements include: an
established SMO; a minimum legal standard that forms the basis for liti-
gation;299 political and legal mobilization;300 the ability to use the litigation
to frame the issue for bystanders and potential movement members;301 on-
going court oversight;302 and a decree that encompasses an experimental
294 See, e.g., Beth Harris, Representing Homeless Families: Repeat Player Implementation
Strategies, 33 L. & SOC’Y REV. 911, 913 (1999).
295 See McCann (2006), supra note 1, at 21–22.
296 See Harris, supra note 294, at 933; Stryker (2007), supra note 256, at 90. Social scien-
tists argue that there are a number of factors which impact whether a court order will
be enforced, let alone whether the order will result in political change. See Harris, supra
note 294, at 933; Stryker (2007), supra note 256, at 90. Those factors include but are not
limited to whether the SMO is permitted to participate in the decision-making process,
whether the court exercises ongoing oversight over the matter, and whether the remedy
fixes responsibility for and monitors the impact of organizational change and its outcome.
See Harris, supra note 294, at 933; Stryker (2007), supra note 256, at 90.
297 See Stryker (2007), supra note 256, at 76.
298 Id. at 88 (emphasis added).
299 See Sabel & Simon, supra note 171, at 1063–64.
300 See Stryker (2007), supra note 256, at 76–78.
301 See Benford & Snow, supra note 287, at 614.
302 See Stryker (2007), supra note 256, at 85.
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remedy, which is negotiated by stakeholders in a transparent process
subject to ongoing oversight by the court, and is also flexible enough to
permit modification as new information becomes available.303
What did this mean in the context of the Mono Lake ecosystem?
As events would demonstrate, restoration and protection of the Mono
Lake ecosystem would require not just a court order but a redistribution
of political power that would change the criteria and method used to
allocate California’s water resources.304
III. METHODS
How then to explore the role of litigation in Mono Lake ecosystem
restoration? In the context of historic events surrounding social change,
the tool of narrative305 is used by historical sociologists to explore what
happened and to explain why events unfolded the way they did.306 Using
the history of events to explain how social change occurs permits the re-
searcher to marry theory and operating assumptions about how the world
operates.307 The narrative can also be used to build and test theories.308
Theory building from case histories involves the use of one or more
cases “to create theoretical constructs, propositions and/or midrange theory
from case-based empirical evidence.”309 Theory is developed by recognizing
patterns of relationships among constructs.310 This is an iterative process,
an over-time process involving a continual interplay and
mutual adjustment between theory and history. Concrete
303 See supra Part II.A.1.
304 See infra Part IV.
305 A narrative is an analytical construct that unifies past and contemporaneous actions
“into a coherent relational whole that gives meaning to and explains each of its elements
and is, at the same time constituted by them.” Larry J. Griffin, Narrative, Event-Structure
Analysis, and Causal Interpretation in Historical Sociology, 99 AM. J. SOC. 1094, 1097
(1993). A narrative is how we reconstitute and describe events. See id. at 1098.
306 Robin Stryker, Beyond History Versus Theory: Strategic Narrative and Sociological
Explanation, 24 SOC. METH. & RES. 304, 305 (1996) [hereinafter Stryker (1996)]; CHARLES
C. RAGIN, THE COMPARATIVE METHOD: MOVING BEYOND QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE
STRATEGIES 19–20 (1989).
307 See Lee Teitelbaum, An Overview of Law and Social Research, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 465,
472–73 (1985).
308 See Kathleen M. Eisenhardt & Melissa A. Graebner, Theory Building from Cases:
Opportunities and Challenges, 50 ACAD. MGMT. J. 25, 25 (2007).
309 Id.
310 Id.
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and specific historical events and configurations are con-
ceptualized in terms of abstract concepts and sensitizing
frameworks. These concepts and frameworks are used to
select, to order, and to interpret . . . data . . . .311
From the narrative and its comparison to the theoretical frame and other
cases, the researcher can begin to make preliminary causal generaliza-
tions to deductively explore how and why a given action does or does not
produce another action in a causal sequence.312
Using a theoretical lens constructed from Sabel and Simon’s de-
stabilization model modified to reflect the findings of social scientists such
as Scheingold, McCann, and Stryker, this article examines the narrative
of the Mono Lake restoration. This article will explore the role of law and
litigation in changing the political and social structures necessary to protect
and restore the Mono Lake ecosystem by using the narrative of the Mono
Lake restoration constructed by Hart313 and supplemented by government
documents, court decisions, media accounts, and the work of other legal
scholars as noted herein.
IV. LESSONS LEARNED FROM MONO LAKE
A. Lesson One: Social Movement Organizations Matter
Although legal scholars recognize that one of the primary goals
of public law litigation is to provide citizens access to the public policy
forum,314 social movement scholars argue that change litigation is most
successful if it is brought by a SMO because SMOs aim for broader social
and political transformations than do traditional litigants.315 Thus, while
SMOs may achieve short term gains, their primary push is for structural
311 Stryker (1996), supra note 306, at 310–11.
312 Id. at 311.
313 See generally HART, supra note 4.
314 See generally SAX (1970), supra note 157, at 175–80. Sax posits that the purpose of public
law litigation in the context of natural resource policy management is to provide citizens
blocked from the policy realm an opportunity to challenge an agency in court on behalf of
the public to stop a project that infringes on the public’s rights to a common resource. See
id. at 175. Likewise, Sabel and Simon argue that one of the primary functions of destabiliz-
ing public law litigation is to give disenfranchised stakeholders access to policy decision-
making forums that have become politically steeled to consumer citizen groups. See Sabel
& Simon, supra note 171, at 1064.
315 McCann (2006), supra note 1, at 23–24.
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change to political and social institutions.316 Additionally, SMOs that
use litigation as a regular strategy are more adept at using litigation for
social change because they are more likely to have pre-existing networks,317
including activists and other organizations capable of mobilizing the re-
sources necessary to bring the litigation and take advantage of its out-
comes.318 These SMOs are “repeat players” in the litigation game.319 Repeat
players are more likely to view litigation as a broad strategy, increasing
the likelihood that litigation will result in “redistributive change.”320 Fur-
ther, research suggests that if SMOs are represented throughout the liti-
gation, courts are more likely to favor the interests they represent.321 For
Mono Lake, SMOs were central to restoration, and these SMOs relied
heavily on a litigation strategy.322
Although there were some early attempts323 to initiate interest in
the restoration of Mono Lake, restoration of Mono Lake would ultimately
316 Id.
317 There is an extensive body of social science literature surrounding the concept of net-
works and the use of social networks by SMOs and others to accomplish change. For pur-
poses of this article, a social network is a social structure made up of individuals and/or
organizations (nodes) connected by one or more types of interdependency. Nancy Katz et
al., Network Theory and Small Groups, 23 SMALL GROUP RES. 307, 308–310 (June 2004)
(discussing the structure of social networks).
318 See Stryker (2007), supra note 256, at 75–76.
319 See id. (explaining the concept of “repeat players”).
320 See Joel B. Grossman, Stewart Macaulay & Herbert M. Kritzer, Do the “Haves” Still
Come Out Ahead?, 33 L. & SOC’Y REV. 803, 803–04 (1999) (discussing the difference be-
tween those who access the courts on a regular basis and those who are “one shotters”).
See also Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculation on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974). Galanter analyzed the impact of litigation based
on the nature of the litigant. See id. at 97. He posited that individuals or organizations
that have only occasional recourse to courts (one shot players) are less successful in lever-
aging litigation to bring about social and political change than are litigants who are en-
gaged in similar pieces of litigation over time (repeat players). See id. at 97–99. One-shot
players have higher costs, are more focused on the outcome of the individual lawsuit than
the long-term picture, and are more likely to settle without obtaining redistributive relief.
See id. at 97–103. As a result, institutions generally have an advantage in the litigation
game. See id.
321 See, e.g., Harris, supra note 294, at 929.
322 See Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Working Out an Environmental Ethic: Anniversary
Lessons from Mono Lake, 4 WYO. L. REV. 1, 18 (2004).
323 In 1961, David Mason, a limnology graduate student, undertook a limnological study of
the area. HART, supra note 4, at 52. Mason tried to enlist Ansel Adams to use his influence
to preserve Mono Lake. Id. Mason also approached several environmental groups; they
were sympathetic but showed little interest in taking on the Mono Lake cause. Id. Mason
was, however, able to stir the interest of local shoreline owners who joined together to
form Friends of Mono Lake. Id. at 59.
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fall on the shoulders of graduate students-turned-activists: David Gains,324
David Winkler,325 and Tim Such.326 In 1976, Gaines and Winkler formed
the Mono Basin Research Group to study the degradation of the Mono
Lake ecosystem.327 Both Gaines and Winkler were passionate about Mono
Lake ecosystem restoration, but neither was particularly interested in
political activism.328 When lake levels dropped to 6375 feet—permitting
Winkler to walk to Negit Island329—in November 1977, however, Winkler
and Gaines saw no alternative to political action.330
Together, Gaines and Winkler approached a number of national
environmental organizations (“NEOs”) for support; the NEOs all expressed
concern but were unwilling to take action.331 Finally, Gaines received the
support of the Santa Monica Bay Chapter of the Audubon Society to create
the “Mono Lake Committee” as a subsidiary,332 while Winkler appealed to
the state and the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) to find a tempo-
rary solution for the elimination of the Negit Island land bridge.333
In March 1978, the California National Guard blasted a moat be-
tween Negit Island and the shores of Mono Lake, and in that same month
the Mono Lake Committee opened an office in a print shop in Oakland,
California.334 In its first publication, the Mono Lake Committee called for
restoration of Mono Lake water elevations to 6378 feet, the 1976 level.335
324 In 1972, David Gaines, a U.C. Davis ecology graduate student, was hired by the
California Natural Resources Coordinating Council to do an inventory of Mono County and
became alarmed by the state of Mono Lake. Id. at 65–66.
325 In 1975, Gaines recruited Winkler, then a student, to do research at Mono Lake. Id. at 66.
326 Tim Such, an undergraduate at U.C. Berkeley, discovered Mono Lake as part of an
assignment in his environmental studies class. Id. at 61.
327 See id. at 66–71 for a detailed outline of the biological research of the Mono Basin
Research Group.
328 See HART, supra note 4, at 70–71.
329 Historically, Negit Island was separated from the mainland and provided a primary
nesting site for the California Gull. Id. at 16–17. As early as 1972, American Bird maga-
zine documented the creation of a land bridge between Negit Island and the mainland and
predicted the “total destruction” of the California gull nesting population. Id. at 59–60.
As a symbolic response, the Bureau of Land Management declared Negit Island an
Outstanding National Area. Id. at 60.
330 See id. at 71.
331 Id. at 72. Gaines and Winkler reported approaching the Sierra Club, the Friends of the
Earth, and the Natural Resources Defense Council among others. Id.
332 Id.
333 Id.
334 HART, supra note 4, at 72–74.
335 Id. at 74. This was the minimum level the Committee believed necessary for ecosystem
restoration. Id. When criticized by the national environmental groups for not calling for
an end to all diversion, the committee retorted that it did not intend to overreach. Id. It
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The LADWP did not even acknowledge the proposal.336 Hart characterized
the pending battlefield.
In this corner: the [LADWP]. Its annual budget, over
one billion . . . . It had armies of lawyers, armies of engi-
neers, armies of lobbyists. Its right to the waters it had
tapped, however much resented by people in the source
regions, seemed unassailable; it was anchored in a system
of state water law that every water supplier in the state
could be counted on to defend.
And in the other corner: the upstart Mono Lake
Committee. It spent, in 1978, $4,867.15. In the early days
it could not be reached by phone. Its leaders worked out of
“homes and tents scattered hither and yon” . . . “a small
band of birdwatchers and graduate students . . . activated
by nothing more complex than their deep affection for a
place few Californians will ever see.”337
While Winkler and Gaines were building the Mono Lake Commit-
tee, Tim Such independently took a different track.338 Such began contact-
ing established NEOs and government agencies urging them to litigate to
halt the diversion.339 Such recalls: “[t]hey [NEOs] thought the Mono issue
was too complex . . . . [Y]ou couldn’t fight Los Angeles.”340 They suggested
he come back “[i]f you find a good legal theory.”341 Such suspended his
undergraduate studies at Berkeley and began searching for a legal
theory, ultimately landing on the public trust doctrine when he read
Joseph Sax’s 1970 law review article: The Public Trust Doctrine in
Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention.342
Such made a second round of the NEOs in 1978 with this new
theory.343 Only the Friends of the Earth (“the Friends”) was receptive
would seek the minimum they believed Mono Lake needed to survive based on evidence
compiled to date. Id.
336 Id.
337 Id. (citation omitted).
338 See id. at 61.
339 See id. at 63.
340 Hart, supra note 4, at 63 (quoting interview with Tim Such between March 22 and
March 29, 1994).
341 Id.
342 Id. at 63–64. See generally Sax, Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 201.
343 HART, supra note 4, at 65, 81.
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and, in a classic example of social networking, took the case to its attorney,
Andy Baldwin, who in turn called his contacts in the law firm of Morrison
and Foerster (“MoFo”).344 MoFo agreed to take the case pro bono, but it
needed a plaintiff.345 In its search for a plaintiff, MoFo looked not to an
individual but to three SMOs: the Friends, the Mono Lake Committee, and
the National Audubon.346 One participant at that first meeting between
MoFo and the three Mono Lake plaintiffs observed: “[it was] the Children’s
Crusade at the court of some Eastern potentate. Trail mix and backwoods
idealism confronted pinstripes across a corporate table.”347 The processes of
initiating and financing the Mono Lake litigation are illustrative of the ad-
vantages of the SMO as a litigant. Here, the Friends’s social network was
used to locate an attorney, the financial resources of the Friends and the
National Audubon were used to launch the litigation, and the national stat-
ure of the National Audubon was used to give the litigation credibility.348
The LADWP was, however, undaunted by the threat of litigation.349
The parties met in a pre-trial conference but no deal emerged.350 One
LADWP representative was heard to remark: “[t]he last lawsuit we had
like this took forty-three years.”351 With that ominous warning, the parties
filed suit.352 The environmental goal of the litigation was clear: to save the
Mono Lake ecosystem. In hindsight, it is also clear that this environmental
outcome would require not only revisiting the 1940 SWRCB permitting
decision but also for the SWRCB to consider the needs of the ecosystem in
the permitting decision process and a change in the historic relationship
between the LADWP and the SWRCB.353 Could the litigation accomplish
this feat?
344 Id. Most of the NEOs rejected Such’s plea because they were gearing up for a fight over
the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta and the Peripheral Canal. Id. at 65. Saving Mono Lake,
these NEOs believed, would only put more pressure on the Sacramento River and other
Northern California water sources. Id.
345 Id. at 82.
346 Id. Although all three organizations were named parties in the litigation, National
Audubon was the first named plaintiff primarily because of its national stature and its
financial resources. Id. at 82–83. Both the Friends and National Audubon contributed an
initial $10,000 to cover costs and expenses. Id. at 83.
347 Id. at 82 (quoting interview of Gray Brechin, May 26, 1994).
348 Id. at 81–83.
349 See HART, supra note 4, at 83.
350 Id.
351 Id. (quoting interview with Bruce F. Dodge, Counsel to National Audubon Society,
April 12, 1994).
352 Id.
353 See supra Part I.B.
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B. Lesson Two: Minimum Performance Standards May Not Be
Essential
Sabel and Simon argue that effective destabilizing litigation re-
quires the failure of the administrative agency to satisfy some minimum
performance standard.354 A minimum performance standard is uncontro-
versial or based on industry standards developed through custom and
practice.355 The court looks to these standards to define the minimum per-
formance standards in destabilizing litigation,356 yet arguably, the public
trust doctrine relied on by Such and the Mono Lake Committee is one of
the more elusive and controversial legal standards in environmental law.
The public trust doctrine, an ancient legal doctrine originating
under Roman and English common law, is premised on the theory that
certain types of public property—most notably seashores, tidal waters,
fisheries, highways, and waterways—are dedicated to perpetual public use
and must be held in trust for the public by the sovereign.357 Historically,
the sovereign could not convey trust lands to private interests, although
Parliament had the authority to enlarge or diminish trust rights for a
“legitimate public purpose.”358 The U.S. Supreme Court recognized the
application of the public trust doctrine in the United States as early as
1868.359 The ability of a state legislature to convey trust properties to pri-
vate interests was most famously addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court
in Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Illinois,360 where the Court ruled
that because the public trust doctrine extended to navigable waters and
streams, the Illinois legislature could not convey the Lake Michigan water-
front and the associated control over commerce to a private enterprise.361
354 See Sabel & Simon, supra note 171, at 1062–63.
355 Id. Federal prison standards are illustrative of this type of uncontroverted legal stan-
dard. See id. at 1063. Sabel and Simon cite to a number of cases where senior prison
officials encouraged litigation by outsiders to promote prison reform. See id.
356 Id. at 1063.
357 Sax, Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 201, at 475–76. See also SAX (1970), supra note
157, at 163–64. These public trust properties were distinguishable from general public
property, which the sovereign could grant to private owners. Sax, Public Trust Doctrine,
supra note 201, at 475.
358 Sax, Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 201, at 476.
359 See R.R. Co. v. Shurmeir, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 272, 287 (1868) (noting that navigable rivers
are subject to the jus publicum). See also Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 14–47 (1894)
(recounting the history of the public trust doctrine in the United States).
360 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
361 Id. at 454. Illinois Central involved a state grant of land under Lake Michigan to the
Illinois Central Railroad. Id. The grant extended one mile out and across the Chicago
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The shores of Lake Michigan were a public trust asset,362 and the state
could not “abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people are
interested . . . so as to leave them entirely under the use and control of
private parties . . . .”363
Sax, in his now famous law review article on the public trust doc-
trine, argued the public trust doctrine should be extended beyond tide
waters to form the basis of a legal theory which would enable private citi-
zens to protect the public’s interest in common pool resources such as air
and water.364 Sax noted that, because the public trust doctrine rests upon
the principle that the public’s interest in certain natural resources is so
important that these resources could not be transferred to private hands
but should remain freely available to the entire citizenry, the role of the
government must be to “promote the interests of the general public [in
the common pool resource] rather than to redistribute public goods from
broad public uses to restricted private benefit.”365 The transfer of trust
assets into private hands, if permitted at all, must be accompanied by
“substantial evidence that some compensating public benefit is being
achieved thereby.”366 The trust obligation was not unlimited but, where
applicable, assured that
the property subject to the trust must not only be used for
a public purpose, but it must be held available for use by
the general public; . . . the property may not be sold, even
for a fair cash equivalent; and . . . the property must be
maintained for particular types of uses [that benefit the
larger public].367
Harbor and comprised most of Chicago’s commercial waterfront. Id. at 437–38. The Illinois
legislature, regretting its decision, voted to repeal the grant and sued to have the grant
declared invalid. Id. at 439. The Supreme Court upheld the revocation, finding that the
title to the waters of Lake Michigan was “different in character from that which the State
holds in lands intended for sale. . . . It is a title held in trust for the people of the State . . . .”
Id. at 452. For a more detailed history of the Illinois Central case see Joseph D. Kearney
& Thomas W. Merill, The Origins of the American Public Trust Doctrine: What Really
Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 799 (2004). See Alexandra B. Klass, Modern
Public Trust Principles: Recognizing Rights and Integrating Standards, 82 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 699 (2006) for a more detailed discussion of the history of the public trust doctrine
in the United States since 1970.
362 Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 455–56.
363 Id. at 453.
364 See SAX (1970), supra note 157, at 172–73.
365 Id. at 165.
366 Id.
367 Sax, Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 201, at 477.
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Citizens, Sax concluded, should be permitted to sue the government to
compel it to comply with its trust obligations.368
California itself had a long history of using the public trust doctrine
to protect shoreline resources and navigable waters.369 Since the mid-1860s,
California courts had regularly invalidated public-private conveyances of
tidelands valued for navigation and fishing even where the legislature ap-
peared to authorize the conveyances to private interests.370 The California
court observed that “[n]othing short of a very explicit provision [in stat-
ute] . . . would justify us in holding that the legislature intended to permit
the shore of the ocean . . . to be converted into private ownership.”371 Even
where the legislature explicitly authorized the conveyance of trust prop-
erty to private interests, California courts were loath to find that the legis-
lature had conveyed all public interest in the property.372 The grantee of
trust lands was presumed to have obtained title subject to the public’s
right of navigation.373
In 1971, the California Supreme Court expanded the scope of the
public trust doctrine in Marks v. Whitney,374 a quiet title action.375 Marks’s
property had been acquired under an 1874 patent from California.376
Marks claimed he had the right, as owner of the shoreline, to fill and
develop the property.377 Whitney, who owned property inland from Marks’s
property, opposed the shoreline fill, arguing that it would cut off his rights
to the tidelands that he held as a member of the public under the public
trust doctrine.378
368 See SAX (1970), supra note 157, at 173 (arguing that citizens are entitled to enforce the
legal protection of common property resources). See generally id. at 175–92 (discussing the
use of litigation to enforce trust obligations).
369 See Sax, Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 201, at 524–34, 538–44 (discussing the
California courts’ use of the public trust doctrine prior to 1970).
370 See id. at 525–26.
371 Id. at 527 (quoting Kimball v. MacPherson, 46 Cal. 104, 108 (1873)).
372 See id. at 525–26 (noting the California Supreme Court’s narrow reading of statutes so
as to invalidate or declare voidable certain conveyances of tidelands); id. at 528 (noting
that, even when a grant was validated, the landowner was required to use the land subject
to the public’s rights).
373 Id. at 528 (citing People v. Cal. Fish Co., 138 P. 79, 87 (Cal. 1912)).
374 491 P.2d 374 (Cal. 1971).
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The trial court found that Whitney had “no ‘standing’ to raise
the public trust issue.”379 The California Supreme Court reversed.380 The
California Supreme Court’s decision in Marks v. Whitney was important
to the development of a legal theory for Mono Lake for three reasons. First,
the court recognized that Whitney, as a member of the public, could bring
an action to enforce the public trust interest;381 furthermore, had Whitney
not raised the issue, the court itself could take judicial notice of the public
trust burdens and raise the issue on its own.382 This meant that any citizen
could bring suit to protect the public’s interests in trust assets.
Second, the court held that the public trust burden is both flexible
and fluid.383 While historically the trust burden was limited to navigation,
fisheries, and commerce, over time the trust obligation had expanded to
include hunting, boating, and recreating.384 Here the court noted:
The public uses to which tidelands are subject are
sufficiently flexible to encompass changing public needs. In
administering the trust the state is not burdened with an
outmoded classification favoring one mode of utilization
over another. There is a growing public recognition that one
of the most important public uses of the tidelands—a use
encompassed within the tidelands trust—is the preservation
of those lands in their natural state, so that they may serve
as ecological units for scientific study, as open space, and
as environments which provide food and habitat for birds
and marine life, and which favorably affect the scenery and
climate of the area.385
Accordingly, the public trust burden was sufficiently flexible to encompass
changing values, including the preservation of the trust assets in their
natural state. This opened the door for use of the public trust doctrine to
protect ecosystems.386
379 Id.
380 491 P.2d at 383.
381 Id. at 381–82.
382 Id. at 378, 381–82.
383 Id. at 380.
384 Id.
385 Id. (citation omitted).
386 See, e.g., State v. Super. Ct. of Placer Cnty., 625 P.2d 256, 259–60 (Cal. 1981) (using
the public trust doctrine to protect an area of ecological significance).
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Finally, the court concluded that while the legislature could
remove the trust burden from traditional trust lands, it was up to the
legislature “to take the necessary steps” to free trust lands of their trust
burdens.387 The natural conclusion of this holding is that put forth by Sax
who argued that
[a]ny action which will adversely affect traditional public
rights in trust lands is a matter of general public interest
and should therefore be made only if there has been full
consideration of the state’s public interest in the matter;
such actions should not be taken in some fragmentary and
publicly invisible way.388
The problem with the public trust doctrine from a destabilization
perspective was that there was no agreement about the application of the
public trust doctrine to water appropriations for the preservation of non-
extractive trust assets;389 thus, the public trust doctrine was hardly an un-
controversial performance standard.390 The SWRCB had long argued that
it had no alternative under California law but to permit the appropriation
of the Mono Lake tributaries.391 The SWRCB noted:
it is indeed unfortunate that the City’s proposed develop-
ment will result in decreasing the aesthetic advantages of
Mono Basin but there is apparently nothing that this office
can do to prevent it. The use to which the City proposes to
put the water . . . is defined by the Water Commission Act
387 491 P.2d at 381.
388 Sax, Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 201, at 531 (emphasis added). It should be
noted that, at the time Sax wrote his public trust article in the Michigan Law Review, the
California Supreme Court had not yet issued a final ruling in Marks v. Whitney. Sax had
reviewed the appellate court decision and criticized the appellate court for not taking up
the public trust issue. See id. at 530–31 (discussing Marks v. Whitney, 80 Cal. Rptr. 606
(Ct. App. 1969), rev’d, 491 P.2d 374 (Cal. 1971)).
389 See HART, supra note 4, at 64–65. See generally J.B. Ruhl, Ecosystem Services and the
Common Law of “The Fragile Land System”, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Fall 2005, at 3,
5 (noting that most state courts have declined to apply the public trust doctrine to
protect ecosystems).
390 See supra notes 354–55 and accompanying text (noting that destabilizing litigation
typically involves an uncontroversial performance standard).
391 See, e.g., Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine County (Nat’l Audubon), 658 P.2d
709, 714 (Cal. 1983).
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as the highest to which water may be applied . . . . This
office therefore has no alternative but to dismiss all protests
based upon the possible lowering of the water level in Mono
Lake and the effect that the diversion of water from these
streams may have upon the aesthetic and recreational value
of the Basin.392
To prevail in its legal challenge, the Mono Lake Committee would have to
convince the court to apply the public trust doctrine to California’s water
rights/appropriation system for the benefit of the natural system.393 This
feat would require the court to develop a new legal theory premised on
the argument that California’s water rights/appropriation system did not
subsume the state’s public trust obligations.394
Initially, the prospect of litigation playing any role in Mono Lake
ecosystem restoration seemed fairly bleak.395 Almost four years and several
early defeats were to elapse before the Supreme Court of California issued
its now landmark decision in National Audubon Society v. Superior Court
of Alpine County.396 The filing of the lawsuit in the spring of 1979 was fol-
lowed by a flurry of motions and counter motions.397 The venue of the Mono
Lake litigation was not resolved until July 1980 when the Federal District
Court for the Eastern District of California ordered the removal of the
392 Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Div. Wat. Resources Dec. 7053, 7055, 8042 & 8043
at 26 (Apr. 11, 1940)). The SWRCB reiterated this argument in the lower court. See id.
at 714 n.7 (quoting an interrogatory response made by the Water Board).
393 See id. at 712 (noting that the lower court had rejected this argument on summary
judgment).
394 Id. The California Supreme Court observed that the National Audubon case brought
together “for the first time two systems of legal thought: the appropriative water rights
system which since the days of the gold rush has dominated California water law, and
the public trust doctrine . . . .” Id.
395 See supra note 337 and accompanying text.
396 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
397 See HART, supra note 4, at 83–89. The lawsuit was originally filed in Mono County. Id.
at 83. The court granted the LADWP’s first request for change of venue, moving the matter
to Alpine County but denied a second request for change of venue. Id. at 89. The LADWP
filed a cross claim against 117 residents of the Mono Basin alleging that they had contrib-
uted to the decline in lake elevation. Id.; see also Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Dep’t of Water
& Power of Los Angeles, 496 F. Supp. 499, 502 (E.D. Cal. 1980). Not to be outdone, the
SWRCB filed a cross claim against Audubon and the Mono Lake Committee arguing that
they had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. HART, supra note 4, at 89; 496
F. Supp. at 502. The SWRCB filed a cross complaint naming the United States as a
defendant which resulted in a petition to remove the case to federal district court. 496
F.Supp. at 502.
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matter from California state court to federal district court.398 Removal
was followed by further jurisdictional wrangling and an abstention order
instructing Audubon and the Mono Lake Committee to file an action in
state court to address: (1) “the relationship between the public trust doc-
trine and the California water rights system” and (2) whether Audubon
was required to exhaust its administrative remedies prior to filing suit
challenging the LADWP allocation permit.399 Thus, the matter was sent
down to California’s Alpine Superior Court.400
On November 9, 1981, Judge Hilary Cook of the Alpine Superior
Court dealt the Mono Lake Committee a devastating blow, ruling that the
plaintiffs, Audubon and the Mono Lake Committee, must “exhaust their
administrative remedies before the [SWRCB] prior to filing suit . . . .”401
More importantly, she found that California’s prior appropriation system
“is a comprehensive and exclusive system for determining the legality of
the diversions for the City of Los Angeles in the Mono Basin . . . . The
Public Trust Doctrine does not function independently of that system. . . .
[T]he Public Trust Doctrine is subsumed in the water rights system of the
state.”402 Audubon and the Mono Lake Committee immediately appealed,
requesting expedited review to the California Supreme Court, but even
with expedited review, the matter would not be resolved until 1983.403
Meanwhile, Mono Lake’s levels continued to fall, dropping to 6373
feet in 1980.404 By June 1981, Negit Island was “solidly fused” to the main-
land, brine shrimp and gull hatches where at an all time low, and many
of those gulls that did hatch suffered massive die offs or were hunted by
predators reaching nesting islands.405 To many, it seemed that the Mono
Lake ecosystem was on the verge of collapse with no relief in sight.406
Then, in the winters of 1981 and 1982, the snow and the rains began.407
There was more water than the reservoir could handle, so Mayor Bradley
398 496 F. Supp. at 509.
399 Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Dept. of Water (Nat’l Audubon v. SWRCB), 858 F.2d 1409, 1411
(9th Cir. 1988).
400 Id.
401 Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine Cnty. (Nat’l Audubon), 658 P.2d 709, 729
(Cal. 1983).
402 Id. at 717–18 (quoting district court order dated November 9, 1981).
403 Id. at 718.
404 See supra Figure 3.
405 HART, supra note 4, at 93–95.
406 Id. at 2.
407 Id. at 100. The winter of 1981–82 had been extremely wet, and the 1982–83 winter was
the wettest winter of the century. Id.
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was forced to order a reduction of Los Angeles’s diversion, sending water
down into Mono Lake and giving it a temporary reprieve while the litiga-
tion plodded forward.408
On February 17, 1983, the California Supreme Court issued its now
landmark decision, holding that the public trust interest in navigable
waters and the lands beneath the navigable waters had not been sub-
sumed by California’s appropriative water rights system.409 Furthermore,
the court held that the public trust obligation extended to non-navigable
tributaries to the extent that damage to those tributaries damaged the
navigable water body into which they flowed.410 The state had an ongoing
public trust interest in these assets that prevented the LADWP from
acquiring a vested right to appropriate water “in a manner harmful to the
interests protected by the public trust.”411 Although the SWRCB had the
authority to permit appropriation of the Mono Lake tributaries for bene-
ficial use, it also had “an affirmative duty to take the public trust [interest
in Mono Lake] into account in the planning and allocation of water re-
sources, and to protect public trust uses whenever feasible.”412 Once the
SWRCB approved an appropriation, the SWRCB had a continuing duty
to supervise the taking and assess the impact on trust assets.413
Furthermore, the court ruled the state’s duty to protect trust assets
is subject to modification over time414 and was more expansive than either
the LADWP or the SWRCB had envisioned: “[t]he objective of the public
trust has evolved in tandem with the changing public perception of the
values and uses of water-ways.”415 The doctrine was “sufficiently flexible
to encompass changing public needs”416 and could expand to include inland
408 Id. This rapid rise of the lake levels caused meromixis, or the separation of salt water
and fresh water into layers, in Mono Lake. Id. at 101. Under normal conditions, fresh water
came into Mono Lake in a fairly steady, even flow, allowing the fresh and salt water to mix.
Id. The quick release of water by the LADWP was too much for Mono Lake’s hydrological
system. Id. The fresh water settled on top of the salt water rather than mixing. Id. This
phenomenon persisted for six years from 1981 through 1987. Id. at 100–01.
409 Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine Cnty. (Nat’l Audubon), 658 P.2d 709, 727
(Cal. 1983); see also Cynthia L. Koehler, Water Rights and the Public Trust Doctrine:
Resolution of the Mono Lake Controversy, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 541, 565–66, 568 (1995)
(providing an overview of the court’s National Audubon decision).
410 Nat’l Audubon, 658 P.2d at 721.
411 Id. at 727.
412 Id. at 728.
413 Id.
414 Id.
415 Id. at 719.
416 Nat’l Audubon, 658 P.2d at 719 (quoting Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal.
1971)).
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waterways and tributaries flowing into navigable waters417 and ecosystems
in their natural state.418 The court concluded:
one of the most important public uses of tidelands . . . is the
preservation of those lands in their natural state, so that
they may serve as ecological units for scientific study, as
open space, and as environments which provide food and
habitat . . . which favorably affect the scenery and climate
of the area.”419
The public trust doctrine is:
an affirmation of the duty of the state to protect the people’s
common heritage of streams, lakes, marshlands and tide-
lands, surrendering that right of protection only in rare
cases when the abandonment of that right is consistent
with the purposes of the trust.420
This duty is a continuing duty imposed on the state in the allocation of
the state’s water resources,421 a duty that the SWRCB failed to undertake
in the initial allocation of water from the Mono Lake tributaries.422 The
Court concluded that “some responsible body ought to reconsider the allo-
cation of the waters of the Mono Basin” to take into account the impact of
the LADWP’s diversion on the Mono Lake ecosystem.423 The ruling did not
vacate the LADWP permit, but it did impose a new requirement on the
SWRCB, a requirement that was ongoing and which applied to all water
allocations past, present, and future made by the SWRCB which affected
417 See id. at 724 (discussing the reach of the public trust doctrine beyond tidelands).
418 Id. at 719.
419 Id. (quoting Marks, 491 P. 2d at 380).
420 Id. at 724. The court did, however, note that consistent with California water law, all
uses of water in California “including public trust uses, must now conform to the standard
of reasonable use.” Id. at 725. However, the “use of water for recreation and preservation
and enhancement of fish and wildlife resources is a beneficial use of water.” Id. at 726
(quoting Cal. Water Code § 1243).
421 Id. at 732.
422 See Nat’l Audubon, 658 P.2d at 728–29.
423 Id. at 729. The court observed that both the California District Court and the SWRCB
had concurrent original jurisdiction over the matter and declined to state which body
should be the body to assess the impact of the LADWP’s diversion on the public trust in-
terest. Id. at 729–32. In any event, the case was to continue in federal district court, which
had retained jurisdiction during the pendency of the state court actions. Nat’l Audubon
Soc’y v. Dept. of Water, 869 F.2d 1196, 1199 (9th Cir. 1989).
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a navigable water body, including the allocation from the Mono Lake
tributaries.424 The matter was sent back to the federal court where it sat
for another eighteen months.425
From the perspective of destabilization theory, the Mono Lake Com-
mittee had won with an unconventional legal theory;426 however, neither
the filing of the lawsuit nor the California Supreme Court’s ruling resulted
in an alteration of the SWRCB’s permitting decision.427 There was no equi-
table relief for Mono Lake nor was there a “flexible remedy” bringing the
parties together to negotiate a solution for the dying ecosystem.428 This was
not due so much to the legal theory as it was to the fact that, as Rosenberg
notes, court orders are not, in and of themselves, self-executing.429 Execu-
tion may depend upon a number of variables, including the availability
of political support within the administrative agency,430 broad political sup-
port beyond the administrative agency,431 the existence of public support,432
and the existence of incentives to comply.433 Uncontroversial legal theories
might be easier to implement when the theory has broad based support,
as Rosenberg notes,434 but this does not mean that controversial theories
cannot form the basis for structural change.435 For Mono Lake, it would
simply take more than the court order to move the parties, but in the end
game, the litigation and the court’s holding would play a major role in
reconstructing water allocation in California, not only in the Mono Lake
case, but in all of California’s water appropriation cases going forward.436
In many respects, the far reaching nature of the National Audubon
decision was in part due to the innovative theory applied by the plaintiffs,
suggesting that “a minimum performance standard” is less important than
424 See Nat’l Audubon, 658 P.2d at 728. The LADWP immediately appealed the decision
to the U.S. Supreme Court, and the Mono Lake Committee filed a motion for injunctive
relief in the federal district court to maintain flows to the Mono Lake tributaries. See HART,
supra note 4, at 102. The State of California requested that the matter be remanded to
state court in its entirety. Id.
425 HART, supra note 4, at 102–03.
426 See Karkkainen, supra note 28, at 812–15.
427 Id. at 815.
428 See HART, supra note 4, at 101–02.
429 See ROSENBERG, supra note 250, at 19.
430 See id.
431 See id. at 31.
432 See id. at 32.
433 See id.
434 See id. at 31.
435 See ROSENBERG, supra note 250, at 30.
436 See generally Hart, supra note 4, at 101–02.
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a legal standard which is fluid and flexible enough to give the court latitude
to bring the parties together to craft a remedy.437 The California Supreme
Court applied this principle, holding that it was incumbent upon either the
California District Court or the SWRCB to incorporate trust principles
into the LADWP allocation permit.438
C. Lesson Three: The Ongoing Power of Framing
In the end, however, the National Audubon ruling facilitated change
because it was used as an important political resource by the Mono Lake
Committee to build a new collective action frame for the Mono Lake extrac-
tion.439 While there are many types of frames,440 from the perspective of
SMOs, “collective action frames” are the most meaningful.441 Collective
action frames are used by SMOs for two important functions: (1) to “mobi-
lize potential adherents and constituents” thereby building the SMO and
(2) to “garner bystander support” to increase the legitimacy of the SMO
and its views and to “demobilize antagonists.”442 In the context of fram-
ing, law can be a resource used by the SMO to both build the SMO and
to garner public support by increasing the legitimacy of preferred policy
outcomes through the framing process.
Framing played an important role in both the demise443 and resto-
ration444 of the Mono Lake ecosystem. For years, the LADWP controlled
the framing game, and it framed the water issue as one of economics and
water scarcity: water was scarce but essential to economic growth, and
without it, Los Angeles and California could not prosper.445 When oppo-
nents objected to water appropriations from Mono Lake, the LADWP, re-
sorting to its frame, simply noted that the water would have to come from
somewhere, perhaps the Sacramento-San Joaquin River Delta.446 This
437 See id. at 101.
438 See Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine Cnty. (Nat’l Audubon), 658 P.2d 709,
728–29 (Cal. 1983).
439 See infra notes 442–54 and accompanying text.
440 Nisbet, supra note 287, at 15–16 (discussing how journalists, policymakers, and experts
use frames).
441 Benford & Snow, supra note 287, at 614.
442 Id. (quoting Benford & Snow, Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization,
1 INT’L SOC. MOV’T RES. 197, 198 (1988)).
443 See discussion supra pp. 40–40.
444 See discussion infra pp. 61–62.
445 See discussion supra pp. 40–40 (discussing the LADWP’s use of framing in the context
of the construction of the Los Angeles Aqueduct and the Mono Lake project).
446 HART, supra note 4, at 76. This frame was successful in deterring efforts to garner sup-
port from other environmental interest groups. See id. These groups feared supporting
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frame was a dilemma for the Mono Lake Committee; saving the Mono
Lake ecosystem would mean the destruction of the Delta ecosystem.447
Other environmental groups were reluctant to support the Mono Lake
Committee if it meant taking water from the Sacramento-San Joaquin
River Delta.448 The Mono Lake Committee could not ignore Los Angeles’s
perceived need for more water without raising the ire of the citizens of Los
Angeles and their political leaders.449 The citizens of Los Angeles might
support saving the Mono Lake ecosystem, but would they do so at the
expense of their morning shower?
Frames spotlight events and their underlying causes and con-
sequences for bystanders and direct attention away from other conse-
quences.450 The Mono Lake Committee had to find and build a new frame
to replace the LADWP frame. If Mono Lake ecosystem restoration was to
become possible, the Committee would need a frame that could capture
the attention of the citizens of Los Angeles and California.451 Thus, David
Gaines began to traverse the state in earnest, delivering lectures on the
dying Mono Lake ecosystem to anyone who would listen,452 and the Mono
Lake Committee began publishing scientific studies documenting the
impact of water extractions on the Mono Lake ecosystem health.453 This
frame carried a strong ethical component and attracted the attention of
the national news media.454 Between 1978 and 1980, articles about the
Mono Lake would simply result in less water for Los Angeles and greater pressure for the
Peripheral Canal, a project to divert water from the Sacramento River around the San
Joaquin Delta to supply Los Angeles. Kelly Zito, Peripheral Canal Urged to Save the
Delta, S.F. CHRON., July 18, 2008, available at http://articles.sfgate.com/2008-07-18/
news/17172640_1_peripheral-canal-water-system-water-supply. The Peripheral Canal
proposal was ultimately defeated in the 1980s but has become an issue again as pressure
has built on California’s water system. Id.
447 See HART, supra note 4, at 76, 77.
448 See id. at 76.
449 See id. at 76–77.
450 See Nisbet, supra note 287, at 15–16.
451 See HART, supra note 4, at 77. In general social movement parlance, the citizens of
California and Los Angeles are bystanders. See William A. Gamson, Bystanders, Public
Opinion, and the Media, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 242,
243–44 (David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule & Hanspeter Kriesi eds., 2004). Citizens generally
construct their opinions based on cues flowing from issue-framing or the relevance of the
issue to their individual life. See id. at 245.
452 HART, supra note 4, at 77.
453 Id. at 80.
454 See id. Nisbet, in his analysis of the framing of the climate change debate, notes that
the climate change debate has been characterized by a number of frame typologies, at
least three of which are apparent in the history of framing in the context of Mono Lake
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demise of the Mono Lake ecosystem appeared in the Smithsonian, Sports
Illustrated, National Geographic, and Outside Magazine455 boasting head-
lines such as “Elegy for a Dying Lake,”456 “Mono Lake: Silent, Sailess,
Shrinking Sea,”457 “The Destruction Of Mono Lake Is on Schedule,”458
“The Troubled Waters of Mono Lake,”459 and “Is This a Holy Place?”460 In
1981, a picture of Mono Lake “would drive the marriage of Prince Charles
and Lady Diana off the cover of Life” magazine.461
The importance of mainstream national media coverage of the
impact of the LADWP water extraction on the Mono Lake ecosystem can-
not be overestimated. The ability of an SMO to promote change is depend-
ent upon the SMO’s ability to leverage resources to forward collective
action.462 One of the primary means of accomplishing change is by “mobi-
lizing consensus” among the general population, “turning bystanders and
opponents into adherents to the goals of a social movement.”463 “Private
conflicts are taken into the public arena precisely because someone wants
to make certain that the power ratio among the private interests most
immediately involved shall not prevail.”464 Thus, the SMO uses the media
to convince bystanders to become engaged in the struggle for change in
ways that alter the power dynamics among existing players.465 The goal
of the SMO in framing the issue in the mass media is to: (1) strengthen the
readiness of SMO members to act, (2) increase the volume and intensity
of bystander support, and (3) “neutralize and discredit the framing efforts
of adversaries and rivals.”466
ecosystem restoration: “economic development and competitiveness,” “morality and ethics,”
and the “middle way/alternative path.” Nisbet, supra note 287, at 18–20.
455 HART, supra note 4, at 79.
456 Gray Brechin, Elegy for a Dying Lake, CAL. LIVING MAG., Oct. 1, 1978, at 10.
457 Gallen Rowell, Mono Lake: Silent, Sailess, Shrinking Sea, AUDUBON, Mar. 1978, at 102.
458 Harold Gilliam, The Destruction of Mono Lake is on Schedule, S.F. EXAM., Feb. 11,
1979, at 41.
459 Young, supra note 36, at 504.
460 Bill Gilbert, Is This a Holy Place?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, May 30, 1983, at 76, available
at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG1120887/index.htm.
461 HART, supra note 4, at 80; America the Dry: The Booming Sunbelt is Drinking Its Share
of Water—and Much, Much More, LIFE, July 1981, at 36 [hereinafter America the Dry].
462 Bob Edwards & John D. McCarthy, Resources and Social Movement Mobilization, in
THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 116, 116 (David A. Snow, Sarah A.
Soule & Hanspeter Kriesi eds., 2004).
463 Id. at 140.
464 E. E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST’S VIEW OF DEMOCRACY
IN AMERICA 38 (1960).
465 See Gamson, supra note 451, at 242.
466 Id. at 250.
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The mass media not only affects how bystanders frame an issue,
but how an issue is portrayed in the mass media reflects the success or
failure of the SMO’s press for political and social change.467 “Journalists
decide which . . . [SMOs] should be taken seriously . . . . [They are] players
who comment on the position of other players, shaping and framing the
discussion . . . .”468 A change in how the media portrays an issue challenges
old frames and signals and spreads new frames.469 For an SMO to have
its “preferred labels used [in the media] . . . is both an important outcome
in itself and carries a strong promise of a ripple effect.”470 The appearance
of favorable media coverage on the devastating impacts of the water ex-
traction on the Mono Lake ecosystem gave the Mono Lake Committee
credibility among bystanders both nationally and in California, and it was
a signal to bystanders that the Mono Lake Committee’s position should
be taken seriously.471
Despite growing credibility, the Mono Lake Committee still faced
a conundrum. Yes, destruction of the ecosystem was sad, but where was
replacement water going to come from and what was the environmental
cost to the ecosystem providing replacement water?472 The Mono Lake
Committee had to face the water scarcity issue head-on as the Mono Lake
diversions represented twelve percent of Los Angeles’s water supply.473
So, the Mono Lake Committee began a search for an “alternative path”474:
finding replacement waters that would not damage another ecosystem.475
Then, the 1976–77 drought hit, and Los Angeles cut its water consumption
by nineteen percent with minimal conservation efforts.476 The Mono Lake
Committee seized the moment. The city could reduce its water consump-
tion and save the Mono Lake ecosystem without sacrifice by instituting




471 See HART, supra note 4, at 80.
472 See id. at 76.
473 Id.
474 See Nisbet, supra note 287, at 18.
475 See HART, supra note 4, at 76–77. The committee had to face the replacement issue head-
on because LADWP’s historical response to calls for reductions in diversions from Mono
Lake was to demand compensation in excess of $30 million a year, the cost of replacing the
water from another source, most likely the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta, which was
facing environmental challenges of its own. Id. at 76.
476 Id.
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efficient plumbing, reducing water main pressure, using drought tolerant
plants on lawns, and altering lawn irrigation systems.477 The Mono Lake
Committee used the opportunity to convert the frame from one of water
scarcity to one of waste.478 The frame was picked up by Life in 1981 when
the magazine reported: “The sad irony is that minimal conservation could
save Mono Lake and better water-demand management might obviate
future aqueduct projects.”479 Finding replacement water, together with
demand and waste reduction, provided the basis for an “alternate path
frame” for the Mono Lake issue.480
Using both the ecosystem destruction ethical frame and the alter-
nate path frame, the Mono Lake Committee increased support among by-
standers and political leaders across the state to such an extent that, in
1978, the Brown administration formed an Interagency Task Force on
Mono Lake to “develop and recommend a plan of action to preserve and
protect the natural resources in Mono Basin, considering economic and
social factors.”481 While the primary focus of the Task Force was to find a
new source of water for Los Angeles,482 the Task Force also had extensive
discussions about target lake levels,483 an apparent acknowledgment that
the Mono Lake ecosystem should not be permitted to crash.484 When, in
mid-1979, the Task Force recommended raising lake levels,485 the LADWP
was quick to veto the recommendation.486 Despite the veto, the Task
477 Id. at 76–77.
478 See id.
479 America the Dry, supra note 461, at 38.
480 See HART, supra note 4, at 76–77; see also discussion supra note 454.
481 HART, supra note 4, at 85 (quoting Interagency Task Force on Mono Lake). Although
the Task Force received information from a variety of sources, its membership was limited
to government agencies including: the California Department of Water Resources, the
California Department of Fish and Game, the U.S. Forest Service, the U.S. Bureau of Land
Management, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the County of Mono, and the LADWP.
Id. Non-governmental stakeholders had no formal voice on the Task Force. Id.
482 Id.
483 Id.
484 See generally id. at 85. This view appeared to have significant statewide support as
evidenced by the response during the May 1979 Task Force public hearings on target lake
levels. See HART, supra note 4, at 85. Roughly a quarter of the participants supported a
lake level of 6378 feet, the level formerly supported by the Mono Lake Committee. Id. And,
over half of the attendees supported a target lake level of 6388 feet. Id.
485 See id. at 88. The Task Force recommended increasing lake levels to 6388 feet. Id. The
6388-foot elevation would require the LADWP to cut its exports from the Mono Lake
tributaries by 15,000 acre-feet per year. Id.
486 HART, supra note 4, at 89.
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Force Report provided legitimacy to the Mono Lake Committee’s position
that elevated lake levels were needed to save a dying ecosystem.487 This
legitimacy was important in order to increase bystander support.488
Despite national and statewide gains, however, the Mono Lake
Committee’s attempts at framing in the City of Los Angeles did not fare
quite as well, as evidenced by a review of editorials in the L.A. Times.489
When the 1979 Task Force Report recommended increased lake levels, the
L.A. Times was quick to back the position of the LADWP using the old eco-
nomic frame to characterize the proposed reductions as “harsh penalties”
imposed by the Task Force on Los Angeles rate payers.490 Additionally,
in February 1983, when the California Supreme Court issued its landmark
public trust decision,491 the L.A. Times characterized the court’s decision
as “a far-reaching reinterpretation of California water law,” which would
deprive the City of Los Angeles of seventeen percent of its water supply.492
The litigation had, however, provided the Mono Lake Committee
with a powerful framing resource.493 Law, litigation, and court rulings have
the potential to affect bystanders by legitimizing the SMO’s policy prefer-
ences and frame when accompanied by sustained social movement pres-
sure from mass political mobilization,494 which is accomplished in part
through the framing process.495 The very process of crafting a complaint,
in effect, mobilizes the law into an assertion of a lawful claim of right—a
claim that can be used to transform or reconstitute the terms of the social
and power relationships within politics.496 This certainly was true in the
case of Mono Lake.
The use of the public trust argument in the complaint gave rise to
a claim of right on behalf of the public.497 The public had a right to have
487 Id. at 88.
488 See id. at 88.
489 See, e.g., Editorial, Water and Power in Our Future, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1980, § II, at
6 [hereinafter Water and Power].
490 See id. The editorial alleges that the Task Force’s proposed elevations were based on
speculative data and argues that the City could not recoup the resulting fifteen percent
reduction in its water supply with conservation measures. Id.
491 Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine Cnty. (Nat’l Audubon), 658 P.2d 709 (Cal.
1983).
492 Editorial, Water Revolution, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1983, § IV, at 4.
493 McCann (2006), supra note 1, at 23. See generally Turk, supra note 173, at 281.
494 See Stryker (2007), supra note 256, at 76; see also McCann (2006), supra note 1, at 23.
495 See McCann (2006), supra note 1, at 23.
496 Id. at 21–22.
497 Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine Cnty. (Nat’l Audubon), 658 P.2d 709, 732
(Cal. 1983).
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its trust interest in Mono Lake at least recognized by the SWRCB.498 The
legitimacy of the Mono Lake Committee argument and claim of right was
formally recognized when, less than a year after MoFo served and filed
the compliant in the National Audubon case, U.C. Davis held a two-day
conference on “The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law and
Management”499 that featured the Mono Lake legal team.500 The claim of
right was further legitimized when the California Supreme Court, the
highest court in the State of California, ruled that the citizens of California
had a public trust interest in lakes and their ecosystems, which must be
considered by the SWRCB in the allocation of the state’s waters.501
These legal successes were coupled with the Mono Lake Com-
mittee’s “Saving Mono Lake” campaign, the “campaign that spawned a
thousand bumper stickers,”502 including: “Save Mono Lake,” “I Save Water
For Mono Lake,” and “Restore Mono Lake.”503 By the mid-1980s, the Mono
Lake Committee had grown to 20,000 members,504 evidence of a growing
“environmental ethic.”505 Educational campaigns were conducted across
the state, including information programs for Los Angeles youth.506 Arnold
reports that this educational campaign had an “impact on the attitudes of
Southern California residents,” the water consumers.507 Even the LADWP
ultimately conceded that the Mono Lake Committee was a “ ‘well-orga-
nized, effective group . . . . [that had] done a pretty good job mobilizing
public opinion,” an effort one L.A. Times reporter characterized as “selling
the lake’s charms.”508 By 1981, the State of California had established a
498 Id. at 712.
499 Harrison C. Dunning, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law and
Management: A Symposium, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 181, 181 (1980).
500 HART, supra note 4, at 91. U.C. Davis dedicated an entire issue of its law review to topics
surrounding use of the public trust doctrine in natural resource management, highlighting
the work at Mono Lake. Dunning, supra note 499, at 181. Hart reports that Prof. Johnson’s
session at the U.C. Davis conference focused on the blending of prior appropriation water
rights systems and public trust interests and featured the National Audubon case and liti-
gation team. HART, supra note 4, at 91; see also Ralph W. Johnson, Public Trust Protection
for Stream Flows and Lake Levels, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 233 (1980).
501 Nat’l Audubon, 658 P.2d at 712.
502 Koehler, supra note 409, at 564.
503 Arnold & Jewell, supra note 4, at 16.
504 Id.
505 Koehler, supra note 409, at 564.
506 Arnold & Jewell, supra note 4, at 16.
507 Id.
508 Kevin Roderick, Selling a Lake: Tenacious Mono Backers Use Sophisticated Tactics
to Beat DWP to Its Knees, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1989, at 3, 32, available at http://www
.kevinroderick.com/monocomm.html.
2011] HOW LAW MATTERED TO THE MONO LAKE ECOSYSTEM 477
tufa reserve around the lake.509 And, in March 1983, the U.S. House of
Representatives held hearings to create a national monument at Mono
Lake under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Forest Service.510
The Mono Lake Committee’s work was further advanced by the
water releases necessitated by heavy snows in the high Sierras in the win-
ters of 1981–82 and 1982–83.511 The LADWP’s reservoir aqueduct system
was full, almost overflowing,512 and Mayor Bradley was forced to order a
release of water into Mono Lake.513 Although release of the water was a
physical necessity given the limitations of the extraction infrastructure,514
both sides used the release to their political advantage.515 Bradley, who at
the time was running for governor, used the release to appeal to voters in
Northern California, and the Mono Lake Committee “play[ed] along,” prais-
ing the city.516 When Mono Lake levels began to rise, even the L.A. Times
editorial board grudgingly noted that although the Court’s public trust
decision abrogates the City’s water rights, the resumption of the City’s ex-
traction could “destroy a resource that is as unique as it is vulnerable.”517
The veneer in Los Angeles was beginning to crack.
In the fall of 1983, the L.A. Times editorial board began to call for
the flexible remedy the court had yet to grant, arguing: “Obviously a pru-
dent balance must be struck, and it is better to strive for it through good-
faith negotiations than through a renewal of long and contentious actions
in the courts . . . .”518 In March 1984, this suggestion was picked up by the
University of California Los Angeles’s (“UCLA”) Public Policy Program,
509 Id.
510 HART, supra note 4, at 103. By 1989, 250,000 people a year were visiting Mono Lake.
Roderick, supra note 508, at 32.






517 Editorial, Mono Lake: Coming Back, L.A. TIMES, May 29, 1983, § IV, at 4. In 1985, one
could detect further cracks in the veneer. See, e.g., Editorial, Melting Snows, Melting
Hearts, L.A. TIMES, April 30, 1985, § II, at 4. In this editorial, the Times praised the
Metropolitan Water District for hiring a new General Manager committed to pursuing
innovative water development and conservation programs that would reduce Los Angeles’s
dependence on existing water sources. See id. Up until this time, the LADWP and the L.A.
Times had taken the position that conservation or water rationing would not come close
to meeting the shortfall that would result should the City be deprived of the Mono Lake
water. See, e.g., Water and Power, supra note 489, at 6.
518 Editorial, Water and the Public Trust, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1983, § II, at 6; see also
HART, supra note 4, at 105.
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which, at the urging of the Mono Lake Committee, brought the parties to-
gether to discuss the resolution of the Mono Lake controversy.519 Although
nothing substantive was to come of this preliminary meeting, the LADWP
was finally at the table and talking.520
The LADWP’s new willingness to talk, rather than bully its way
forward, is evidence of the diminishing power of the LADWP, as litigation
and framing began to change public sentiment in Los Angeles about the
importance of the Mono Lake ecosystem.521 The relationship between the
LADWP and the SWRCB had now been called into question by the court’s
decision in National Audubon,522 the national media,523 California citi-
zens,524 and the L.A. Times itself.525 And, although the SWRCB had yet
to implement the National Audubon decision, it knew that if it did not do
so, the court could.526 Here, then, is evidence of both the veil effect527 and
status quo effect528 of destabilizing litigation. No longer could the LADWP
rely on past partners and patterns of doing business.529 What now became
clear to the LADWP was that these past business practices were stigma-
tized, forcing the LADWP into a new operational paradigm.530 It is impor-
tant to recognize that it was litigation, together with ongoing framing, that
brought the LADWP to this point.
It would, however, take two more pieces of litigation531 before the
Los Angeles City Council would break rank with the LADWP and SWRCB,
and the LADWP would become fully engaged in finding a remedy for
the Mono Lake ecosystem.532 The LADWP was on the verge of exploring
519 HART, supra note 4, at 105. The parties came together in a jointly sponsored conference
titled “Mono Lake: Beyond the Public Trust Doctrine.” Id.
520 Id.
521 See generally id. at 105.
522 See Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine Cnty. (Nat’l Audubon), 658 P.2d 709,
712–13 (Cal. 1983).
523 See supra notes 454–61 and accompanying text.
524 See supra notes 481–84 and accompanying text.
525 See supra note 517 and accompanying text.
526 See HART, supra note 4, at 101–02, 105.
527 See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
528 See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
529 See Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine Cnty. (Nat’l Audubon), 658 P.2d 709, 726
(Cal. 1983) (holding that the Water Board now had a statutory duty to “consider interests
protected by the public trust” when approving the LADWP’s requests for water appropri-
ations). The court went on to hold that a reconsideration of the LADWP’s rights to the
entire flow of Mono Lake was possible. See id. at 729.
530 See HART, supra note 4, at 105.
531 See discussion infra Part IV.D.
532 See infra note 649 and accompanying text.
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alternatives together with the Mono Lake Committee, because of the
deliberative effect of destabilizing litigation, but the scales did not tip
until the City of Los Angeles and the LADWP came face-to-face with
trout fishermen.533
D. Lesson Four: The Importance of Secondary Litigation
The gates to the Grant Lake reservoir remained open through early
1984, pouring water down the Mono Lake tributaries into Mono Lake.534
With the water came the trout and the trout fishermen,535 but by the fall
of 1984, the LADWP was ready to shut off the flow to Mono Lake.536 So,
Dick Dahlgren, an avid fisherman, wrote to Mayor Bradley praising him
for restoring the fish to Rush Creek.537 The letter found its way into the
press.538 While there was no response from Bradley’s office, Dahlgren, in
yet another example of the use of the social networks created by the Mono
Lake Committee, enlisted the support of CalTrout and the Mono Lake
Committee to entice City Councilman John Ferraro, chair of the Los
Angeles City Council’s Energy and Natural Resources Committee, to hold
immediate committee hearings.539 At the hearing, the Council requested
a fish study,540 a citizens advisory committee,541 and that the LADWP keep
water flowing into the Mono Lake tributaries.542 The LADWP would bend
but would not break; it acquiesced to the study and the advisory committee,
533 Under the Los Angeles City Charter, the LADWP is governed by an independent board,
the majority of which is appointed by the Mayor and confirmed by the City Council. Charter
of the City of L.A., art. VI, § 70.1 (1999), available at http://www.amlegal.com/nxt/gateway
.dll?f=templates&fn=default.htm&vid=amlegal:la_charter. Prior to 1996, the Los Angeles
City Council had no oversight over the LADWP as noted by Councilman Ferraro who
“acknowledged, ‘DWP does not have to come to the council for permission for their
actions.’ ” HART, supra note 4, at 110; Charter of the City of L.A., art. III, § 32.4 (1999).
534 Peter Vorster & G. Mathais Kondolf, The Effect of Water Management and Land Use
Practices on the Restoration of Lee Vining and Rush Creeks, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
CALIFORNIA RIPARIAN SYSTEMS CONFERENCE: PROTECTION, MANAGEMENT, AND RESTO-
RATION FOR THE 1990S 405, 405-07 (Dana L. Abell ed., 1989), available at http://www.fs
.fed.us/psw/publications/documents/psw_gtr110/psw_gtr110_h_vorster.pdf; see also HART,
supra note 4, at 109.
535 HART, supra note 4, at 109–10.




540 Id. at 110.
541 See HART, supra note 4, at 110.
542 Id.
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“but there would be no water.”543 While this was certainly bad news for
the Mono Lake ecosystem, in the context of political blockage there was
light. There was no longer a unified “city” position on Mono Lake. The
LADWP and the Los Angeles City Council had split ranks.
When on November 14, 1984, the LADWP reduced the water to
Rush Creek down to a trickle,544 the California Department of Fish and
Game began a one-day trout rescue operation.545 Soon after, the Mono Lake
Committee organized a demonstration on Highway 395 at the Rush Creek
Bridge,546 and Dahlgren and CalTrout filed suit in California District Court
to compel the LADWP to continue water flow in Rush Creek to maintain
trout populations.547 The court would later issue a temporary restraining
order,548 but on November 15, 1984, a Mono Lake County Assistant District
Attorney sent two sheriff’s deputies to Rush Creek to arrest any person
that would close the water valve.549 One cannot underestimate the power
of the presence of law enforcement upholding the rights of the ecosystem
in the framing of the Mono Lake controversy. What the citizens of Los
Angeles saw that night on the evening news was a sheriff upholding the
rights of Rush Creek and Mono Lake against the LADWP.550 This judicial
relief provided an important framing tool to the Mono Lake Committee,
as well as a temporary reprieve for both the trout and Mono Lake while
the litigation marched on.
Dahlgren’s initial suit was followed by a series of lawsuits brought
by CalTrout and the Mono Lake Committee to keep the water flowing in




546 Id. at 111.
547 HART, supra note 4, at 111.
548 Id. The temporary restraining order “became a preliminary injunction in 1985.” Arnold
& Jewell, supra note 4, at 15. In 1986, the California superior court issued a temporary
restraining order to maintain flows into Lee Vining Creek. Id. A preliminary injunction
for Lee Vining Creek was issued in 1987. Id.
549 HART, supra note 4, at 111. The Mono Lake Committee and the National Audubon
Society petitioned the court and were granted amicus status in the Dahlgren case. Id. at
115. Five days later, the California District Court “issued a temporary restraining order
requiring [the LADWP to maintain] a flow of 19 cubic feet per second” in Rush Creek. Id.
at 111. A flow of 19 cubic feet per second would mean “14,000 acre feet into Mono Lake,”
not enough to stabilize the lake, but enough to create a “real crack in the dam.” Id. at 111
(quoting Mono Lake Committee newsletter).
550 See id. at 111.
551 See, e.g., Cal. Trout, Inc. v. State Water Res. Control Bd. (CalTrout I), 255 Cal. Rptr.
184 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); see also JONES & STOKES ASSOCS., MONO BASIN ENVIRONMENTAL
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California Fish and Game Code.552 Since 1933, California’s Fish and Game
Code had prohibited the dewatering of creeks below dams553 and required
that “[t]he owner of any dam shall allow sufficient water at all times . . .
to pass over, around or through the dam, to keep in good condition any fish
that may be planted or exist below the dam.”554 Plaintiffs argued that the
Code was amended in 1953 to prohibit the SWRCB from issuing any water
appropriation permit or license after September 9, 1953, unless the permit
or license was “conditioned upon full compliance” with the requirement
to allow sufficient waters to pass below the dam to maintain fish popula-
tions.555 CalTrout and the Mono Lake Committee argued556 that these
provisions were applicable to the LADWP and its Grant Lake Dam and
requested that the court issue a writ of mandamus compelling SWRCB
to rescind the LADWP’s current permit and reissue it together with a re-
quirement that the LADWP maintain sufficient water flow in the Mono
Lake tributaries to support fish populations.557
The California Court of Appeals took a slightly different tack.558
Relying heavily on California’s water allocation scheme, the court observed
that under California law a permittee must act diligently to undertake and
complete any construction necessary to perfect its water claim and must
IMPACT REPORT app. R, R-2 to R-3 (1993) available at http://www.monobasinresearch.org/
onlinereports/mbeir.htm.
552 See generally CalTrout I, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 186 (describing vagaries and confusion in
the trial court’s decision between the two requirements of section 5946 with respect to
construction of dams and appropriation of water).
553 See CAL. FISH AND GAME CODE § 5937 (West 1998).
554 CalTrout I, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 186 (quoting Cal. Fish and Game Code § 5937).
555 Id. (quoting Cal. Fish and Game Code § 5946).
556 Respondents, the LADWP, argued that the provisions of the Fish and Game Code only
applied to the construction of a dam and not to the appropriation of water. See id. at 191.
Thus, it reasoned that because the dam was constructed for the appropriation of water,
there was no requirement to permit enough water to pass to maintain fish populations. Id.
The LADWP also argued that the Fish and Game Code did not apply to a license that was
“predicated upon a permit issued prior . . . to September 9, 1953.” Id. at 194. Finally, the
LADWP argued that application of the statute to the LADWP’s license constituted a
retroactive application of law. See id. at 197.
557 See CalTrout I, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 186. The trial court denied the petition on the grounds
that the Grant Lake dam had been built prior to 1953. Id. All of the trout cases were con-
solidated and appealed to the California Court of Appeals. Id.
558 Cal Trout and the Mono Lake Committee had argued that the 1933 requirement that
an owner of a dam must permit sufficient water to pass to support existing fish populations
applied to the LADWP and required it to maintain flow for fish populations. Id. at 186. The
California Court of Appeals did not rule on this issue, finding it unnecessary in light of
the history of the LADWP’s appropriation of the waters from the Mono Lake tributaries.
Id. at 192.
482 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 35:413
apply the water to beneficial use.559 If a permittee fails to put appropriated
water to beneficial use within three years, the unused water reverts to the
public and is considered unappropriated.560 In the case of the Mono Lake
appropriation, the LADWP had received a permit to appropriate the entire
flow of the Mono Lake tributaries in 1941.561 Although the LADWP could
divert and store the water in 1941, it was incapable of putting the full
volume of water to beneficial use until construction of the second barrel
of the Los Angeles aqueduct in the early 1970s,562 nearly twenty years
after the effective date of the 1953 Fish and Game Code amendment.563
Thus, in 1953, when the Fish and Game Code was amended to apply to
water appropriations, the water to be carried by the second aqueduct had
not yet been appropriated and could not be appropriated for another seven-
teen years.564 Therefore, the LADWP was required to leave enough water
in the Mono Lake tributaries to support existing trout populations.565 The
Court ordered the trial court to issue the appropriate writs to compel the
SWRCB “to attach the conditions required by section 5946” to the LADWP’s
appropriation license.566 When the SWRCB failed to attach these condi-
tions in a timely manner, the California Court of Appeals issued a second
opinion ordering the trial court to issue a writ to the SWRCB ordering it
to “exercise its ministerial duty” to set minimum flows without delay567
and to attach language to the LADWP’s appropriation license providing:
559 Id. at 198.
560 CalTrout I, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 199.
561 See id. at 188, 203.
562 Id. at 199–200.
563 Id.
564 Id. at 187.
565 Id. at 191, 205. The Court also rejected the LADWP’s argument that the SWRCB’s
numerous extensions to the 1940 permit vitiated the requirements of the 1953 Fish and
Game Code Amendment. CalTrout I, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 205. Between 1948 and 1960, the
SWRCB gave the LADWP numerous extensions to “Complete Use of Water.” Id. at 201–02
n.18. In each permit extension application, the LADWP was asked “Have you used as much
water as you expect to use under this permit?” and in each case the LADWP responded
“No.” Id. at 202. When asked when beneficial use would be perfected, the LADWP re-
sponded, “When required by municipal needs.” Id. It was not until the 1968 permit ex-
tension that there was any indication that the second aqueduct would be constructed. See
id. at 202 n.18. That extension asserts that the second aqueduct would be completed on or
before December 1, 1971, and that application of the water to be carried by that aqueduct
“shall be completed on or before December 1, 1975.” Id.
566 CalTrout I, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 213.
567 Cal. Trout, Inc. v. Super. Ct. of Sacramento Cnty. (CalTrout II), 266 Cal. Rptr. 788,
803 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
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In accordance with the requirements of Fish and Game
Code section 5946, this license is conditioned upon full com-
pliance with section 5937 of the Fish and Game code. The
licensee shall release sufficient water into the streams from
its dams to reestablish and maintain the fisheries which
existed in them prior to its diversion of water.568
Water left in the tributaries to support trout populations meant
water for Mono Lake and the Mono Lake ecosystem.569 While National
Audubon resulted in groundbreaking legal precedent, compelling the
SWRCB to consider public trust interests including ecosystem viability
in the water appropriation process,570 the Mono Lake ecosystem might
well have collapsed while waiting for the SWRCB to issue a new permit,
a hollow victory indeed. It was the trout litigation that forced the LADWP
to limit its extractions, and it also gave the Mono Lake Committee’s claims
further legitimacy in the press, among bystanders, and in Los Angeles’s
City Hall.571
By 1986, the political atmosphere in Los Angeles had changed so
significantly that in August there was a symbolic 100-mile run transport-
ing water from the Los Angeles aqueduct intake to Mono Lake, which was
co-sponsored by Mayor Bradley and four members of the Los Angeles City
Council.572 During that same month, the L.A. Times published an editorial
urging a negotiated solution to the controversy–a push toward a delib-
eration–that afforded protection to the Mono Lake ecosystem.573 For all
practical purposes, by 1986, there were significant fissures in the power
relationships that were the foundation of the LADWP’s water claims. The
blockage was beginning to dissolve.
568 Id. at 803–04.
569 See HART, supra note 4, at 111. While the releases into Rush Creek and Lee Vining
Creek were not enough to stabilize the lake, the Mono Lake Committee argued it was
“the first real crack in the dam.” Id.
570 Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine Cnty. (Nat’l Audubon), 658 P.2d 709, 732
(Cal. 1983).
571 See HART, supra note 4, at 120, 129.
572 Id. at 120. And, by 1988, even some members of the LADWP Board of Commissioners
recognized that the Mono Lake Ecosystem was “worth saving.” Id. at 131–32.
573 Editorial, Mono Issue Can Be Negotiated, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1986, § II, at 4 [here-
inafter Mono Issue]. The editorial board argued, “Barring catastrophic drought . . . .
California should have enough water, used wisely, to meet all reasonable needs including
environmental protection.” Id.
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E. Lesson Five: Court Sanctioned Temporary Relief and the Decree
The rise of public law litigation was, in part, enabled by the relax-
ation of constraints on equitable remedies,574 which enabled courts to
examine controversies surrounding future probabilities and allowed liti-
gants and courts to realize the potential policy function of litigation in the
context of public issues and in a manner not permitted by purely private
litigation.575 In the context of environmental litigation, the equitable rem-
edy of injunction, essentially a judicially imposed prohibition, is funda-
mental.576 Indeed, how would it benefit Mono Lake if, during the course
of litigation, litigation which was to extend almost fifteen years,577 the
LADWP extractions continued unabated, causing the Mono Lake ecosystem
to collapse. Injunctive relief permits the court to place a hold on an agency
decision pending the termination of the litigation and creates the space
needed to develop a flexible remedy, a remedy driven by the parties.578
Ironically, it was the trout litigation, and not the National Audubon
case, that gave the Mono Lake ecosystem the moratorium and water it
needed to survive. In 1988, the National Audubon litigation579 was consoli-
dated with the trout cases by the California Supreme Court and assigned
to Judge Finney of El Dorado County Superior Court.580 On August 29,
1989, Judge Finney issued a temporary injunction “prohibiting respondent
DWP from causing the level of Mono Lake to fall below 6,377 feet as a re-
sult of its diversions for the remainder of the current run-off year, ending
March 30, 1990.”581 This left the court to resolve how to implement both
the California Supreme Court’s directive in the original National Audubon
case and the Court of Appeals’ directive in the trout cases.582
574 Chayes notes that by the turn of the century “the old sense of equitable remedies as
‘extraordinary’ has faded.” Chayes, supra note 156, at 1292.
575 See id. at 1292–95.
576 See SAX (1970), supra note 157, at 196.
577 See generally HART, supra note 4, at 183. The Mono Lake litigation commenced in 1979
when MoFo filed the National Audubon complaint. Id. at 83–84. The litigation was effectively
concluded in 1994 when the SWRCB issued the Water Rights Decision. See id. at 171–73.
578 See Sabel & Simon, supra note 171, at 1067–69.
579 The National Audubon litigation continued to bounce around federal court until 1988
when the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the federal air pollution claims, sending
the original public trust litigation back to state court. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Dep’t of Water,
858 F.2d 1409, 1417 (9th Cir. 1988).
580 HART, supra note 4, at 130.
581 Id. at 131. This preliminary injunction was extended until completion of the SWRCB
public trust hearing process. See JONES & STOKES ASSOCS., supra note 551, at R-2 to R-3.
582 See JONES & STOKES ASSOCS., supra note 551, at R-2 to R-3.
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F. Lesson Six: The Experimental Remedy
The purpose of the remedy in any legal action is to give effect to the
judgment made by the court.583
[T]he remedy arises from a reflective effort to give mean-
ing to the right. . . . The remedy is an elaboration of the
rights in question: it is not a technical effort to execute an
already defined norm, as rights essentialism implies; nor
is it an exercise of instrumental discretion, as crude posi-
tivism suggests.584
However, in public law litigation, the right is more ambiguous than in
private litigation, seeking, as it does, the modification of public policy.585
Likewise, the remedy in public law litigation differs substantially
from private litigation in which the remedy is retrospective and intended
to correct past legal wrong.586 In public law litigation, the remedy is pro-
spective and designed to “modify a course of [agency] conduct.”587 The
remedy is embodied in the decree, which is a legal order that prescribes
how the agency must modify its present and future actions to comply with
the policy directives set forth in statute.588 Historically, in public law liti-
gation, the decree is prescriptive and often referred to as the “command-
and-control” decree.589 This is no less true in the case of environmental
public law litigation.590
583 Sabel & Simon, supra note 171, at 1054.
584 Id. at 1055.
585 Chayes, supra note 156, at 1302.
586 Id. at 1296.
587 Id.
588 Id. at 1296–1300.
589 Sabel & Simon, supra note 171, at 1019. Sabel and Simon suggest that the command
and control decree has three characteristics: (1) it attempts to “anticipate and express . . .
key directives needed to induce compliance in a single, comprehensive, and hard-to-change”
order; (2) it requires compliance which is measured by the degree of the “defendant’s con-
formity to [the] detailed prescriptions” of the decree; and (3) it is a directive in that the
court undertakes a strong role in forming the remedial norm. Id. at 1021–22.
590 See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe (Overton Park I), 401 U.S. 402
(1971). In Overton Park I, an SMO sued the Department of Transportation (“DOT”) to
stop construction of an interstate highway through Overton Park, a 342-acre public park
in Memphis, Tennessee. Id. at 405–06. The SMO alleged that the highway construction vio-
lated section 4(f) of the Transportation Act of 1966, which prohibits the use of federal funds
to construct highways through public parks unless there is no “feasible and prudent”
alternative to construction through the park. Id. at 404–05 (quoting the United States
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Destabilization legal theorists argue that successful destabilizing
litigation requires the court to abandon the traditional command-and-
control decree for a decree that is both “flexible” and “ongoing.”591 Although
the court uses the decree to impose a legal standard and to grant tempo-
rary injunctive relief, the court leaves implementation of the legal standard
to the parties to negotiate subject to ongoing oversight.592 Destabilization
theorists would argue that the flexible or experimental remedy holds the
greatest possibility for social and political change or destabilization.593 It
is not the court’s legal determination that causes social or political change;
but, as McCann notes, it is the manner in which the litigants and stake-
holders assess how the court decision “indirectly create[s] important expec-
tations, endowments, incentives, and constraints” toward reform agendas
that leads to social and political change.594 Thus, social scientists suggest
that the remedy is more likely to result in social change if:
1. Implementing the order offers positive incentives to
induce compliance.595
Code). The case landed in the U.S. Supreme Court where the court held that, in passing
section 4(f), Congress intended “that protection of parkland was to be given paramount
importance. [P]arks were not to be lost unless there were truly unusual factors present
in a particular case or the cost or community disruption resulting from alternative routes
reached extraordinary magnitudes.” Id. at 412–13. The Court clarified the policy analysis
that the Secretary was required to undertake under section 4(f) and sent the matter back
down to the district court. Id. at 411, 420. On remand, the federal district court issued a
decree (remedy): (1) adopting the Supreme Court’s interpretation of section 4(f); (2) enjoin-
ing the highway construction; and (3) ordering the DOT Secretary to make a route deter-
mination in compliance with the section 4(f) interpretation adopted by the Court. Citizens
to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 335 F. Supp. 873, 885 (W.D. Tenn. 1972). In effect, the
decree set out the applicable legal standard and a two-part remedy: the first part of the
remedy, the injunction, halts the implementation of the contested agency policy regarding
highway construction, and the second part of the remedy requires the agency to modify its
policy to conform to the court order after which the injunction will be lifted. See id. at 885.
591 Chayes, supra note 156, at 1298–1302 (discussing ongoing court oversight and nego-
tiated decrees).
592 See id. at 1281.
593 See id. at 1281, 1304.
594 See Michael McCann, How the Supreme Court Matters in American Politics: New
Institutionalist Perspectives, in THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS: NEW
INSTITUTIONALIST INTERPRETATIONS 68 (Cornell Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999).
595 Rosenberg, supra note 250, at 32–33. Rosenberg notes that there are two prevailing
views among social scientists about the ability of the court to instigate social reform. Id.
at 30. Proponents of the Dynamic Court view argue that courts can produce social reform
when used effectively by SMOs. See id. at 22–23. Even then, there are several contributing
factors which affect the effectiveness of litigation in stimulating social and political change,
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2. Some or all of the parties are willing to “impose
costs to induce compliance.”596
3. The court’s order provides “leverage, or a shield,
cover, or excuse” to persons in positions to imple-
ment the change who are willing but have been un-
able to act.597
4. The court order can be implemented through mar-
ket mechanisms.598
5. There is ongoing court oversight.599
6. The members of the social movement are permitted
to participate in the decision-making process.600
7. The remedy “fixes responsibility for” and monitors
the impact of organizational change and its out-
come.601
Many of these elements are incorporated in the experimentalist remedy.602
The experimentalist remedy has three general characteristics: first,
it is negotiated by the stakeholders; second, it “takes the form of a rolling
rule regime;” and third, it is transparent.603 To this we might add a fourth
requirement that the remedy is ongoing and subject to court oversight.604
A court, using the experimentalist remedy, requires the parties and stake-
holders “to negotiate a remedial plan.”605 This negotiation process, often
overseen by a special master, requires stakeholders to gather information,
share data, acquire resources, set agendas and ground rules for discussion
and decision-making, deliberate together, set remedial goals, and reach
consensus about a regime that implements the remedial goals.606 Through
including whether there is a benefit to elites and bureaucrats to comply with the court’s
order. Id. at 32. These benefits may, but need not, be monetary. Id.
596 Id. at 33.
597 See Rosenberg, supra note 250, at 35.
598 Id. at 33. In her review of research on the politics of enforcement, Stryker notes that
corporate organizations are traditionally successful at defending against implementation
of court orders when they are able to argue that enforcement interferes with economic
viability. Stryker (2007), supra note 256, at 84 (referencing studies by Melnick, Yeager,
and Nelson and Bridges).
599 Harris, supra note 294, at 933.
600 Id.
601 Stryker (2007), supra note 256, at 90.
602 See Sabel & Simon, supra note 171, at 1067–71.
603 Id.
604 Chayes, supra note 156, at 1302; Harris, supra note 294, at 933.
605 Sabel & Simon, supra note 171, at 1067.
606 See id. at 1067–69.
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this process, the stakeholders build relationships, previously non-existent,
which facilitate the creation of trust.607
Harris highlighted the importance of the negotiated remedy in her
analysis of litigation’s impact on the ability of poverty lawyers to redis-
tribute public resources for the benefit of homeless populations.608 In her
analysis of three homeless cases, Harris observed that through the nego-
tiated decree, the courts created an avenue for “outsiders,” those blocked
from the agency decision-making process, to become “insiders.”609 In effect,
the court used its legal authority to create room in the agency decision-
making process for the previously excluded voice of the poverty lawyer.610
In turn, the poverty lawyers were able to mobilize judicial support to in-
duce policy reform.611 The negotiation itself permitted the poverty lawyer
to act as an insider to help shape and reform the agency process.612 Sabel
and Simon refer to this as the stakeholder effect, noting that the liability
determination empowers the outside player and legitimizes their claim
giving the plaintiff a viable position at the negotiating table.613 This, in
turn, increases the power of the outsider and decreases the influence of
traditional agency stakeholders or power elites.614
Harris contends, however, that the ability to participate in negoti-
ation alone is not sufficient to cause change.615 Her analysis suggests that
ongoing involvement of the poverty lawyer was only meaningful so long
as the court itself maintained continued oversight of the process.616 The
presence of court oversight assures that the parties continue to give legit-
imacy to outsiders.617 Such was the case with the Mono Lake negotiations,
though matters did not evolve in the manner in which Professors Sabel
and Simon or Harris might have anticipated.
By 1989, the California Supreme Court had issued its landmark
National Audubon decision, which held that the state had an ongoing
607 See id. at 1068.
608 Harris, supra note 294, at 911–12.
609 Id. at 933–34.
610 Id.
611 Id. at 933.
612 Id. at 933–34.
613 Sabel & Simon, supra note 171, at 1077–78.
614 See id. Note that in terms of the power structure identified by Turk, the court’s liability
determination increases the SMO’s enforcement power; the SMO has the backing of the
court to enforce its view of the law as applied to the policy context at issue. See Turk, supra
note 173, at 279–83 (discussing the types of power associated with law).
615 See Harris, supra note 294, at 934.
616 Id.
617 See id.
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obligation to protect the public trust interest in public waters and to
“take such uses into account in allocating water resources.”618 The Court
also held that the Superior Court of California had concurrent original
jurisdiction with the SWRCB over the issue.619 Thus, when the matter was
remanded to state court and consolidated in Judge Finney’s court with
the trout cases,620 Judge Finney could have immediately held a hearing,
taken evidence, and issued a decree directing the SWRCB to apply the
trust doctrine to the LADWP allocation license. Additionally, in the trout
cases, Judge Finney had the option of either issuing a writ that “com-
manded the immediate imposition of the conditions” of Fish and Game
Code section 5937 and requiring the SWRCB to conduct a study to estab-
lish flow rates or conducting his own hearing and issuing a decree speci-
fying flow rates necessary to comply with California statute.621 Rather
than hold a hearing on the public trust and trout issues, Judge Finney
ordered the SWRCB to review Los Angeles’s water rights in the context of
the public trust doctrine and Fish and Game Code section 5937 and stayed
the litigation until September 1993 pending the SWRCB determination,
but Judge Finney also retained jurisdiction over the case until the SWRCB
had submitted its completed work to the court for review.622 This was not
the traditional command-and-control decree. Nor was it, however, an order
for formal negotiation as envisioned by destabilization theorists.
Application of the court’s orders required the SWRCB to determine
how much water was needed to support trout populations and public trust
assets.623 To support this analysis, the SWRCB was required to prepare
an Environmental Impact Report (“EIR”) and hold public hearings on the
LADWP license, a process that would take several years to complete.624
During this hiatus, the Mono Lake Committee and the LADWP were in a
618 Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine Cnty. (Nat’l Audubon), 658 P.2d 709, 732
(Cal. 1983).
619 Id. at 731.
620 HART, supra note 4, at 130.
621 Cal. Trout, Inc. v. Super. Ct. of Sacramento Cnty. (CalTrout II), 266 Cal. Rptr. 788, 802
(Cal. Ct. App. 1990); see also Cal. Trout, Inc. v. State Water Res. Control Bd. (Cal Trout I),
255 Cal. Rptr. 184, 213 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
622 HART, supra note 4, at 131, 139, 144.
623 CAL. STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REPORT FOR
REVIEW OF MONO BASIN WATER RIGHTS OF THE CITY OF L.A. 2-1 (1994), available at
http://www.monobasinresearch.org/images/mbeir/fch2.pdf.
624 Profile of the Mono Basin EIR, MONO BASIN CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.monobasin
research.org/onlinereports/eirprofile.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2011) [hereinafter Profile
of Mono].
490 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 35:413
state of limbo. Neither could be certain of the final outcome of the SWRCB
process, although it was certain that both the landscape and the rules
of the game had changed.625 Thus, the court, by its order, established the
foundations for the flexible remedy.626 In issuing the order, the court
effectively gave notice to the parties that the status quo was dead.627 No
longer could the LADWP rely upon its traditional relationship with the
SWRCB to ensure receipt of the entire flow of the Mono Lake tributaries
because it could not be certain of how the SWRCB would rule.628 The
LADWP could either sit back and wait or try to negotiate an alternate
remedy.629 Evidenced by the shifting tides on the L.A. Times editorial
page, by 1989, the public was urging the LADWP to change its strategy
and encouraging negotiation.630
Additionally, the court’s decision to maintain jurisdiction over the
litigation meant that the LADWP could no longer ignore the claims of the
Mono Lake Committee, who now had the legitimacy of two court orders
and the ongoing oversight of the court.631 This oversight ensured that the
Mono Lake Committee would continue to have a meaningful voice in the
ultimate resolution of the Mono Lake dilemma.632 Finally, the length of
time required to prepare the EIR gave the parties the space needed to
negotiate the flexible remedy.633
By necessity, negotiating a remedy is grounded in uncertainty, and
nowhere is this truer than in the arena of ecosystem management, which
is grounded in the scientific uncertainty of the operation of biological
625 See HART, supra note 4, at 131.
626 See supra notes 425–35 and accompanying text (explaining why the court order was
insufficient). The order established foundations by its resulting five-year hiatus and
uncertainty, which would prompt negotiations.
627 See HART, supra note 4, at 131.
628 See id. at 145–47.
629 See id.
630 See Editorial, Halt the Decline at Mono Lake, L.A. TIMES, June 17, 1989, § II, at 8
[hereinafter Halt the Decline]. By July 1986, the L.A. Times editorial board was pushing
for a negotiated solution to the Mono Lake controversy noting that “[n]egotiation of the
Los Angeles-Mono Lake issue is bound to produce a more practical solution than protracted
litigation that always carries the potential for surprising consequences not desired by either
party.” Mono Issue, supra note 573, § II, at 4. And, by 1989, the Editorial Board observed
that “Los Angeles should realize by now that it never will win its dogged legal battle to
continue its historic diversion of eastern Sierra streams that naturally flow into Mono
Lake. . . . At some point, the decline must be halted.” Halt the Decline, supra, § II, at 8.
631 See supra notes 606–22 and accompanying text.
632 See HART, supra note 4, at 139–40.
633 See supra note 624 and accompanying text.
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systems.634 Added to this is the fact that the negotiating process itself
places the stakeholders in a position of uncertainty.635 Parties can no longer
rely on traditional relationships and, as such, must reorient their goals,
their partners, and even their understanding of the problem.636 The status
quo is no longer a possibility because the liability determination has stig-
matized the status quo, making it risky,637 which forces the stakeholders
to explore and develop new options previously politically unavailable.638
The new remedy and the effectiveness of the remedy is itself un-
known, and new relationships between stakeholders force them to con-
tinually reassess and reposition themselves as their knowledge about the
issue becomes deeper and time reveals more information.639 Often, the
complexities and futuristic nature of the issue requires the stakeholders
to make decisions with incomplete knowledge, forcing the stakeholders
into a “rolling rule regime.”640 To address this issue, the stakeholders focus
on: (1) outcome norms and goals; (2) monitoring and assessment of norms
and goals as a rolling remediation plan is implemented; and (3) reassess-
ment of norms and goals based on information gleaned from previous
attempts to realize norms and goals and from the success or failure of the
negotiated remedy to meet performance measures.641 This process results
in a remedy that is more fully explored and developed, which increases the
likelihood of its success and acceptability among multiple stakeholders.642
Sabel and Simon argue that the negotiation process forces decisions
that were previously made in non-public forums to be made in public as the
parties work toward establishing, implementing, and revising implemen-
tation strategies to meet the goals or performance measures established
634 Mary Doyle, Introduction: The Watershed-Wide, Science-Based Approach to Ecosystem
Restoration, in LARGE-SCALE ECOSYSTEM RESTORATION: FIVE CASE STUDIES FROM THE
UNITED STATES, ix, xii–xiii (Mary Doyle & Cynthia A. Drew eds., 2008). Doyle notes that
an ecosystem approach to environmental problem-solving “is by definition comprehensive,”
and grounded in “scientific uncertainty and emerging scientific understanding,” requiring
an adaptive management approach. Id. at xii-xiii. Adaptive management assumes that
policymakers and policies will be flexible enough to permit course changes as new scientific
knowledge becomes available. Id. at xiii.
635 Sabel & Simon, supra note 171, at 1074 (explicating the “veil effect”).
636 Id. at 1074–75.
637 Id. at 1075–76 (explicating the “status quo effect”).
638 Id. at 1076–77 (explicating the “deliberation effect”).
639 Id. at 1069.
640 Sabel & Simon, supra note 171, at 1069.
641 See id. at 1069–70.
642 See id. at 1076. Sabel and Simon characterize this outcome of the negotiated remedy
as the deliberative effect of destabilized litigation. Id. at 1076–77.
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by the stakeholders in the decree.643 The negotiation process also results
in public vindication of the plaintiff’s claim, brings public attention to the
problem, and causes increased public scrutiny.644 The very public nature
of the remedy, its design, and implementation ripples out beyond the liti-
gation and the litigants into other private and public realms in a process
of “iterative disequilibriation and readjustment.”645 While this is ultimately
what happened at Mono Lake, it did not happen in the manner envisioned
by Sabel and Simon.
Once it was clear that the LADWP water allocation license would
be subject to revision, both the Mono Lake Committee and the LADWP
had a significant incentive to negotiate a remedy.646 The process under-
taken by the SWRCB to prepare the EIR gave them the space they needed
to negotiate a remedy.647 For the Mono Lake Committee, this was an oppor-
tunity to, at last, participate in the decision-making process, but for the
LADWP, it had become a necessity since it had no way of predicting the
outcome of the SWRCB process.648 Thus, it was in the early 1990s that the
Mono Lake Committee, the LADWP, the City of Los Angeles, Mono County,
and the U.S. Forest Service, collectively known as the Mono Lake Group,649
came together in earnest to wrestle with the major ecosystem restoration
questions at Mono Lake.650 And, while the negotiations did not take place
in the public forum of the courts,651 the Mono Lake Committee not only
continued to report negotiation progress to its membership, but it was
able, through ongoing framing, to keep the process in the media.652 This
643 See id. at 1071–72.
644 Id. at 1077. Sabel and Simon refer to this as the “publicity effect” and suggest that it
is a natural outcome of the experimental remedy. See Sabel & Simon, supra note 171, at
1077. But, social scientists argue that the publicity effect is a combination of the court
legitimizing the plaintiff’s position and the plaintiff’s willingness to use the outcome of
the litigation as one of many political resources in the process of framing, which is an
important part of social mobilization. See supra Part II.A.1.
645 See Sabel & Simon, supra note 171, at 1081. The “web effect” of the litigation affects
how agencies make decisions in the future. See id. at 1082.
646 See supra notes 618–30 and accompanying text.
647 See supra note 624 and accompanying text.
648 See supra notes 618–30 and accompanying text.
649 HART, supra note 4, at 131. In fact, the Mono Lake Committee and the LADWP had been
meeting quietly since the 1984 UCLA policy forum. Id. at 121. In the summer of 1987, they
broadened their discussions to include the U.S. Forest Service and Mono County, which
formed the Mono Lake Group. Id. at 131. In late 1987, this group hired Tom Graff of the
Environmental Defense Fund to find an alternative water source for Los Angeles. Id.
650 See id. at 144.
651 See id. at 131.
652 See supra note 630 and accompanying text.
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kept pressure on the LADWP to find a resolution or submit to the uncer-
tainties of the SWRCB deliberations under the court’s oversight.653
There were two central ecosystem restoration questions that the
parties needed to resolve: (1) what was the appropriate lake level and
(2) how would the City of Los Angeles make up for the lost water from the
Mono Lake tributaries without stressing other ecosystems.654 Although
the parties had yet to determine how to accomplish the latter, meeting
Los Angeles’s water needs without damaging another ecosystem became
an initial goal of the negotiation process.655
Discovering solutions for Los Angeles’s water dilemma was an itera-
tive process. The seeds for a negotiated remedy would come from a number
of sources.656 In 1988, California suffered yet another drought, and in 1990,
Los Angeles instituted mandatory water rationing.657 Water rationing cre-
ated financial problems for the LADWP: As less water was used by citizens,
the per gallon cost of running the Los Angeles water system increased.658
Customers, however, paid a flat fee for water, which meant those customers
who conserved water paid a higher per-gallon rate than customers who did
not limit their water use.659 To resolve this inequity, Mayor Bradley ap-
pointed a committee to develop a new water rate scheme for Los Angeles,
and he invited the Mono Lake Committee to appoint a member to the
committee, an unimaginable action just ten years earlier.660 The new rate
scheme was a two-tiered system with reduced rates for small or moderate
users and raised rates for heavy users to finance the cost of developing new
water sources.661 The system was designed to both encourage conservation
and explore alternative water sources.662
In conjunction with the new rate scheme, the statewide Urban
Water Conservation Council issued a list of Best Management Practices
for household water conservation, which included subsidized installation
653 See supra note 630 and accompanying text.
654 See HART, supra note 4, at 146–48.
655 History of the Mono Lake Committee, MONO LAKE COMM., http://www.monolake.org/
mlc/history (last visited Jan. 22, 2011).
656 See HART, supra note 4, at 148–49.
657 Id. Hart reports that during the 1990–91 drought, Los Angeles undertook a mandatory
rationing program and experienced a larger than expected drop in water use with per




661 HART, supra note 4, at 149.
662 See id.
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of ultra-low-flush toilets.663 The Mono Lake Committee, in yet another
example of framing, reinforced these practices with a series of television
spots linking water use in Los Angeles to ecosystem destruction at Mono
Lake and in the Santa Monica Bay.664 The new frame: what was good for
your pocket book (decreased water use) was also good for the Mono Lake
and Santa Monica Bay ecosystems.665 When, in July 1992, water ration-
ing ended and people continued to conserve and Los Angeles’s water con-
sumption dropped by fifteen to twenty-five percent,666 it became clear to
the Mono Lake Committee that some of the water needed to restore the
Mono Lake ecosystem could come through conservation.667 The LADWP
Assistant General Manager admitted as much in a letter in the L.A. Times
but was apparently unwilling to formally concede the issue in negotiations
until a lake level agreement was reached.668
The reduced water rates associated with conservation and the re-
sulting perspective that saving the Mono Lake ecosystem could be accom-
plished without substantial financial burden to the citizens of Los Angeles
is illustrative of Rosenberg’s observation that legal remedies promoting
change are more likely to be implemented when they are supported by
market mechanisms and offer incentives for compliance.669
The California Legislature was also the source of a potential finan-
cial incentive for change. In 1989, a number of legislators seeking resolu-
tion to the Mono Lake controversy approached the Mono Lake Group with
a proposal to fund replacement water for Los Angeles.670 Under the pro-
posal, the legislature would provide $60 million to develop new water for
Los Angeles from reclaimed water or from sources in the Central Valley
663 Id.; see also CAL. STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
REPORT FOR THE REVIEW OF MONO BASIN WATER RIGHTS OF THE CITY OF L.A., 3L8 to 3L9
(1993), available at http://www.monobasinresearch.org/onlinereports/mbeir.htm.





668 See Duane L. Georgeson, Letter to the Editor, Water Shortage, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1987,
§ II, at 4; HART, supra note 4, at 145–47.
669 See ROSENBERG, supra note 250, at 32–33.
670 Hart, supra note 4, at 132–33. This proposal went through a myriad of forms as it moved
through the California Legislature, but, as passed, AB444 allocated $60 million in state
funding to develop replacement water. Id. The LADWP was skeptical of the proposal, but
now even the L.A. Times was prodding the LADWP to find an alternative solution that
would preserve the Mono Lake ecosystem. See Editorial, At Last: A Solution for Mono
Lake, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1989, § II, at 6.
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with the proviso that money would only be allocated upon joint applica-
tion of the LADWP and the Mono Lake Committee.671 But, the Mono Lake
Committee was reluctant to proceed forward until resolution of the lake
level issue.672 Despite the reluctance of the parties to jump at the legisla-
tive proposal, the proposal is an example of the impact of the deliberative
effect of the negotiation process. Here was a potential alternative source
of water for Los Angeles that did not depend on depriving either Mono
Lake or any other natural system of water, which was a central goal of the
committee.673 If and how the parties would apply for and use this appropria-
tion was unknown, but what was clear was that there was some tentative
agreement among the parties that any alternate replacement water source
for Mono Lake would not come at the expense of another ecosystem.674
Setting the appropriate lake level proved to be the more difficult
task, and by 1991, it appeared that the parties were at an impasse.675 Pro-
posals for an acceptable lake level went back and forth without resolution,
and the money provided by the California Legislature sat pending the out-
come of the lake level debate.676 In 1992, Mayor Bradley’s office suggested
that the parties apply for the legislative funding without resolving the lake
level question with the provision that any water developed with legislative
funding be credited to the Mono Lake ecosystem.677 To sweeten the deal,
the City of Los Angeles would agree to a moratorium of all diversions from
the Mono Lake tributaries until the SWRCB reached its final resolution
on the Los Angeles permit.678 Although the LADWP ultimately vetoed the
proposal,679 this proposal made by the City of Los Angeles serves as yet
another example of Sabel and Simon’s “rolling rule regime” in which the
parties explored and developed a series of new options and tentative agree-
ments based on an ecosystem preservation outcome.680 Such outcomes, a
few short years ago, were beyond the realm of possibility.681
671 HART, supra note 4, at 132–33, 147–48.
672 See id. at 132–33.
673 History of the Mono Lake Committee, supra note 655.
674 See id.; HART, supra note 4, at 147–48.
675 See HART, supra note 4, at 144.
676 See id. at 146. While the parties argued over the lake level, funding from the $60 million
allocation was being diverted by the California Legislature for other purposes. Id.
677 HART, supra note 4, at 147.
678 See id.
679 Id.
680 See supra notes 233, 237–40 and accompanying text.
681 See HART, supra note 4, at 147. Throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, a number
of alternative water sources to replace waters from the Mono Lake tributaries were
explored. See id. An option rejected by environmental groups was exportation from the
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Another factor that aided the search for replacement water for the
Mono Lake ecosystem, and ultimately the development of a remedy, was
Los Angeles’s growing interest in water reclamation spurred by the need for
a sewage system upgrade.682 Historically, Los Angeles dumped wastewater
effluent into the Pacific.683 Los Angeles was under continuous pressure to
improve its sewage treatment to reduce effluent pollutants.684 By the early
1990s, water from local sewage treatment plants was almost potable.685 The
combined reclamation projects could yield upwards of 100,000 acre-feet
of water.686 But, using this water for irrigation, to recharge groundwater
aquifers, or for other non-consumptive uses required an increase in recla-
mation capacity and the construction of transmission infrastructure.687
In a partnership, previously unimaginable in 1983, the LADWP
and the Mono Lake Committee jointly approached Congress for a federal
appropriation to construct the necessary infrastructure to develop and
transmit reclaimed water.688 An appropriation for the infrastructure project
was included in the 1992 Federal Reclamation Projects Authorization and
Adjustment Act.689 Together, the LADWP and the Mono Lake Committee
found funding for the largest water reclamation project in the United
States.690 This project would allow Los Angeles to meet its water needs
without damaging other ecosystems while returning water to the Mono
Lake ecosystem.691
Within several years after the National Audubon and trout cases
were consolidated in Judge Finney’s court, the stakeholders had developed
a series of viable, ecosystem neutral water options for Los Angeles.692 The
Mono Lake Committee had been incorporated into the City of Los Angeles’s
political decision-making structure.693 The LADWP, the City of Los Angeles,
Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta. Id. Another option explored was water marketing, which
involved purchasing water rights from farmers in the Central Valley where soil was
“tainted with toxic selenium” and shifting that water to Los Angeles. Id. at 148.
682 Id.
683 See id. at 149.





689 Id. at 147; see also Reclamation Projects Authorization and Adjustment Act of 1992,
H.R. 429, 102d Cong. § 1606 (1992).
690 HART, supra note 4, at 148.
691 See id. at 147; History of the Mono Lake Committee, supra note 655.
692 See HART, supra note 4, at 147–49.
693 See id. at 148.
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and the Mono Lake Committee had developed enough trust in each other
to jointly approach Congress to find a partial resolution of the water supply
issue.694 This is a prime example of the types of remedies developed through
the rolling rule regime process and the modification of the political infra-
structure in Los Angeles City Hall.
Resolution of the appropriate lake level, however, remained a road-
block.695 Then, in May 1993, the SWRCB issued the Draft Environmental
Impact Report for the Review of Mono Basin Water Rights of the City of Los
Angeles (“DEIR”).696 The DEIR identified 6383 feet as an “environmentally
superior alternative” lake level for Mono Lake, but noted that “[b]ased on
an assessment of unmitigable cumulative impacts relative to prediversion
conditions . . . , the 6,390-Ft Alternative appears to be the environmen-
tally superior [lake level] alternative . . . .”697 The DEIR further concluded
that the impact of the 6390-foot lake level on the Los Angeles water sup-
ply would be “less-than-significant” if the LADWP adopted mitigation
measures, including conservation and best management practices to re-
duce water use.698 The finding was jolting to the LADWP, which had con-
tinued to insist that 6377 feet was the appropriate average lake level.699
But, the LADWP had no allies.700 And, even though the parties had not
reached agreement about the appropriate lake level when the SWRCB
694 See id. at 148–49.
695 See id. at 147, 156.
696 Id. at 157; CAL. STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., supra note 663.
697 CAL. STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., supra note 663, at S-11.
698 Id. at 3L28 to 3L29. Mitigation measures recommended in the DEIR included applica-
tion for AB 444 funding to develop replacement water through reclamation, use of HR 429
funding to develop reclamation projects, development of demand-side reductions from
water conservation programs, monitoring compliance with best management practices,
and recovery of storm runoff. Id. at 3L27 to 3L28.
699 See HART, supra note 4, at 158–63. In truth, the parties always spoke of lake levels in
ranges. See id. at 162. The low level end of the range was the drought level and the upper
level the wet year level, but the focus of most lake level discussions was of the average lake
level. See id. at 160–63. The mid-level recommended by the LADWP (6377.7 feet) would
have maintained the status quo, but the levels recommended by the DEIR would require
returning Mono Lake to either 1989 or the 1940 lake levels. Id. at 157, 162.
700 See id. at 162–63. By July 1993, the EPA, the U.S. Forest Service, and the California
Department of Fish and Game all supported a 6390-foot lake level. See id. at 163–64. The
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service announced that if lake level selection dropped below 6390,
it would list the brine shrimp as a threatened species. HART, supra note 4, at 163. Even
the Los Angeles City Council’s Commerce, Energy and Natural Resources Committee ex-
pressed concern about continuing to fund litigation when the money could be spent on
water reclamation projects. Id. at 162.
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commenced its hearing on the LADWP permit in the summer of 1993,701
the LADWP now recognized that the law required sufficient water flows
into Mono Lake to support fish hatcheries and the Mono Lake ecosys-
tem.702 The fight had essentially devolved into a factual dispute over the
needs of the ecosystem: could the ecosystem survive at a lake level of 6377,
the LADWP’s preferred lake level, or was 6390 the appropriate level for
the ecosystem?703
The SWRCB hearing had an interesting side benefit. Hart reports
that “[a]s the testimony trundled on toward Christmas, with no end in
sight, a curious thing happened: the contending lawyers and witnesses,
board staffers and onlookers, began to form a community, a sort of vil-
lage.”704 Although the hearings did not constitute the traditional negotia-
tion process envisioned by Sabel and Simon, it was the means by which
Judge Finney proposed resolving the underlying litigation.705 The hearing
process itself forced daily interaction among stakeholders over several
months, and this interaction likely further facilitated the building of rela-
tionships and trust between stakeholders.706
Shortly before Christmas 1993, the City pulled the Mono Lake
Committee and the LADWP together to again try to broker a deal for the
water development funding offered by the California Legislature.707 In the
end, the Mono Lake Committee agreed to make a joint reclamation fund-
ing request without resolving the lake level issue, and the LADWP agreed
to “abandon its claim to at least 41,000 acre feet per year of the Mono
Basin water.”708 This was tantamount to the LADWP relinquishing approx-
imately one-half of its annual diversion from the Mono Lake tributaries,
701 See Decision 1631, supra note 42, at 14–15. The SWRCB hearing on the Los Angeles
Water Rights License was conducted in two phases. HART, supra note 4, at 164. The first
phase provided an opportunity for interested parties to present “non-evidentiary policy
statements.” Decision 1631, supra note 42, at 15. The second phase was a formal eviden-
tiary hearing. Id. In total, the Water Resources Board hearing included forty days of testi-
mony from over 125 witnesses and 1000 exhibits. Id. The five-month evidentiary hearing
commenced in October 1993, concluded in February 1994, and was followed by a briefing
schedule that extended into April 1994. Id. at 15.
702 See HART, supra note 4, at 164–66.
703 See id. at 165–66. See generally Decision 1631, supra note 42.
704 HART, supra note 4, at 167.
705 Id. at 131.
706 See id. at 169.
707 See id.
708 Id. Between 1974 and 1989, the LADWP diverted, on average, 83,000 acre-feet from the
Mono Lake tributaries per year. Decision 1631, supra note 42, at 6.
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allowing this water to flow into Mono Lake for restoration purposes.709 The
issue of the appropriate lake level was left to the SWRCB for resolution
through the hearing process.710
In retrospect, both the growing public opposition to the LADWP,
or water scarcity frame, and the court’s National Audubon decision made
it apparent to the City of Los Angeles, and to some lesser degree to the
LADWP, that the status quo was dead and that Los Angeles was moving
into uncharted political waters.711 This is evidence of the veil and status
quo effects of the litigation and political mobilization of the litigation.712
The uncertainty created an incentive for the City of Los Angeles to explore
alternate methods to meet its water needs that would not entail ecosystem
degradation.713 The status quo effect of the litigation, resulting mobiliza-
tion, and changed constituency perspectives induced the City’s political
structure to pressure the LADWP to recognize a changed reality.714
These changes also induced the City to encourage the LADWP and
the Mono Lake Committee to explore together new paradigms that would
assure water for both the Mono Lake ecosystem and the City of Los An-
geles.715 In this process, not only was the Mono Lake Committee assured
greater voice in how water would be allocated between the natural and
human systems,716 but the Mono Lake Committee’s willingness to explore
new paradigms, while the LADWP came to the table reluctantly, in-
creased the Mono Lake Committee’s credibility as a can-do partner in the
water allocation decision making process.717
Indeed, the political landscape had so significantly changed that
when, on September 28, 1994, the SWRCB issued its decision calling for
a lake level of 6390 feet,718 “the sticking point” for the LADWP was not
709 See Hart, supra note 4, at 169; Decision 1631, supra note 42, at 6. By only diverting
41,000 acre-feet of water, 42,000 acre-feet would be left to flow into Mono Lake. See Hart,
supra note 4, at 169; Decision 1631, supra note 42, at 6.
710 See supra notes 701–03, and accompanying text.
711 See supra notes 429–36, 627–30 and accompanying text.
712 See Sabel & Simon, supra note 171, at 1074–76.
713 See History of the Mono Lake Committee, supra note 655.
714 See Sabel & Simon, supra note 171, at 1075–76.
715 HART, supra note 4, at 169.
716 See id.
717 See id.
718 Id. at 172. In truth, setting the lake level issue was more complex than simply setting
a lake level. The lake had to be restored to the 6390-foot level. Id. To accomplish this, the
SWRCB established a complex diversion scheme that essentially prohibited the LADWP
from diverting any water until the lake reached 6377 feet, and thereafter, the LADWP was
permitted limited diversions until the lake reached 6391 feet. Decision 1631, supra note
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the lake level, which had indirectly been resolved in December 1993, but
the restoration requirements.719 And, although LADWP professional staff
favored contesting the SWRCB Decision, the LADWP had lost virtually
all of its historic allies, including the Los Angeles City Council, the Mayor’s
office, and the Water and Power Commissioners.720 Even LADWP executive
staff were disinclined to contest the decision, so the LADWP professional
staff and attorneys stood alone in their desire to continue the contest.721
The once powerful LADWP was essentially politically isolated–clear evi-
dence of a change in the water allocation decision-making structure.722
And, in an ironic twist of events, it was the Mono Lake Committee that
came forward to save the day when Martha Davis, Executive Director of
the Mono Lake Committee, sat down with LADWP Commissioners and
agreed to help the LADWP secure trout stream restoration funding in
exchange for assurances that the LADWP would not appeal the SWRCB
Decision.723 Such an event had seemed unimaginable in 1978 at the
LADWP-Mono Lake Committee pretrial meeting.724 The agency that had
once informed the Mono Lake Committee that it was prepared to outlast
and out-litigate a group of tree huggers725 was now working with the Mono
Lake Committee towards ecosystem restoration.
But, what of the political power that permitted the LADWP to
dominate water allocation determinations in California and that led to
the decision permitting the LADWP to divert all waters from the Mono
Lake ecosystem? In the words of the L.A. Times editorial board:
It is time to give up the Mono Lake battle, to move on
and try to replace the lost water with reclaimed water and
through conservation. The Metropolitan Water District says
it can make up for much of the loss. But the possibility of
more drought, federal and state requirements to increase
42, at 156–57, 202–03. The SWRCB’s decision also established dry and wet year flows for
the Mono Lake tributaries. Id. at 196–200. These diversion limitations would essentially
provide 30,800 acre-feet a year for Mono Lake. HART, supra note 4, at 171. Finally, the
SWRCB’s Decision ordered the LADWP to undertake extensive habitat restoration of the
Mono Lake tributaries and to develop a waterfowl restoration plan for the Mono Lake
Water Basin. Decision 1631, supra note 42, at 204–06.
719 HART, supra note 4, at 173.
720 See id. at 162–63, 173.
721 Id. at 173–74.
722 See supra notes 700, 711–13, 720 and accompanying text.
723 See id. at 174.
724 See supra notes 335–41, 349-50 and accompanying text.
725 See HART, supra note 4, at 83.
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fresh-water flows to repair environmental damage in the
Sacramento Delta and other uncertainties mean the city
should not rely too heavily on this old, reliable source [the
LADWP]. As ever, water is the future of arid Southern
California. But what is needed at the [LADWP] is not just
more water, but more vision, leadership and courage.726
More importantly, the Mono Lake Committee had won a structural victory.
Not only did it have an ongoing voice in water allocation decisions in Los
Angeles, but through the National Audubon decision and a changed public
ethos, it had ensured that the ecosystem would be considered in the context
of the state’s public trust obligation in future water allocation permitting
decisions made by the SWRCB.727
V. SOME FINAL INSIGHTS ABOUT DESTABILIZING LITIGATION &
ECOSYSTEM RESTORATION
Did law and litigation matter to the Mono Lake ecosystem, and if
so, is litigation an effective tool to promote the protection and restoration
of water-based ecosystems? Today, the elevation of Mono Lake is about
6382 feet,728 ten feet above its historic low, eight feet below the 6390-foot
level established by the SWRCB,729 and thirty-five feet below pre-diversion
levels.730 Between 1990 and 1994, shortly after the court of appeals issued
its decision in CalTrout II,731 the Restoration Technical Committee began
restoration of Rush and Lee Vining Creeks.732 Restoration efforts intensified
after the SWRCB issued its 1994 decision setting target lake levels, estab-
lishing minimum and annual peak flows for the Mono Lake tributaries and
ordering the LADWP to commence restoration of both Mono Lake and its
tributaries pursuant to an approved restoration plan.733 Today, the parties
726 Editorial, DWP’s Terrible Case of Mono, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1994, at B7.
727 Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine Cnty. (Nat’l Audubon), 658 P.2d 709, 719–21
(Cal. 1983) (holding the state has an ongoing public trust interest in its navigable waters,
which prevents appropriation of water in a harmful manner to the interests protected by
the public trust, such as ecosystems in their natural state).
728 MONO LAKE COMM., http://www.monolake.org (last visited Jan. 22, 2011).
729 See HART, supra note 4, at 171-73.
730 MONO LAKE COMM., http://www.monolake.org (last visited Jan. 22, 2011).
731 Cal. Trout, Inc. v. Super. Ct. of Sacramento Cnty. (CalTrout II), 266 Cal. Rptr. 788 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1990).
732 See Restoration Chronology 1982–2009, MONO LAKE COMM., http://www.monolake.org/
mlc/restochr (last visited Jan. 22, 2011).
733 Id.; see also Decision 1631, supra note 42.
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have taken significant steps towards ecosystem restoration.734 What is
even more remarkable is that restoration has been accomplished without
extracting water from other ecosystems to replace the reduction in water
going to Los Angeles as a result of restoration.735 Thus, it seems clear that
the answer to the question “did law matter to the Mono Lake ecosystem”
must be yes, but in a more complex manner than anticipated by destabili-
zation theorists. While the Mono Lake Committee credits both the initial
public trust litigation and the trout litigation for the restoration out-
come,736 as this analysis of the historic narrative and litigation history of
the events leading to the Mono Lake ecosystem restoration suggests, the
success of Mono Lake ecosystem restoration was dependent on far more
than litigation alone.737
So what does the Mono Lake case tell environmental practitioners,
social scientists, and destabilization theorists about the ability of litigation
to change political and social structures to protect ecosystems? The lessons
from Mono Lake suggest that if the Sabel and Simon destabilization liti-
gation model is to be a successful tool for promoting changes in political
and social structures necessary for ecosystem protection and restoration,
litigation must be approached as a political resource mobilized by environ-
mental organizations as part of a larger strategy.738 This requires a stra-
tegic litigant willing to look beyond the desired environmental outcome of
the litigation–a litigant willing to focus on the change in the underlying
social and political structure that made the initial decision resulting in
ecological degradation.739
The case of Mono Lake suggests that the goal of change litigation
should be twofold: (1) alteration of the ecological outcome and (2) alter-
ation of the underlying political and social environmental decision-making
structures. To accomplish this end, the litigant must look beyond correc-
tion of the environmental wrong through a consent decree to the necessary
changes in political and social structures that would result in long-term
ecosystem protection.740 In short, accomplishing and sustaining long-term
734 See Restoration Chronology, supra note 732, for a chronology of the restoration of the
Mono Lake ecosystem.
735 See supra notes 654–55, 708–09 and accompanying text; see also Restoration Chronology,
supra note 732.
736 Restoration: Repairing a Damaged Ecosystem, MONO LAKE COMM., http://www.monolake
.org/mlc/restoration (last visited Jan. 22, 2010) [hereinafter Restoration].
737 See HART, supra note 4, at 175.
738 See supra notes 192–94 and accompanying text.
739 See supra notes 331–37 and accompanying text.
740 See supra Part IV.E-F.
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ecosystem protection requires the litigant to explore how destabilizing liti-
gation can be mobilized in conjunction with other strategies to facilitate
meaningful change.741 The tale of the Mono Lake ecosystem restoration
efforts tells us that had the Mono Lake Committee simply relied on the
National Audubon litigation to motivate the LADWP to change, it is far
from certain what, if anything, would have been accomplished.742 It was
the National Audubon decision in conjunction with resource mobilization,
including ongoing framing and the secondary trout litigation, that pushed
the parties to negotiate a flexible remedy in compliance with the National
Audubon decision743 and which ultimately led to ecosystem restoration
for Mono Lake.744 More importantly, from the perspective of water-based
ecosystems in California, it was the use of the National Audubon court
order as a political resource that resulted in the development of a flexible
remedy and modified California’s water allocation rules and decision-
making structures in a manner that gave voice to natural systems.745
Thus, the primary lessons from Mono Lake indicate that effective
use of Sabel and Simon’s destabilization theory to promote change requires
an intermingling of legal strategy and political mobilization.746 More specifi-
cally, Mono Lake suggests that effective destabilization in environmental
litigation is facilitated by: (1) the existence of an active social movement;747
(2) the ability of the social movement to effectively use framing to build
support for the litigation and the willingness and ability to use the liti-
gation as a framing resource to foster ecosystem and political outcomes;748
(3) the use of secondary litigation to complete the job;749 and (4) the ability
to develop flexible performance standards that permit a systems approach
to environmental management.750
A. The Litigant Matters
The Mono Lake case supports Scheingold and McCann’s argument
that destabilizing change litigation is most successful if brought by SMOs
741 See supra Part IV.E-F.
742 See generally Hart, supra note 4 (discussing the Mono Lake ecosystem and litigation
history).
743 See Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine Cnty. (Nat’l Audubon), 658 P.2d 709
(Cal. 1983); Benford & Snow, supra note 287, at 611; Restoration, supra note 736.
744 See Restoration, supra note 736.
745 See Nat’l Audubon, 658 P.2d at 709, 719.
746 See Sabel & Simon, supra note 171, at 1055–56; Stryker (2007), supra note 256, at 88.
747 See McCann (2006), supra note 1, at 19; Sabel & Simon, supra note 171, at 1055.
748 See supra Part IV.C.
749 See supra Part IV.D.
750 See supra Part IV.B.
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that aim for broader social and political transformation than traditional
litigants because SMOs are more likely to seek the structural changes that
bring access to policymaking forums.751 The observation that organizational
litigants make a difference appears to be borne out by many of the cases
discussed by Sabel and Simon in support of destabilization.752 A brief over-
view of these cases indicates that many were brought by either SMOs or
groups of plaintiffs represented by a single attorney, which indicates some
type of organized approach to the litigation and its underlying purpose.753
The importance of the SMO as a litigant is illustrated by the Mono
Lake case. The complex strategy that led to ecosystem restoration at Mono
Lake required extensive financial resources, the development of and access
to complex networks, ongoing framing to develop support from both by-
standers and supporters, and a leadership succession plan to accommo-
date the changing interests and availability of early Mono Lake Committee
leaders Winkler and Gaines.754 Not only was it necessary to garner these
resources, but these resources had to be maintained over the twenty years
it took to negotiate a restoration agreement and to accomplish the changes
in California’s water allocation scheme.755 This would eventually result in
the recognition of water ecosystem values in water appropriation decisions,
which would have been difficult for a single citizen litigant.756
The Mono Lake case also supports Galanter’s theory that organiza-
tions with access to ongoing resources are more successful at leveraging
litigation to bring about structural social change.757 This is especially true
when accomplishing change requires ongoing and repeated litigation and
the development of public support for a changed environmental para-
digm.758 The characteristics of the Mono Lake case study comport with
751 See SCHEINGOLD, supra note 158, at 4–5, 8–10; McCann (2006), supra note 1, at 23–24.
752 See Sabel & Simon, supra note 171, at 1022–53.
753 See id.; see, e.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (class action brought by individuals
and organizations alleging police brutality); Sheppard v. Phoenix, 210 F. Supp. 2d 450
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (action brought by current and former prison inmates to challenge use of
force practices in New York City jails); New York State Ass’n for Retarded Children v.
Carey, 393 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (class action brought on behalf of mentally
disabled children and adults against a state institution).
754 See HART, supra note 4, at 71–72, 81–83; TARROW, supra note 270, at 2; Benford & Snow,
supra note 287, at 614.
755 See Restoration, supra note 736.
756 See id.
757 See Galanter, supra note 320, at 97–98; Grossman et al., supra note 320, at 803, 808;
Harris, supra note 294, at 923–24.
758 See Galanter, supra note 320, at 97–98; Grossman et al., supra note 320, at 803, 808;
Harris, supra note 294, at 923–24.
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the observation by social scientists that successful litigants are generally
those with a long-term view, who think strategically about the outcomes
of the litigation and implications of the litigation beyond the courthouse,
and tend to be organizations or litigants who regularly appear in court.759
However, the existence of an SMO as a litigant does not, standing
alone, ensure that successful destabilizing litigation will occur.760 It is
equally apparent that how the SMO leverages its resources, including
litigation, has a signification bearing on whether litigation will result in
destabilization.761 Furthermore, as the discussion of framing suggests
below, the type of SMO bringing the litigation may also play a role in the
ability of the SMO to leverage destabilizing change.762 The use of framing
in the Mono Lake case raises the question: to what resources must the
SMO have access to successfully mobilize litigation in support of desta-
bilizing change?
B. Framing—Fertilizing the Ground
The Mono Lake experience also demonstrates that destabilizing
change is facilitated when litigation is accompanied by political mobiliza-
tion brought about by resource mobilization and framing.763 The framing
process is a reflexive process that occurs when resources are mobilized
to frame an issue for bystanders and potential supporters.764 As McCann
observed, framing plays a vital function, not only in building the environ-
mental movement or SMO, but also in preparing the field for successful
litigation by increasing public support.765 Pre-litigation, it appears that
framing plays three important functions essential to preparing the way for
destabilization. At these early stages framing can: (1) build support for
ecosystem restoration across the population; (2) discredit historic frames
that lead to ecosystem degradation; and (3) provide preliminary legitimacy
to the SMO’s legal claim of right.766
759 See Galanter, supra note 320, at 97–98; Grossman et al., supra note 320, at 803, 808;
Harris, supra note 294, at 923–24.
760 See McCann (2006), supra note 1, at 19, 21–22; see also supra notes 746–50 and
accompanying text for elements needed for successful destabilizing litigation.
761 See McCann (2006), supra note 1, at 19, 21–22.
762 See Galanter, supra note 320, at 97–98.
763 See Benford & Snow, supra note 287, at 612; see also supra notes 743–44 and accom-
panying text.
764 See Benford & Snow, supra note 287, at 613–14, 625.
765 See McCann (2006), supra note 1, at 25–26, 28.
766 See HART, supra note 4, at 84–85; Nisbet, supra note 287, at 15–16.
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These lessons were borne out at Mono Lake when the Mono Lake
Committee intuitively prepared the field for successful destabilizing litiga-
tion. By consciously building a new water frame designed to shift the public
understanding from a frame of economic growth or ecosystem destruction
to an ethical/alternate path frame premised on ecosystem destruction
caused by water waste, the Committee found resonance in the national
press.767 This frame supported the public trust claim of right that the state
had an affirmative duty to take the state’s public trust interest in the Mono
Lake ecosystem into consideration in the water allocation scheme.768
Early framing also permitted the SMO to make use of a more
flexible, albeit more controversial, legal standard. Sabel and Simon suggest
that effective destabilization claims are claims premised on the failure of
the public agency to meet an uncontroversial or widely accepted perfor-
mance standard.769 In environmental law, there are few performance stan-
dards designed to effectively protect ecosystems; those that do exist, such
as the public trust doctrine, are hardly non-controversial.770 Yet, in the
Mono Lake case, the destabilizing change litigation was premised on a
legal theory that had never been extended to inland tributaries of navi-
gable waters nor applied to ecosystem protection. And, in the view of Los
Angeles, this was intended to deprive the city of “valid water rights that it
has held for more than a half a century.”771 Arguably, the acceptability of
the public trust doctrine as a legal theory was premised on a claim of right
to a healthy ecosystem on behalf of the citizens. Support for this claim of
right was developed through extensive framing that built public acceptance
in the media, among the citizens of California, and was ultimately recog-
nized by legal scholars when U.C. Davis held a one-day seminar on the
767 See supra notes 478–81 and accompanying text.
768 See HART, supra note 4, at 105.
769 Sabel & Simon, supra note 171, at 1062—63.
770 See Keiter, supra note 15, at 45–46; Sabel & Simon, supra note 171, at 1063–64. One
need only peruse the range of law review articles published on the public trust doctrine
since 1970 to glimpse the degree of controversy surrounding the public trust doctrine. See,
e.g., Hope M. Babcock, The Public Trust Doctrine: What a Tall Tale They Tell, 61 S.C. L.
REV. 393 (2009); Michael C. Blumm et al., Renouncing the Public Trust Doctrine: An
Assessment of the Validity of Idaho House Bill 794, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 461 (1997); Thomas
A. Campbell, The Public Trust, What’s It Worth?, 34 NAT. RESOURCES J. 73 (1994); Darren
K. Cottriel, Comment, The Right to Hunt in the Twenty-First Century: Can the Public Trust
Doctrine Save an American Tradition?, 27 PAC. L.J. 1235 (1996); Barton H. Thompson, Jr.,
The Public Trust Doctrine: A Conservative Reconstruction & Defense, 15 SOUTHEASTERN
ENVTL. L.J. 47 (2006).
771 See Water and Power, supra note 489; see also Water Revolution, supra note 492
(discussing the controversial nature of the court’s public trust ruling).
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use of the public trust doctrine featuring the Mono Lake attorneys.772 This
framing helped build legitimacy for the Mono Lake Committee legal argu-
ment at the time the complaint was filed and suggests that framing can
be used prior to litigation to build support for an otherwise controversial
legal standard.773
The Mono Lake case also highlights the importance of using the
litigation itself as a framing resource. As McCann notes, simply crafting
a complaint can mobilize the law into an assertion of a lawful claim of right
that can be used to transform power relationships within politics and can
legitimize the SMO’s legal claim.774 And, indeed, it might be argued that
the destabilizing effect of litigation for Mono Lake was as much a result of
using the litigation as a framing tool throughout the life of the litigation
as was the destabilizing impact of the litigation itself. The Mono Lake
Committee began using the litigation as part of its framing process to illus-
trate a legitimate claim of right as soon as the litigation was filed.775 By the
time the California Supreme Court issued its landmark National Audubon
decision in 1983, the Mono Lake Committee’s claim of right had received
legitimacy in the national press, in major portions of the legal commu-
nity, among political forces in Sacramento, and among citizens across the
state.776 Although inroads in the City of Los Angeles were harder to find,
even the LADWP grudgingly admitted that the Mono Lake Committee’s
framing efforts had done a decent job of mobilizing the public and creating
public acceptance of a claim of right to a healthy Mono Lake ecosystem.777
Nor does the importance of framing diminish after the court has
issued its determination. As Stryker and Harris note, the mere fact that
the court has issued an order does not, in and of itself, mean that the court
order will be enforced or result in destabilizing change.778 The case of Mono
Lake supports the conclusion that, post-litigation, the ability and willing-
ness of an SMO to use a court’s legal ruling and decree to support a new
frame appears to be central to successful, destabilizing litigation. Like the
proverbial mustard seed, there is little advantage to an advantageous
legal determination if nothing is done with it. It may sprout institutional
change; it may not.
772 See HART, supra note 4, at 105.
773 See Arnold & Jewell, supra note 4, at 6.
774 See McCann (2006), supra note 1, at 21–22, 29.
775 See HART, supra note 4, at 81–91.
776 Id. at 120, 131–32.
777 See Roderick, supra note 508.
778 See Harris, supra note 294, at 933; Stryker (2007), supra note 256, at 90.
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This need for ongoing framing, post-litigation, is clearly illustrated
by the Mono Lake case. For although the California Supreme court issued
its National Audubon decision in 1983, the federal district Court made no
effort to enforce the determination. Instead, the matter languished in fed-
eral court for several more years.779 The transformation of the National
Audubon decision into a destabilization tool was a tribute to the Mono
Lake Committee’s decision to use the court order as a framing tool to con-
tinue to build public support for a restored ecosystem, and its willingness
to undertake the secondary trout litigation that became the forum for
implementation of the order.780
Even though the National Audubon court order was not immedi-
ately implemented, the court order gave significant legitimacy to the Mono
Lake Committee’s frame.781 A historical supporter of the LADWP, the L.A.
Times recognized this legitimacy in 1989, observing, “Los Angeles should
realize by now that it never will win its dogged legal battle to continue
its historic diversion of eastern Sierra streams that naturally flow into
Mono Lake. . . . At some point, the decline must be halted.”782 Absent
active framing and acceptance of this new frame by Californians, particu-
larly Los Angeles residents, it is doubtful that a court order alone could
have instigated this shift. But, it is likewise true that the court order it-
self validated the Mono Lake Committee’s claim of right giving important
legitimacy to the Mono Lake Committee’s frame, and this legitimacy in-
creased the Mono Lake Committee’s political power and voice.783
Additionally, in recognizing the Mono Lake Committee’s claim of
right, the National Audubon court ruptured the old water decision-making
paradigm and cast the LADWP, the SWRCB, and California water law
into a state of uncertainty.784 No longer could it be presumed that trust
interests are subsumed in California’s water allocation schemes. At the
very least, the SWRCB had to separately consider the public trust interest
in a healthy ecosystem in the allocation process. This required giving voice
to the ecosystem–the very frame advocated by the Mono Lake Committee.
779 Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine Cnty. (Nat’l Audubon), 658 P.2d 709, 709
(Cal. 1983); Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Dep’t of Water, 858 F.2d 1409, 1409 (9th Cir. 1988).
780 See generally Cal. Trout, Inc. v. Super. Ct. of Sacramento Cnty. (CalTrout II), 266 Cal.
Rptr. 788 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); Cal. Trout, Inc. v. State Water Res. Control Bd. (CalTrout I),
255 Cal. Rptr. 184 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
781 See supra notes 526–30 and accompanying text.
782 See Halt the Decline, supra note 630.
783 See supra notes 626–32 and accompanying text.
784 See supra note 625 and accompanying text.
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In short, these events suggest that the success of litigation in
destabilizing change that transforms environmental outcomes, and the
structures that create them, is dependent, not only on successful litigation,
but on the SMO’s willingness to use litigation outcomes to frame the envi-
ronmental demands for movement members and bystanders as a claim of
right, thereby maintaining pressure on political and social structures to
adopt a changed paradigm in their operating structures—the transforma-
tion of the structure that made the challenged environmental decision.
C. Secondary Litigation—Once May Not Be Enough
A third important lesson from the Mono Lake case is that once may
not be enough. From a legal perspective, the Mono Lake Committee was
wildly successful in its National Audubon785 litigation. But, the litigation
did little to move the LADWP nor did it immediately change the political
landscape or provide relief to the ecosystem.786 It took the trout litigation
and the resulting temporary injunction to encourage the LADWP to nego-
tiate a resolution and provide temporary relief to the ecosystem in the form
of an order mandating the LADWP to maintain minimum flows in the
Mono Lake tributaries.787
The Mono Lake case supports the observation that a court order
may provide important expectations and incentives for reform,788 but court
orders are not, in and of themselves, self-executing.789 The court orders that
are most effective in promoting change are executed, provide some induce-
ment (either positive or negative) to the parties to perform, and are accom-
panied by ongoing court oversight.790 One method for providing negative
inducement, as illustrated by the Mono Lake case, is secondary litigation.
Arguably, it was the secondary trout litigation that prodded the
California court and the parties into action when, in 1984, the Mono Lake
Committee and CalTrout sued to sustain water in the Mono Lake tribu-
taries for trout populations.791 Only then did the Mono Lake Committee
get its injunctive relief for the Lake.792 This injunctive relief had three
785 Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine Cnty. (Nat’l Audubon), 658 P.2d 709 (Cal.
1983).
786 See supra notes 569–71 and accompanying text.
787 See supra note 567 and accompanying text.
788 See supra note 597 and accompanying text.
789 See supra note 429 and accompanying text.
790 See supra notes 599–605 and accompanying text.
791 See supra note 571 and accompanying text.
792 See supra note 571 and accompanying text.
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immediate impacts: (1) it insured much needed water for Mono Lake;
(2) it created actual impacts that the LADWP was forced to acknowledge,
such as the reduction in its water allocation; and (3) it gave rise to the un-
certainty that made the status quo impact real for the LADWP.793 For the
first time, the LADWP was forced to accept reduced water allocations for
the benefit of the environment, and it could no longer be certain that it
would receive its full allocation of water from the Mono Lake tributaries.794
This uncertainty was magnified when the matter was consolidated in
Judge Finney’s court.795 Now, there was both incentive to act in the face
of uncertainty and ongoing court oversight. If the parties did not act, the
court would, and it ultimately did when it issued a decree to the SWRCB
to apply both the public trust doctrine and the holding from the trout cases
to the LADWP’s allocation license.796
The Mono Lake case also suggests that ongoing court oversight and
time, in conjunction with uncertainty, may be more essential to destabi-
lizing litigation than a court ordered negotiation.797 It is interesting to
note that Judge Finney did not order the parties to negotiate a remedy.
Rather, he ordered the SWRCB to implement the National Audubon and
CalTrout I decisions by balancing the public trust interest with the water
needs of the LADWP and the minimum stream flow needs of the trout
populations.798 To support this decision-making process, the SWRCB com-
menced a three to four year study followed by extensive permit hearings.799
The court maintained oversight over the process pending the SWRCB’s
final decision.800 The court’s order left the LADWP in a state of uncertainty,
and it could no longer depend on the outcome of the water allocation pro-
cess.801 Ongoing court oversight ensured that the parties would not relapse
to the status quo.802 In light of this uncertainty, the LADWP entered into
protracted negotiations with the Mono Lake Committee.803 The outcome
of the negotiation included agreed upon lake levels and restoration of the
Mono Lake ecosystem, a changed water use and acquisition paradigm
793 See supra notes 410–15, 526–30 and accompanying text.
794 See supra note 424 and accompanying text.
795 HART, supra note 4, at 130.
796 See supra note 623 and accompanying text.
797 See supra notes 631–33, 647 and accompanying text.
798 See supra notes 621–23 and accompanying text.
799 See supra note 624 and accompanying text.
800 See supra notes 631–33, 647 and accompanying text.
801 See supra notes 625–28 and accompanying text.
802 See supra notes 628–34 and accompanying text.
803 See supra notes 631–33, 647 and accompanying text.
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that relied extensively on conservation and re-use, and the acceptance of
new natural system values incorporated in California’s water allocation
system.804 This outcome was essentially negotiated outside the courtroom
while the SWRCB prepared its documentation and commenced the
LADWP permit hearing.805 And, while the Court or the SWRCB could
have squelched the agreement, it is noteworthy that the parties were not
ordered to negotiate a resolution. Rather, it was the uncertainty, the
knowledge that the status quo was no longer possible (status quo effect),
with an uncertain future (veil effect), that pushed the LADWP to the
negotiating table.
D. Flexible Remedy—A Necessity for Ecosystem Restoration
Ecosystems are complex systems and restoring an ecosystem
requires working across large landscapes in the face of scientific uncer-
tainty.806 Given that ecosystem science and management of complex sys-
tems is uncertain, a degree of policy flexibility is required as scenarios are
tested and accepted or rejected.807 Decisions must be amenable to modifi-
cation as “new scientific knowledge reveals that the previously established
plan was misguided, is deficient, or needs to be adjusted.”808
Ecosystem restoration presents “metaproblems” intermingling both
human and natural systems and reaches across a multitude of stake-
holders, some of whom, like the Mono Lake Committee, have a vested in-
terest in healthy ecosystems.809 These stakeholders are highly diverse and
fragmented.810 Yet, “no one organization, even in the case of the least
complex . . . ecosystems, can solve the problems of ecosystem management
unilaterally.”811 Nor is there necessarily equal political power among stake-
holders or agreement about the need for or nature of restoration.812 Thus,
it appears that successful ecosystem restoration requires collaborative,
804 See supra note 691 and accompanying text. This was a complex and flexible remedy
befitting of the complex ecosystem surrounding Mono Lake.
805 See supra notes 708–10 and accompanying text.
806 See supra note 634 and accompanying text.
807 See supra note 634 and accompanying text.
808 Doyle, supra note 634, at xiii.
809 Frances Westley, Governing Design: The Management of Social Systems and Ecosystems
Management, in BARRIERS AND BRIDGES: TO THE RENEWAL OF ECOSYSTEMS AND INSTITU-
TIONS 391, 406–07 (Lance Gunderson, C.S. Holling & Stephen S. Light eds., 1995).
810 Id. at 407.
811 Id.
812 See id.
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flexible decision-making, in a process designed to give meaningful voice
to divergent stakeholders, that has public support, and provides a mech-
anism for resolving disputes amongst stakeholders.813
As ecosystems go, one might argue that Mono Lake restoration was
far less complex than restoring the Everglades or the Great Lakes ecosys-
tems. But, even in Mono Lake, it was recognized that ecosystem restoration
required managing the interaction of multiple systems and identifying
appropriate water levels for trout and lake levels for brine shrimp and
protected nesting areas.814 Added to this complexity was the need to find
a replacement water supply or to reduce water needs in Los Angeles.815
And, on top of this complexity, the existing California water appropriation
structure, as managed by the SWRCB, did not recognize the need for resto-
ration, nor was its decision-making process designed to address restoration
challenges or incorporate collaborative decision-making.816
And, although the Mono Lake Committee went to court to rectify
an environmental wrong, it unwittingly used the flexible remedy of de-
stabilizing litigation to help restore the Mono Lake ecosystem.817 It used
the court not only to give voice to its claimed wrong, but also to establish
standing for its voice on behalf of the ecosystem and to increase its political
power–a necessity for negotiation of the flexible remedy.818 The Mono Lake
Committee, together with the City of Los Angeles and the LADWP, used
the time and uncertainty created by the court’s decision to explore alter-
nate water sources and restoration scenarios while the court provided the
oversight necessary to keep the parties at the table.819 Thus, Mono Lake
serves as an illustration of how an SMO might strategically use the flex-
ible remedy of destabilizing litigation as a political resource to promote
the structural change necessary for successful ecosystem restoration.
CONCLUSION
As this case study of the Mono Lake restoration indicates, the use
of litigation to protect ecosystems can be an important and effective tool.
To better understand the effectiveness of that tool, however, requires a
813 See id. at 406; Doyle, supra note 634, at 294–98.
814 See CAL. STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., supra note 663, at S-1, S-11.
815 See supra notes 444–46 and accompanying text.
816 See supra notes 150–52 and accompanying text.
817 Karkkainen, supra note 28, at 815.
818 See supra notes 493–96 and accompanying text.
819 See supra notes 477–80 and accompanying text.
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broader understanding of the interrelationship between Sabel and Simon’s
destabilization theory and social movement theory in practice.
Recently, a colleague, an environmental litigator, bemoaned the
fact that the day of “environmental change litigation” is gone, a view shared
in part by Professor Tarlock in his much discussed article The Future of
Environmental “Rule of Law” Litigation.820 Indeed, Tarlock suggests that
the role of litigation in improving environmental performance is limited
because “environmental lawyers may have thought Unger [and destabi-
lization] but they have litigated H.L.A. Hart,”821 and because environ-
mental law is now a mature area of law that relies heavily on collaborative
decision-making which is ill-suited to a rule-of-law approach to litigation.822
But, this argument assumes that we must continue to operate
within present legal constructs. And, while Tarlock and others recognize
that the complex ecosystem challenges we face call for new collaborative
approaches to environmental decision-making based on a claim of right
to shared environmental resources, and operating within complex human
and natural systems, they do not see a role for law or litigation in fostering
change.823 They have, as Scheingold suggests, approached the law from
a conventional perspective and not as reform lawyers.824 But, the lessons
from Mono Lake tell another story. They suggest that the strategic use of
litigation by SMOs and reform lawyers can provide the tools and frame-
work necessary to protect ecosystems and the services they provide to
human well-being.
820 See A. Dan Tarlock, The Future of “Rule of Law” Litigation and There Is One, 19 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 611 (2002); Tarlock (2000), supra note 161, at 237.
821 Tarlock (2000), supra note 161, at 252. Tarlock describes how Unger advocated a non-
formal, destabilizing approach, but because “environmentalism was perceived as a legiti-
mate and non-radical . . . goal,” environmental lawyers used the more formal method
advocated by H.L.A. Hart. Id.
822 See id. at 255–56.
823 See id. at 242.
824 See supra notes 251–53 and accompanying text.
